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Abstract 
This study investigates how the aesthetic concept of Stimmung [‘mood’ or 
‘attunement’] informs the affective and experiential dimension of the reading process 
through the lens of modern philosophy and literature. It seeks to establish ‘mood’ as 
a key concept in literary theory and to outline the modes and articulations of this 
aesthetic phenomenon as an integral part of the modern discourse on existentialism 
and aesthetics. Modernity, I propose, fundamentally redefined Stimmung as an 
intersubjective phenomenon, and has sparked a sustained exploration of this concept 
in pivotal philosophical and literary texts of the modern age. 
The study first examines the conceptual history of this term and its musical 
origin to then focus on Martin Heidegger’s redefinition of attunement as a crucial 
aspect of his ontology. From these considerations, a phenomenological theory of 
Stimmung in literature is developed, in which the reading process is defined through 
the attunement between text and reader. I subsequently further refine this notion by 
analysing the central role of Stimmung in the narrative fiction of three key authors of 
modern literature: Fyodor Dostoevsky, Samuel Beckett and Thomas Bernhard. What 
these readings demonstrate is a significant shift towards an aesthetic of intensity and 
immediacy, in which the experience of the reading process takes centre stage. 
Stimmung as an attunement between text and reader uncovers the dynamic 
relationality of aesthetic reception, and is inextricably connected to dominant modes 
of conceptualising existence and experience in the modern age. Ultimately, I 
demonstrate how the specific modern configuration of Stimmung answers to a sense of 
crisis and vicissitude that aesthetic modernity has transformed into a mood in its own 
right. 
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Gestehn wir es, ich schreibe über Stimmungen, indem ich eben 
jetzt gestimmt bin; und es ist ein Glück, daß ich gerade zum 
Beschreibe[n] der Stimmungen gestimmt bin. 
      Nietzsche, ‘Ueber Stimmungen’ 
 
 
[Let us admit that I am writing on moods because right now I 
am in a mood, and it is a good thing that I am just in the mood 
to give a description of moods. 
Nietzsche, ‘On Mood’] 
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Preamble 
In 1864, a young Friedrich Nietzsche ponders his struggle to decide on a theme for 
his writing: 
Man vergegenwärtige sich, wie ich am Abende des erste[n] Ostertages in einen Schlafrock 
eingehüllt zu Hause sitze; draußen regnet es fein; niemand ist sonst im Zimmer. Ich starre 
lang auf das vor mir liegende weiß[e] Papier, die Feder in der Hand, ärgerlich über die wirre 
Menge von Stoffen, Ereignissen und Gedanken, die alle niedergeschriebe[n] zu werden 
verlangen; und manche verlangen es sehr stürmisch, da sie noch jung und gährend wie Most 
sind; dagegen sträubt sich aber mancher alte, ausgereifte, geklärte Gedanke, wie ein alter 
Herr, der mit zweideutigem Blick die Bestrebungen der jungen Welt mißt. Sagen wir es 
offen, unsre Gemühtsverfassung ist durch den Streit jener alten und jungen Welt bestimmt, 
und wir nennen die jedesmalige Lage des Streites Stimmung oder auch, etwas verächtlich, 
Laune1. 
[Imagine me on the evening of the first day of Easter, sitting at home wrapped in my dressing 
gown: outside a fine rain is falling; no one else is in the room. I stare for a long time at the 
white paper lying in front of me, pen in hand, angered by the confused crowd of themes, 
events, and thoughts all demanding to be written down; and a number of them demand it in 
a very stormy way, because they are still young and in ferment, like must [new wine], while a 
number of old, mature, settled thoughts resist, like an old gentleman gauging the efforts of the 
world of youth with an equivocal glance. Let us say this plainly: our frame of mind is 
determined by the struggle of the old with the young world; and we call the state of the 
struggle at each moment ‘mood,’ or else, somewhat contemptuously, ‘whim’2.] 
This self-reflexive passage addresses the circumstances, and difficulties, of its own 
writing. Where is one to begin when myriad ideas are present in one’s mind at the 
same time, asks Nietzsche. Old and new impressions, ideas and thoughts come to 
mind as he sits down to write, and where ‘old’ and ‘new’ collide something Nietzsche 
calls ‘Stimmung’ [‘mood’ or ‘attunement’] emerges. The moods of one’s daily 
existence, he suggests, grow out of the tension between that which is familiar and that 
which is new, but they are often discarded as being mere ‘whim’ [Laune] since they 
are considered as being rather mundane. Since Nietzsche cannot settle on either an 
‘old’ or ‘new’ idea, he decides to address the mode of writing itself: the state of being 
in a mood that is, by his definition, indicative of the relationship and tension between 
various, temporally disparate impressions in his mind. 
                                                            
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Ueber Stimmungen’, in Frühe Schriften, Vol. 2, Jugendschriften 1861-1864, ed. by 
Hans Joachim Mette (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1994), pp. 406-8 (p. 406). 
2 Nietzsche qtd. in Stanley Corngold, ‘Nietzsche’s Moods’, Studies in Romanticism, Vol. 29, No. 1, 
Nietzsche and Romanticism (1990), 67-90 (pp. 69f.). 
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 In his short prose text ‘Ueber Stimmungen’, Nietzsche thus gives the term 
‘mood’ a decidedly temporal dimension: it is the mutual consciousness of past, 
present and future in whose field of tension mood arises. That which has been, that 
which is and that which is to be all lay claim to and forge the ‘Stimmung’ arising in 
the mind of the writer. Mood becomes the locus of an encounter with a perpetual 
sense of novelty as Nietzsche further elucidates that moods never repeat themselves 
but are always new: ‘keine einzige gleicht einer andern genau, sondern jede ist 
unergründlich jung und die Geburt des Augenblicks’3 [‘no single one is exactly like 
any other one, but each is unfathomably young and the offspring of the moment’4]. 
To Nietzsche, Stimmung thereby becomes the locus of a perpetual modernity of 
experience. Every mood he enters is unprecedented as it arises out of the tension 
between novelty and past. 
 As he describes the phenomenology of a moment-to-moment experience of 
affect, Nietzsche also tries to create an aesthetic mood in its own right in this short 
essay: opening the text by prompting the reader to imagine the physical 
circumstances he is writing in, the essay aims to envelop the reader in a similar 
mood. It attempts to make the author’s mood accessible by evoking a material 
presence through the parameters of space, time of day and weather. Not only does 
mood thus become a pivotal aspect of everyday experience; it is also conceptualised 
as a central element of writing, which is made communicable to the reader through 
textual means. 
 This short text summarises a number of key components of how the concept 
of Stimmung manifests itself in the literature as well as in aesthetic and philosophical 
discourses of modernity, and it sets the scene for the work of this study. Stimmung has 
recently resurfaced in a number of scholarly explorations of aesthetic affect – which I 
will engage with in the pages to follow – putting the question of mood on the map of 
emerging research on ways of conceptualising art and modes of affective aesthetic 
reception. In this study, I aim to further investigate this phenomenon’s far-reaching 
influence on modern aesthetics and its crucial relationship with the concepts of the 
self that are emblematic of modernity. Ultimately, I will demonstrate that the re-
positing of the question of Stimmung and aesthetic modernity are inextricably 
                                                            
3 Nietzsche, ‘Ueber Stimmungen’, p. 408. 
4 Nietzsche qtd. in Corngold, ‘Nietzsche’s Moods’, p. 71. 
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connected and marked by an experiential ‘comorbidity’ that is constitutive for the 
notion of modernity itself as this phenomenon produces a pressing need to negotiate 
forms of attunement. I aim to show that Stimmung can make a principal contribution 
to the understanding of modern aesthetics and philosophy as it permeates the 
modern self-understanding of the subject as well as the dominant modes of receiving 
and understanding art that modernity has produced. The focus of this study will be 
directed at the philosophical discourse on Stimmung and at the ways in which three 
eminent authors of modern literature, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Samuel Beckett and 
Thomas Bernhard, negotiate the question of mood in their narrative fiction. By 
examining the intersection of individual consciousness and affect with the world and 
with others – as well as the modes of unison and dissonance that spring from this 
relationship – in the works of these three writers, I will outline the philosophical 
modes of Stimmung that have shaped our present-day understanding of literary fiction 
and aesthetic affect. 
 8 
 
Chapter 1 
Stimmung and Modernity: Theoretical Explorations 
I. Conceptual History 
The German noun ‘Stimmung’ carries multiple connotations that inform its usage as 
an aesthetic concept: firstly, it describes psychological ‘mood’, both that of an 
individual and of a group; secondly, it refers to ‘atmosphere’ as an affectively charged 
sense of a place and situatedness; and, thirdly, it denotes the tuning of instruments 
through its etymological kinship with the verb ‘stimmen’ (which translates both as 
‘tuning’ and as ‘being correct’) and the noun ‘Stimme’ [‘voice’]. Through the 
intersection of these semantic fields in one term, the word ‘Stimmung’ may well be 
‘untranslatable’1, at least in the Anglophone context. ‘Mood’, ‘humour’ and 
‘attunement’ are perhaps the closest English equivalents to it, although none of them 
encompass all three elements of meaning simultaneously present in the German, that 
is the affective, spatial and musical dimensions. As an aesthetic concept, Stimmung 
addresses the elusive ‘sweet spot’ between subject and other, between individual and 
group, that allows for a transmission of affect and for different people to have similar 
forms of experience, psychologically and aesthetically. As the short essay by 
Nietzsche which I have discussed above exemplifies, a pivotal notion silently 
underlying discourses on mood is that it makes aesthetic impressions communicable 
and liberates them from the confinement of subjectivism as it allows for readers, 
viewers and listeners to encounter pieces of art in a way that suggests a shared or 
related form of experience. 
The musical dimension of Stimmung indicates this element of relationality: 
musical tuning aims to first bring elements together that are initially marked by 
difference. The Oxford Dictionary of Music defines tuning as the ‘[a]djustment of pitch in 
any instrument so that it corresponds to accepted norm’2, thus suggesting a notion of 
                                                            
1 Leo Spitzer, Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony: Prolegomena to an Interpretation of the Word 
‘Stimmung’, ed. by Anna Granville Hatcher (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), p. 5. 
2 Michael Kennedy and Joyce Bourne Kennedy, ‘tuning’, in The Oxford Dictionary of Music, ed. by Tim 
Rutherford-Johnson (Oxford University Press, 2012), <http://0-www.oxfordreference.com. 
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interdependence that is structured through an adherence to normativity. Initially, 
tuning applies to the elements constituting an instrument: the strings of a violin or 
guitar must be tuned to a given standard and attuned to one another as a preparatory 
action for playing music. Then, different instruments playing together must be 
attuned to one another to establish a harmonious relationship. Through the process 
of musical attunement, difference is thus not erased but integrated into a connection 
of mutual dependence whereby the different elements are brought into a relationship 
marked by a preconfigured sense of consonance and harmony. 
 In his important study Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony: Prolegomena 
to an Interpretation of the Word ‘Stimmung’ (1944/5), the Austrian philologist Leo Spitzer 
traces the concept of musical ‘Stimmung’ back to the ancient Greek idea of world 
harmony and, by extension, to the Christian tradition. Spitzer sees the conceptual 
origin of attunement in Pythagorean philosophy, where a natural ‘world harmony’, 
metaphorically derived from musical harmony, is pursued as an aesthetic and 
philosophical ideal that was later on carried forth into Christian theology. In this 
context, Augustine’s writings shifted the focus from an all-encompassing 
transcendent harmony to an inner-worldly, phenomenologically significant form of 
attunement3. According to Spitzer, the pervasive idea of world harmony dominated 
European theological and philosophical discourses until it started to erode and was 
eventually repealed after the Renaissance period. Although Spitzer hints a 
connection with the process of secularisation and the development of modern 
European philosophy, his study closes by emphasising the need for further research 
on the ways in which the concept of Stimmung was adapted and transformed in the 
age of modernity: 
[T]he death of this concept cannot be attributed to Protestantism as such—as one might be 
tempted to assume from Novalis’ Christenheit oder Europa—but only to the destructive process 
of ‘demusicalization’ and secularization, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries […]. How 
this process is connected, in turn, with Calvinism and Cartesianism, with the growth of 
analytical rationalism and the segmentary, fragmentary, materialistic, and positivistic view of 
the world—all this would have to be shown in another study. An inquiry into this era of 
disintegration would put into relief once more the ancient and Christian tradition of world 
harmony, that is, the spiritual and intellectual background on which alone a future linguistic 
and semantic interpretation of the word Stimmung itself can be built4. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/view/10.1093/acref/9780199578108.001.0001/acref-9780199578 108-e-
9315> [accessed 2 April 2017]. 
3 Cf. Spitzer, Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony, pp. 8; 19-33. 
4 Ibid., p. 138. 
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The crucial turn in the conceptual framework revolving around the term Stimmung 
which Spitzer hints at coincides temporally with the outset of modernity and its far-
reaching impact on societal and political realities, ways of living and philosophical 
and aesthetic paradigms. 
One of the most common, and at the same time most debated terms in recent 
scholarship, modernity has been used to designate a number of different phenomena: 
historically speaking, it addresses the consequential impact of secularisation, 
technological progress and the emergence of new forms of governance and 
capitalism in Europe from the Enlightenment period onwards, and the vicissitudes of 
the circumstances of social and private life resulting from these manifold 
transformations. From a philosophical point of view, modernity is very much 
associated with wide-ranging paradigm shifts affecting discourses on human 
existence, politics and aesthetics, and is often fashioned in an antithetical relationship 
to antiquity5. In his influential book All That Is Solid Melts into Air (1982), Marshall 
Berman defines modernity first and foremost as a mode of experience marked by 
transformation, change and the absence of stable points of reference and meaning. 
This ‘maelstrom of modern life’6 is engendered by the ongoing vicissitude of world-
historical processes from the sixteenth century onwards, which generated a sense of 
disintegration that, according to Zygmunt Bauman, renders modernity an age 
marked by an increasing sense of fluidity7. 
However, the concept of modernity as defined through a single radical break 
with the past has become subject to criticism from prominent scholars such as 
Fredric Jameson and Arjun Appadurai, who argue against the notion of a singular 
historical moment that propelled the world into a state of modernity8. Jameson, 
conversely, argues that rather than a historical fact, modernity is a ‘narrative 
category’9 that has led to the creation of the trope of the modern as an 
epistemological and historiographic instrument. Taking these qualifications into 
account, for the purpose of this study I understand modernity as a dominant mode of 
                                                            
5 Cf. Fredric Jameson, A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present (London and New York: 
Verso, 2002), p. 17. 
6 Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity (London and New York: 
Verso, 2010), p. 16. 
7 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2000), p. 6. 
8 Cf. Jameson, A Singular Modernity, pp. 24-30; Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of 
Globalization (London and Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 2f. 
9 Jameson, A Singular Modernity, p. 40. 
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thinking about experience, existence and the notion of the ‘present’ that has shaped 
in particular European philosophical thinking and aesthetic production from the 
post-Renaissance age onwards. 
Coining the term in his 1864 essay ‘The Painter of Modern Life’, Charles 
Baudelaire laid the foundation for disseminating this mode of experience. He therein 
states: ‘La modernité, c’est le transitoire, le fugitif, le contingent, la moitié de l’art, 
dont l’autre moitié est l’éternel et l’immuable’10 [‘Modernity is the transient, the 
fleeting, the contingent; it is one half of art, the other being the eternal and the 
immovable’11]. Baudelaire’s poetic response to the urban reality of nineteenth-
century Paris constitutes one of the first instantiations of an aesthetic that would 
become constitutive for and emblematic of modernity and which places experience, 
space and contingency front and centre. Modernity thus becomes the self-defined 
birthplace of a new aesthetic that grows out of a mode of experience shaped by 
instantaneity and presence, one I argue is inextricably connected to Stimmung: where 
the notion of a world harmony has been declared as lost, the moment-to-moment 
attunement of experience becomes the new focal point of philosophy and aesthetics. 
As Darío Gonzáles points out, mood’s capacity to create a unity of affective 
experience that goes beyond the subject takes on a particularly significance in the 
context of modernity: 
As in earlier phases of the German aesthetic tradition, Stimmung seems to designate a non-
reducible meaning that can become perceptible under the condition of a unifying vision. 
What seems to constitute a new turning point in the interpretation of the phenomenon, 
however, is the increasing awareness of the necessity of that kind of vision in the modern 
world12. 
The development of the modern subject that is commonly traced back to the 
philosophy of René Descartes13 constitutes an ‘obstacle’ to existential and artistic 
attunement: if there is such a thing as a subjective, interior core of being that is 
separate from the world, attunement becomes a secondary process that connects a 
primary subject of cognition and experience, the locus of the Cartesian ‘cogito’, to a 
                                                            
10 Charles Baudelaire, ‘Le Peintre de la vie moderne’, in Œvres Complètes (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1980), 
pp. 790-815 (p. 797). 
11 Charles Baudelaire, ‘The Painter of Modern Life’, in Selected Writings on Art and Literature, trans. P.E. 
Charvet (London et al.: Penguin, 1992), pp. 390-435 (p. 403). 
12 Darío Gonzáles, ‘Mood/Attunement’, in German Aesthetics: Fundamental Concepts from Baumgarten to 
Adorno, ed. by J. D. Mininger and Jason Michael Peck (London and New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2016), pp. 188-95 (p. 193). 
13 Cf. Jameson, A Singular Modernity, pp. 42f. 
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contingent world. The emergence of modern individualism and subjectivity renders 
attunement not a given state of affairs, as it was for the Pythagoreans, but an 
unsolved problem. In line with Gonzáles’s position, I thus suggest that the 
disjunctive, ever-changing experience of the modern world and its emphasis on the 
individual subject render the question of Stimmung even more pressing than it had 
previously been. In other words, through the advent of modernity – here understood 
as an epistemological category – the question of attunement becomes a pivotal 
problem in aesthetics as well as the philosophical discourse on affect and the subject. 
David E. Wellbery’s comprehensive article on the history and development of 
the aesthetic concept of Stimmung in the recently published encyclopaedia Ästhetische 
Grundbegriffe: Historisches Wörterbuch in sieben Bänden (2000-5) outlines the most 
prominent developments in response to this question of attunement within the 
modern context. Wellbery’s summary of the evolution of the aesthetic concept of 
Stimmung departs from the sixteenth century, the historical point where Spitzer’s 
study concludes. For the purpose of embedding my analysis of this phenomenon in 
its historical context, I will briefly summarise the most pertinent philosophical and 
aesthetic positions on mood Wellbery’s essay comprises. 
In the German-speaking context, the word Stimmung, according to Wellbery, 
had been in use in the musical sense of its meaning since the sixteenth century, while 
the aesthetic concept of the same name emerged in the late eighteenth century and 
derived from the musical meaning by metaphorically applying the musical usage of 
the term to aesthetic theory14. While the term was initially free of reference to 
subjective experience, it subsequently underwent a successive process of 
‘subjectivisation’. Immanuel Kant’s use of the term in Die Kritik der reinen Urteilskraft 
(1790) first transferred it into the realm of aesthetic experience as Kant finds that 
aesthetic judgments can only be communicated between individuals through the 
attunement of their dispositions. In Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen (1794), 
Friedrich Schiller uses the concept of aesthetic Stimmung to describe an absence of 
‘Bestimmung’ [‘determination’] through the faculties of reason and feeling which 
results in a state of artistic freedom and potentiality15. 
                                                            
14 Cf. David E. Wellbery, ‘Stimmung’, in Ästhetische Grundbegriffe: Historisches Wörterbuch in sieben Bänden, 
Band 5: Postmoderne – Synästhesie, ed. by Karlheinz Barck et al. (Stuttgart and Weimar: Verlag J.B. 
Metzler, 2003), pp. 703-33 (pp. 706f.). 
15 Cf. ibid., pp. 708-10. 
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Throughout the nineteenth century, particularly within the context of 
German Idealism, the meaning of the term was shifted more and more towards the 
description of subjective and individual states of mind. In the writings of Wilhelm 
Dilthey, Friedrich Schlegel and G.W.F. Hegel, Stimmung is interpreted as the 
innermost form of subjective experience16. According to Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s 
aesthetic theory, then, the aesthetic process transfers the artist’s subjective mood to 
the recipient. In Wellbery’s words, this semantic shift renders mood as the main 
aspect of what is communicated in art: ‘die Stimmung ist zum Inhalt der Mitteilung 
geworden, nur ist die Stimmung kein Inhalt, sondern die Bewegungsform der 
eigensten Subjektivität des Künstlers als Selbsttätigkeit’17 [‘mood itself has become 
the content of the message, except that mood is not a form of content, but an 
autonomous form of movement of the artist’s innermost subjectivity’ (my 
translation)]. In this account, literature thus needs to bridge the gap between 
subjectivity and language in order to make the moods experienced by the artist 
communicable. 
 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the aesthetic discourse on mood 
gradually started to move beyond the notion of Stimmung as an expression of 
subjectivity: questioning the notion of the ‘innermost’ self, Hugo von Hoffmansthal 
emphasised the central role mood plays in aesthetics, describing the evocation 
thereof as art’s main objective. Aesthetic attunement, Hoffmansthal further argues, is 
brought into being through the ways in which literature physically affects the body 
and language18. From here, Wellbery moves on the theory of Stimmung Martin 
Heidegger developed in the first half of the twentieth century, which is considered a 
pivotal turning point for the development of the concept in philosophy and 
aesthetics. Heidegger’s philosophy eliminates the distinction between exteriority and 
interiority and conceptualises Stimmung not as expression of the innermost self, but as 
a way of embedding the subject position within a transsubjective structure of affect19. 
 Wellbery concludes that the different inflections that have been applied to the 
term Stimmung and the diverging concepts of its role in the aesthetic process indicate 
that there is no such thing as an essential, trans-historic meaning of the term; instead, 
                                                            
16 Cf. ibid., p. 713. 
17 Ibid., p. 715. 
18 Cf. ibid., p. 717. 
19 Cf. ibid., pp. 724-8. 
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he proposes that the development of the concept showcases to what extent its 
variations and inflections are historically and culturally contingent. In keeping with 
this notion, in the following chapters my analysis of the modes of Stimmung in the 
works under scrutiny will be framed through their historic contingency and 
situatedness. At the same time, my analysis of the modern configurations of Stimmung 
will be informed by the conviction that the question of attunement becomes 
particularly pressing in historical moments of fracture and crisis, which is exemplified 
by the development of Heidegger’s concept of Stimmung in the inter-war years as well 
as Spitzer’s reconsideration of the dimension of harmony at the end of the Second 
World War. 
 This study, then, aims to interrogate the aesthetic and philosophical role of 
Stimmung in the context of modernity, focusing on the conception of mood and its 
relationship to subjectivity, affect, space and the notion of harmony, both in a 
musical and in an existential sense. In this context, although they are not fully 
semantically congruent, I will use the terms Stimmung, ‘attunement’ and ‘mood’ 
synonymously. To deepen my analysis of the philosophical dimension of this 
phenomenon, I will now outline Heidegger’s influential theory of Stimmung as 
developed in his landmark work Sein und Zeit (1927). Presenting the most fully-fledged 
ontological reflection on attunement, Heideggerian Stimmung is part and parcel of the 
first comprehensive attempt to structurally examine human existence as ‘Being-in-
the-world’ and thereby locates mood within a field of tension between the subject 
and the world that is, as I will demonstrate, crucial to an understanding of mood in 
the context of modernity. 
 
 
 
II. Heidegger’s Ontology of Stimmung 
Heidegger’s project of describing the nature of human existence in Sein und Zeit 
fundamentally redefines the subject through its relationship to the world. Self and 
world are therein not separate from each other; on the contrary, in Heideggerian 
theory Dasein is marked by its so-called ‘Being-in-the-world’. And yet, to Heidegger, 
Being-in-the-world is marked by a sense of struggle and dislocation, of ‘thrownness’ 
[Geworfenheit] into the world rather than a purposeful placement. While we endeavour 
to find a home in the world, a space of ‘dwelling’, our sense of belonging to the world 
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and engaging with it is thus by definition always somehow disturbed. To explore this 
relationship and the role of attunement in this framework more closely, I will outline 
a number of significant points from the fifth chapter of division I in Sein und Zeit, 
which is titled ‘Das In-Sein als solches’ [‘Being in as such’]20. 
In attempting to define the existential constitution of Dasein, that is, the 
fundamental conditions and modes of human existence, Heidegger introduces the 
concepts of Befindlichkeit – in Macquarrie and Robinson’s canonical translation 
rendered as ‘state-of-mind’21 – and Stimmung. As opposed to the commonplace 
understanding of states-of-mind and moods as psychological phenomena or 
emotions, Heidegger’s initial definition locates them among the basic conditions of 
human existence, the so-called existentials:  
Was wir ontologisch mit dem Titel Befindlichkeit anzeigen, ist ontisch das Bekannteste und 
Alltäglichste: die Stimmung, das Gestimmtsein. Vor aller Psychologie der Stimmungen, die 
zudem noch völlig brach liegt, gilt es, dieses Phänomen als fundamentales Existenzial zu 
sehen und in seiner Struktur zu umreißen22. 
[What we indicate ontologically by the term ‘state-of-mind’ is ontically the most familiar and 
everyday sort of thing: our mood, our Being-attuned. Prior to all psychology of moods, a field 
which in any case still lies fallow, it is necessary to see this phenomenon as a fundamental 
existential, and to outline its structure23.] 
As existentials, states-of-mind are thus a basic ontological feature of Being-in-the-
world, and moods are the respective ontic form they assume as everyday 
manifestations of these modes of ‘affectedness’. In contrast to emotions and feelings 
as interior states-of-mind, mood as an existential is thus given a transsubjective 
dimension. Moods ‘encompass our total perspective’24, thus taking on a much more 
fundamental and comprehensive role than emotions. And yet, Heidegger’s 
                                                            
20 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 19th edn (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006), pp. 130-80. 
21 Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (New York et al.: 
Harper Perennial, 2008), p. 172. However, Matthew Ratcliffe points out that this translation is 
inaccurate as mood circumvents the category of subjective experience; see Matthew Ratcliffe, ‘Why 
Mood Matters’, in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’, ed. by Mark A. Wrathall 
(Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 157-76 (pp. 157f.). In Being-in-the-World: A 
Commentary on Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’, Division I (Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 1991), 
Hubert L. Dreyfus discusses the difficulty in translating the term Befindlichkeit, suggesting ‘state-of-
mind’, ‘disposition’, ‘situatedness’, ‘where-you’re-at-ness’ and ‘affectedness’ as possible translations. 
Dreyfus ultimately prefers the term ‘affectedness’ as it indicates the mode in which Dasein is affected by 
and relates to objects and other beings in the world (p. 169). Likewise, Bruce W. Ballard translates 
Befindlichkeit as ‘affect’ and ‘situatedness’ in The Role of Mood in Heidegger’s Ontology (London and 
Lanham, NY: University of America Press, 1991), pp. 1; 7. 
22 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 134. 
23 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 172f. 
24 Ballard, The Role of Mood in Heidegger’s Ontology, p. 1. 
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exploration of Stimmung indicates that this phenomenon is related to feelings and 
emotions and that, ontologically, they all belong to ‘the different modes of state-of-
mind’25. States-of-mind, Heidegger finds, disclose ‘wie einem ist’26, i.e. how one’s 
own being appears or ‘feels’ to a person, thus being constitutive for establishing the 
initial relationship of a person to the world and to the way in which they 
conceptualise their own existence and place in the world. In this sense, they articulate 
the fundamental relationality between the subject and the world and shed a light on 
the nature of this connection, as well as on the nature of being itself: ‘a mood does 
not “discover” entities but “discloses” something about the kind of being that I am’27. 
Heidegger further argues that the sensation of being in a bad mood or ‘out of tune’ 
[verstimmt] indicates that Dasein is always already (at)tuned28: only when we feel ‘off-
tune’ do we realise that our existence is subject to an attunement that is always at the 
backdrop of our everyday activities. ‘One mood can be replaced by another’, 
contemporary philosopher Lars Svendsen thus summarises in reference to 
Heidegger, ‘but it is impossible to leave attunement altogether’29. 
 Abandoning the Cartesian notion of a primary, subjective core of being 
which then interacts with the objective world, Heidegger insists that we are always 
already contained in the world and in the circumstances of our existence, and that 
our being is thus, by implication, defined spatio-temporally. In this context, Dasein’s 
attunement is the prerequisite for the subject’s ability to establish meanings, 
intentions and actions in relation to the world. However, the term ‘world’ therein 
designates not simply the ontic environment within which Dasein exists, but also, 
more importantly, the system of references through which it relates to those entities 
surrounding it30. Heideggerian mood is then not a subjective – and in the dualist 
notion of subjectivity vs. objectivity, ‘less true’ – way of experiencing the world; 
instead it describes the fundamental and inescapable mode of being in which we find 
ourselves ‘attuned’ to the world at any given moment in time. 
                                                            
25 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 178. 
26 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 134. 
27 Steven Crowell, ‘Responsibility, Autonomy, Affectivity: A Heideggerian Approach’, in Heidegger, 
Authenticity and the Self: Themes from Division Two of ‘Being and Time’, ed. by Denis McManus (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 215-42 (p. 221). 
28 Cf. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 136. 
29 Lars Svendsen, A Philosophy of Boredom, trans. by John Irons (London: Reaction Books, 2005), p. 114. 
30 Paul Gorner, Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’: An Introduction (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), pp. 43f. 
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 The connection established here renders ‘mood’ an ambivalent phenomenon: 
on the one hand, it belongs to the self since it describes an individual’s relationship to 
the world, but on the other hand, it transcends the realm of subjectivity. Heidegger 
radically foregrounds the intersubjective potential harboured in the term Stimmung – 
which, as mentioned above, can designate both the mood of an individual and of a 
group – thus elevating it from the bias of being a merely subjective phenomenon and 
thereby rendering a philosophical discourse on it possible in the first place. In 
response to this, Michel Haar’s account of the twofold nature of mood highlights that 
‘Stimmung is […] both a property and not a property, both relative to the I and 
relative to the world. But first of all it is relative to the world’31. It connects Dasein to 
the world in the sense that it, firstly, relates it to the social world it is situated in and, 
secondly, lays bare its existential possibilities in relation to this world. Haar hints 
towards a crucial element in the nature of Stimmung as he qualifies it as ‘both a 
property and not a property’, and yet this aspect has largely been neglected by 
previous studies of Heideggerian mood: Stimmung, like most German nouns ending in 
the suffix ‘-ung’, implies a processual element. Due to this, it cannot be considered a 
property or a fixed trait that is attributed to Dasein; conversely, it signifies the 
continual process of tuning human existence, and of attuning it to the world. 
Rather than a static relationship, Heidegger’s Stimmung, then, describes a 
relational process between the subject and the world which is marked by degrees of 
consonance and dissonance, to a great extent hinging on the musical metaphor 
which the the concept is derived from. As Heidegger points out, we tend not to be 
aware of our moods, and they only make their presence felt if we feel ‘out of tune’, 
just as one tends to pay more attention to the one instrument in the orchestra that is 
out of tune rather than to the remaining ones that are not. Haar’s ontological study 
The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being (1993) calls attention 
to the intimate relationship between music and mood as he defines Stimmung as  
a unity that precedes the subject-object division; a nonverbal dimension for which music is a 
more faithful analogy than is language. […] Heidegger thinks Stimmung as a music complete 
by itself, as attunement, the accord that defines the profound coherence of being-in-the-world32. 
                                                            
31 Michel Haar, The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being, trans. by Reginald 
Lilly (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 37. 
32 Ibid., p. 40. 
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Stimmung, like music, is thus located at the stage of the pre-linguistic, and both 
Stimmung and music transcend individual emotion and ‘assail’ the individual, attuning 
it to them. In line with this notion, the German musicologist Heinrich Besseler seized 
the potential for reconceptualising music as a fundamentally mood-related 
phenomenon that is inherent in Heidegger’s notion of Stimmung and traced its origin 
in human ontology, concluding that ‘[t]he musical originally comes to us as a 
manner/melody of human existence’33. In other words, the conceptual affinity between 
music and Dasein’s relationship to the world grounds attunement in a discourse that 
is, by definition, always simultaneously aesthetic and philosophical in nature. 
 It is crucial for this project to unravel the further implications of the concept 
of an existential ‘affectedness’ with various articulations of ontic mood in order to 
outline its ontological significance. Heidegger elaborates: 
[i]n der Befindlichkeit ist das Dasein immer schon vor es selbst gebracht, es hat sich immer 
schon gefunden, nicht als wahrnehmendes Sich-vorfinden, sondern als gestimmtes 
Sichbefinden34. 
[[i]n a state-of-mind Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in 
the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the 
mood that it has35.] 
In Heidegger, Befindlichkeit thus designates how Dasein finds itself thrown into the 
world and how it negotiates that thrownness through the process of attunement: it 
describes the way in which we are, ontically, already attuned to the world rather than 
a conscious, ontological act of perceiving our existence in relation to it. Heidegger’s 
‘gestimmtes Sichbefinden’, i.e. attuned presence or state-of-being, as a way of finding 
and locating oneself, is thus implicitly and unconsciously comprised in every situation 
of life. It argues against a solipsistic idea of finding one’s ‘true’ self as a spiritual 
essence, and instead proposes a relational and spatial definition of self-disclosure. To 
find yourself, then, means to locate the self in its directedness and positioning toward 
the world, an act that thus constitutes a form of disposition. This redefinition results in 
a peculiar tension between selfhood and worldliness: if the finding of the self is 
dependent on finding a place in and attunement to the world, is an individual core of 
being, independent from the ‘outside’ world, possible at all? Can my moods, in that 
                                                            
33 Besseler qtd. in Andrew Bowie, Music, Philosophy, and Modernity (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p. 294. 
34 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 135. 
35 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 174. 
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sense, ever be my own? To identify of the locus of Stimmung, Heidegger’s rejection of 
the distinction between interiority and exteriority must be taken into account. 
 To Heidegger, the source of moods lies neither inside nor outside individual 
consciousness since they are intertwined with the fundamental state of ‘Being-in-the-
world’: 
 Die Befindlichkeit ist so wenig reflektiert, daß sie das Dasein gerade im reflexionslosen Hin- 
und Ausgegebensein an die besorgte »Welt« überfällt. Die Stimmung überfällt. Sie kommt 
weder von »Außen« noch von »Innen«, sondern steigt als Weise des In-der-Welt-seins aus 
diesem selbst auf. Damit kommen wir über eine negative Abgrenzung der Befindlichkeit 
gegen das reflektierende Erfassen des »Innern« zu einer positiven Einsicht in ihren 
Erschließungscharakter. Die Stimmung hat je schon das In-der-Welt-sein als Ganzes erschlossen und 
macht ein Sichrichten auf … allererst möglich. Das Gestimmtsein bezieht sich nicht zunächst auf 
Seelisches, ist selbst kein Zustand drinnen, der dann auf rätselhafte Weise hinausgelangt und 
auf die Dinge und Personen abfärbt. Darin zeigt sich der zweite Wesenscharakter der 
Befindlichkeit. Sie ist eine existenziale Grundart der gleichursprünglichen Erschlossenheit von Welt, 
Mitdasein und Existenz, weil diese selbst wesenhaft In-der-Welt-sein ist36.  
[States-of-mind are so far from being reflected upon, that precisely what they do is to assail 
Dasein in its unreflecting devotion to the ‘world’ with which it is concerned and on which it 
expends itself. A mood assails us. It comes neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside’, but arises 
out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being. But with the negative distinction between 
state-of-mind and the reflective apprehending of something ‘within’, we have thus reached a 
positive insight into their character as disclosure. The mood has already disclosed, in every case, 
Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something. Having 
a mood is not related to the psychical in the first instance, and it is not itself an inner 
condition which then reaches forth in an enigmatical way and puts its mark on Things and 
persons. It is in this that the second existential characteristic of states-of-mind shows itself. We 
have seen that the world, Dasein-with, and existence are equiprimordially disclosed; and a state-
of-mind is a basic existential species of their disclosedness, because this disclosedness itself is 
essentially Being-in-the-world37.] 
Moods, according to Heidegger, originate neither from within nor from without, but 
from a relationship between Dasein and world that precludes that very distinction. 
They emerge and ‘assail’ the subject out of its attunement to the world, and their 
continuous latency as an existential under normal circumstances prevents the human 
agent from consciously reflecting on their presence and origin. If the locus of mood is 
not within the self, Stimmung becomes the scene of an affective relationality with 
potentially far-reaching consequences for the ethics of attunement as it is, in 
Heidegger’s ontology, decidedly not conceptualised as being ‘owned’ by the 
individual. 
                                                            
36 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp. 136f. 
37 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 175f. 
 20 
Further, the existential ‘disclosure’ enabled by moods as it is described in the 
section quoted above does not signify a conscious realisation of the nature of Being-
in-the-world, but a disclosure in the sense of an opening up or making accessible. 
The German erschließen [‘disclose’] refers to an exploration or opening up of 
something that enables practical usage: for instance, a piece of land may be 
‘erschlossen’ to become a building site. Disclosure in the sense of such development 
indicates its more practical – as opposed to intellectual or ontological – orientation. 
Moods disclose Being-in-the-world by means of development; they develop the 
existential possibilities of Dasein at any given point in time and enable us to direct 
ourselves towards other entities by providing the framework of possible ways to relate 
to and interact with the world. Heidegger thus concludes: ‘Die Gestimmtheit der 
Befindlichkeit konstituiert existenzial die Weltoffenheit des Daseins’38 [‘Dasein’s 
openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-
mind’39]. In laying bare its existential possibilities, Stimmung as the attunement of a 
state-of-mind thereby enables Dasein’s openness to the world and its ability to engage 
with it. Matthew Ratcliffe summarises this by writing that 
 for Heidegger, mood is primordial, meaning that it is presupposed by the intelligibility of all 
explicit forms of cognition and volition. It is a condition of sense for any encounter with 
beings, whether theoretical or practical. It is thus prior to the intelligibility of all such beings 
and not reducible to them. Hence moods are not subjective or psychic phenomena but are 
instead prior to the sense of a theoretical subject-object distinction40. 
As the constitutive element between subjectivity and worldliness, Stimmung thus 
illustrates the ways in which Dasein’s notion of identity, its actions, affectedness and 
interpretations are interdependent with the system of reference that establishes the 
world. This interdependence is articulated in the dimension of attunement, which at 
the same time discloses Dasein’s ‘thrownness’. Since the notion of ‘thrownness’ 
indicates a relationship between Dasein and world that is marked by a sense of 
dislocation rather than being contained and finding a harmonious ‘home’ in the 
world, Stimmung becomes a critical requirement for human existence. 
However, in everyday life, Heidegger finds, Dasein tends to evade this 
realisation, which is why he ascribes an exceptional function to anxiety as a 
Grundstimmung [‘basic state-of-mind’]. In anxiety, Heidegger states, echoing Søren 
                                                            
38 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 137. 
39 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 176 
40 Matthew Ratcliffe, ‘Heidegger’s Attunement and the Neuropsychology of Emotion’, Phenomenology 
and Cognitive Emotion 1 (2002), 287-312 (p. 288). 
 21 
Kierkegaard’s existential philosophy41, Dasein is forced to realise its otherwise implicit 
dependence upon the world, a process which then exhibits its ownmost, ‘authentic’ 
possibilities as isolated from the social world: 
Worum sich die Angst ängstet, ist das In-der-Welt-sein selbst. In der Angst versinkt das 
umweltlich Zuhandene, überhaupt das innerweltlich Seiende. Die »Welt« vermag nichts 
mehr zu bieten, ebensowenig das Mitdasein Anderer. Die Angst benimmt so dem Dasein die 
Möglichkeit, verfallend sich aus der »Welt« und der öffentlichen Angelegenheiten zu 
verstehen. Sie wirft das Dasein auf das zurück, worum es sich ängstet, sein eigentliches In-
der-Welt-sein-können. Die Angst vereinzelt das Dasein auf sein eigenstes In-der-Welt-sein, 
das als verstehendes wesenhaft auf Möglichkeiten sich entwirft42. 
[That which anxiety is anxious about is Being-in-the-world itself. In anxiety what is 
environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, in general, do entities within-the-world. 
The ‘world’ can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with others. Anxiety thus 
takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in the terms of the 
‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein back upon 
that which it is anxious about—its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety 
individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that 
understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities43.] 
While it is important to recognise that, for Heidegger, anxiety harbours the 
possibility of authentic and ontologically self-aware being, the notion of authentic 
Dasein must not be mistaken for the idea of a ‘true’ core of being that is independent 
from the world. As a way of rethinking one’s self in relation to the world, anxiety is 
still indebted to and concerned with the world through which Dasein finds its place 
and its own existential constitution. Despite the ontologically accentuated nature of 
anxiety, it is therefore not necessarily more prevalent in human existence than the 
less conspicuous every-day moods that regulate Dasein’s continual attunement to the 
world. 
 Summarising the constitutive structures of Dasein, which he names facticity, 
being-ahead-of-oneself and being-with, Heidegger subsequently develops the term 
‘care’ [Sorge] in order to describe the totality of being. In the existential structure of 
care, past, present and future are encompassed as the three aspects that define Dasein 
at any given moment: 
Das Sein des Daseins besagt: Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-(der-Welt-) als Sein-bei 
(innerweltlich begegnendem Seienden). Dieses Sein erfüllt die Bedeutung des Titels Sorge 
[…]. Weil das In-der-Welt-sein wesenhaft Sorge ist, deshalb konnte in den voranstehenden 
Analysen das Sein bei dem Zuhandenen als Besorgen, das Sein mit dem innerweltlich 
begegnenden Mitdasein Anderer als Fürsorge gefaßt werden. Das Sein-bei… ist Besorgen, weil 
                                                            
41 Gonzáles, ‘Mood/Attunement’, p. 194. 
42 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 187. 
43 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 232. 
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es als Weise des In-Seins durch dessen Grundstruktur, die Sorge, bestimmt wird. Die Sorge 
charakterisiert nicht etwa nur Existenzialität, abgelöst von Faktizität und Verfallen, sondern 
umgreift die Einheit dieser Seinsbestimmungen44. 
[[T]he Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside 
(entities encountered within-the-world). This Being fills in the signification of the term ‘care’ 
[Sorge] […]. Because Being-in-the-world is essentially care, Being-alongside the ready-to-hand 
could be taken in our previous analyses as concern, and Being with the Dasein-with of Others 
as we encounter it within-the-world could be taken as solicitude. Being-alongside something 
is concern, because it is defined as a way of Being-in by its basic structure—care. Care does 
not characterize just existentiality, let us say, as detached from facticity and falling; on the 
contrary, it embraces the unity of these ways in which Being might be characterized45.] 
Care thus implies the temporality of being, but also the temporal nature of 
affectedness. We develop a ‘caring’ relationship to things, others and ourselves in a 
way that brings together our past experience [Faktizität], intentions, wishes and 
desires for the future [Existenzialität] and our present situation [Verfallen]. For the 
concept of Dasein, this means that the sense of self is characterised by the simultaneity 
of past, present and future that is brought into being by the temporal nature of 
existence. Likewise, the attunement of Dasein and world – which is fundamentally 
temporal and processual in nature – is regulated by the structure of care as a form of 
concern that orients Dasein towards its being with others. This fundamental 
dimension of intersubjectivity, which Heidegger places at the core of human 
existence, will constitute a cornerstone for my analysis of literary attunement in 
section IV below. 
To summarise, through Heidegger’s influential framework of Being-in-the-
world, Stimmung takes on a pivotal role in the formation of the self and its relationship 
to the world. To Heidegger, it articulates the ways in which Dasein finds itself by 
disclosing its existential possibilities with regard to the world and within the context 
of a temporal structure that underscores attunement’s processual nature. The origin 
of the pressing need for this attunement is Dasein’s fundamental ‘thrownness’ into the 
world: in the absence of a harmonious home, in Heideggerian terms, ‘dwelling’, in 
the world – as it is fashioned in Pythagorean philosophy – Dasein’s dislocated 
existence necessitates the process of Stimmung to negotiate and establish its position 
within the world. While Heidegger de-subjectifies the concept of attunement against 
the Idealist notion of interior Stimmung, his philosophical framework therefore also 
                                                            
44 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp. 192f. 
45 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 237. 
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solidifies the categorical impossibility of a Pythagorean notion of world harmony 
from a modern perspective. Importantly, from an ontological point of view, 
Verstimmung, the notion of ‘out-of-tuneness’, becomes the much more productive 
state-of-mind to Heidegger as it harbours forms of existential insight. Heidegger’s 
modern take on attunement thus revolves around an intrinsic sense of dissonance 
and displacement, which counters the concept of existential harmony through a 
fundamental sense of fracture underlying philosophical and aesthetic modernity. 
 
 
 
III. Locating Stimmung: Subject, World and Attunement  
In discussing the relationship between Stimmung and the self, I have previously raised 
the question of ownership and belonging: do our moods belong to us? Are they a 
phenomenon of the world or of the self? Dreyfus argues that in Heidegger’s ontology 
‘affectedness is not a structure of the world, but rather a structure of the there’46, an 
assertion that renders the question of ownership void. As a basic feature of our being-
in-the-world, moods are the condition of our ability to define a self and a world in 
the first place. If we thus have no ownership of our moods, do we have any influence 
on or control of them at all? Or are they the masters of our affectedness, of the way 
we find ourselves in the world and engage with it? Heidegger’s notion that mood 
‘assails’ Dasein bestows a form of agency on mood that would suggest an affirmative 
answer to the latter question. To explore this issue further, the linguistic structures 
that are used to describe and define moods can be considered as being indicative of 
the implied cultural understanding of attunement. 
Habitually, moods are referred to as something that we ‘find’ ourselves in, as 
a locus of experience into which the self enters. Charles Taylor elaborates on this 
spatial understanding of affect as he explains the Platonian notion of a unitary self:  
 The temptation to place certain thoughts and feelings in a special locus comes from the 
special nature of those thoughts and feelings. They are different from, perhaps even 
incompatible with, what we ordinarily feel. What we experience in moments of heightened 
inspiration can have this character. And today, we are still tempted by talk of special 
localizations, but of another character: we speak as a person being ‘carried away’, or ‘beside 
herself’, swept off as it were to someplace outside. In a sense, what we feel when we are in a 
towering rage seems incommensurable with what we feel when we have calmed down; the 
people and events are quite transformed in aspect. And a similar change can occur when we 
                                                            
46 Dreyfus, Being in the World, p. 170. 
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fall in or out of love. The landscape of experience changes so much that we are easily 
tempted to use images of a change of locale to describe the transition47. 
As something that contains Dasein, Stimmung is thus traditionally conceptualised in 
accordance to the binary of interior self and exterior world. According to Taylor, 
strong moods are thought to affect the self in a way that endangers the idea of its 
unity, which is why we commonly speak of them as if they are places outside the self 
rather than an integral part of the self. While Heidegger’s philosophy conceptualises 
Stimmung as being neither ‘inside’ nor ‘outside’ the subject, thus making this 
distinction obsolete, the affinity between mood and space is indicative of the ways in 
which attunement depends not only on the temporal dimension – as outlined above 
– but also on an inherent sense of spatiality. Although the idea of being ‘in a mood’ 
upholds the unitary idea of the Platonic self, the notion of moods as affective spaces 
gives them a transsubjective potential. A conception of Stimmung as a space of 
experience – rather than as a property belonging to the individual self – makes it 
possible for two people to be in the same affective locus, i.e. to be ‘in the same 
mood’. However, this notion still implies that the subjects entering into a Stimmung 
are separate, self-sufficient individuals that then encounter an ‘objective’ attunement 
as a force from ‘without’. If ‘being in the same mood’ is described as attuning oneself 
to the same experiential ‘space’, the subject upholds its primacy of existence, wherein 
Stimmung becomes a secondary existential phenomenon. The notion of individual 
experience thus prevails in this traditional account of conceptualising Stimmung. By 
developing the notion of attunement further through twentieth-century post-
structuralism, the contingency of mood on subjectivity can, conversely, be inverted to 
outline the ontological primacy of this phenomenon. 
 
 
 
Inverting Attunement 
In a recent special edition of the New Literary History focusing on the phenomenon of 
mood, Rita Felski and Susan Fraiman emphasise the potential the concept harbours 
for reconceptualising modes of thinking about the categories underlying the notion of 
attunement itself: 
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 The concept of mood […] circumvents the clunky categories often imposed on experience: 
subjective versus objective, feeling versus thinking, latent versus manifest. The field of affect 
studies is sometimes taken to task for reinforcing such dichotomies, creating a picture of affect 
as a zone of ineffable and primordial experience that is subsequently squeezed into the 
rationalist straitjacket of language. The concept of mood, for the most part, avoids such 
difficulties. Definitions of mood often emphasize its role in modulating thought, 
acknowledging a dynamic and interactive relationship between reason and emotion. Mood is 
tied up with self-understanding and shapes thinking rather than being stifled by thinking. It 
makes intellectual work possible and inflects it in subtle and less subtle ways, informing the 
questions we ask, the puzzles that intrigue us, the styles and genres of argument we are drawn 
to. Mood impinges on method48 (my emphasis). 
Rethinking mood, then, means not only to rethink epistemological binaries that have 
long shaped modern thought but also to reconsider the method which we apply in 
order to define and describe the relationship between fundamental categories such as 
those of self and world. Applying this notion to the way in which attunement is 
conceptualised can thus aid in navigating around the ‘clunky categories’ that have 
been used to structure experience in modern thought. In the following section, I will 
use this approach to develop further the concept of attunement as outlined above. 
This will entail the embedding of Heidegger’s notion of Stimmung, which was 
introduced in the previous section, more fully into the modern discourse on 
subjectivity. A more distinctive discussion of world, subject and Stimmung through the 
lens of twentieth-century existential philosophy is required, first to outline the pivotal 
significance of this philosophical concept, and secondly, to reconceptualise its 
position within the modern philosophy of the subject and recent theories of affect. 
As one of the most fundamental problems in philosophy, the question of the 
subject has been explored from different angles, leading to a multiplicity of 
philosophical stances on how it can be defined and what implications these 
definitions have for ontological, epistemological and ethical frameworks. Even on the 
most basic level, speaking of the subject is terminologically difficult. Does it equal the 
‘self, the ‘I’, one’s ‘identity’ or the ‘body’? And if not, how does it relate to these 
ideas? These questions cannot be answered in any easy or definitive fashion, and by 
far exceed the scope of this introduction. Leaning on Heidegger’s concept of Dasein 
and Gilles Deleuze’s theory of the self, I shall, however, outline a working definition 
of subject and world that will be more immediately useful for the purpose of 
conceptualising the role of attunement in the modern context. 
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 The Cartesian philosophy of the subject is often quoted as the origin of 
modern philosophy and has been, according to Dalia Judovitz, ‘instrumental in 
fashioning the viewpoint that we identify today as modern’49. Laying the foundation 
of a philosophy of the self that pits subjective interiority against objective exteriority, 
Cartesianism has created a dominant narrative of the subject that defines it through 
its spatiality and inwardness. As Charles Taylor describes it in his important study 
Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (1989), ‘[w]e think of our thoughts, 
ideas, or feelings as being “within” us, while the objects of the world which these 
mental states bear on are “without”’50. This topography of the mind constitutes a 
dichotomy of self and world that is predicated upon physicality on the one hand and 
a transcendental idea of the self on the other hand. The Cartesian subject is 
characterised by such a notion of interiority as well as by its structural unity:  
 First, dependent upon its identity to itself, the subject is defined by the content or essence—the 
intrinsic being—of this identity. Drawn around such content, the rational subject resides in a 
position of stasis, anchored as it is at the center of knowledge. Finally, the anchoring of the 
subject as such indicates a clearly defined zone of interiority: the thinking subject seeks only to 
apprehend and confirm its identity, thus rendering it immune to the difference at play outside 
of itself51. 
The still pervasive paradigm of the subject introduced by Descartes is thus grounded 
in the principles of essence, unity, stasis and interiority. The Cartesian subject is 
defined in opposition to the outside world, from which it is shut off by means of its 
static, individual essence. Although this dichotomy has largely influenced modern 
ways of conceptualising the subject and the world, Taylor points out to what degree 
this sense of the self, defined by its inwardness and in opposition to the exteriority of 
the world, has lately increasingly been viewed as a ‘historically limited mode of self-
interpretation’52 and has been encountered with a number of philosophical 
interventions. 
As outlined above, Heidegger, in turn, characterises the idea of Dasein as 
located in between what we commonly refer to as the internal and the external in the 
concept of Being-in, a phenomenon that ‘is underivable from the phenomena of 
Worldhood and the Self’, as Bruce W. Ballard states. ‘If anything’, Ballard proceeds, 
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‘the analysis of Being-in explicates human Being as the “between” of World and 
Self’53. Dasein as a ‘between’ of the Cartesian dualism of world and self is determined 
by its Being-in-the-world, but as it is defined by a twofold dependence on the world 
on the one hand and the idea of a subject on the other hand, an echo of 
Cartesianism still looms therein. The difficulty of overcoming the dualism of subject 
and world that is at the core of modern thought reflects particularly in the way in 
which critics have tried to consider more fully the theoretical implications of 
Heidegger’s concept of Stimmung. 
In his discussion of attunement and affectedness, Richard Dreyfus 
problematises the latent Cartesian idea of an independent subject he perceives as 
being present in Heidegger’s philosophy of affect. The problem arises as Dreyfus 
considers the possibility of moods that are specific to the individual: 
 Of the three aspects of being-in, affectedness, especially as manifested in individual moods, is 
the most dangerously close to Cartesianism. How can you and I be said to be open to the 
same situation if what each of us is in is threatening to me and exhilarating to you? At best 
our different moods seem to be subjective colorings projected onto a shared neutral scene. 
Worse, since the situation includes how it matters to me as one of its constitutive aspects, 
Heidegger runs the risk of making my personal situation, colored by my mood, into a private 
world cut off from and more fundamental than, the public world54. 
The primacy of subjectivity that Dreyfus describes in the Heideggerian notion of 
Stimmung leads to an irreconcilable multiplicity of experience, which renders a more 
general discourse on experience and affect insufficient. Dreyfus’s reading of 
Heidegger demonstrates to what degree the notion of the Cartesian subject is 
pervasive in and through the way we habitually think about experience and affect. 
However, the notion of attunement can be rephrased more radically through the lens 
of Gilles Deleuze’s take on the self in order to circumnavigate the affective solipsism 
Dreyfus warns of. 
Dasein, as Heidegger defines it, initially finds itself ‘thrown’ in the world and 
through the process of attunement establishes its position therein, reflecting the 
musical metaphor that this notion of attunement derives from: when tuning an 
instrument, the first operation is to identify a steady point of reference that can be 
used as a measure for the tuning process. Attunement thus requires the setting of an 
arbitrary fixed-point, which then allows for other elements to be established around 
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it. In the Cartesian model, the ‘cogito’ establishes such a fixed-point, while in 
Heideggerian philosophy, the attunement of Dasein and world itself constitutes the 
referential centre of existence and ‘makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards 
something’55. The ideas of self and world are thus relative to our attunement, an 
attunement which determines the way in which we define our selves in relation to the 
‘other’, to the ‘outside’ world. While Heidegger suggests that attunement is that 
which allows the subject to direct itself towards the world, a more radical 
reformulation already implied in Heidegger’s theory thus emerges from the concept 
of Stimmung: rather than modulating the relationship between a pre-existing world 
and subject, the continuous attunement between these two is instead precisely what 
produces the categories of subjectivity and world in the first place. 
Without explicitly relating this phenomenon to the Heideggerian concept of 
Stimmung, Deleuze’s interpretation of Kant points towards a similar definition of the 
self through a perpetual process of attunement dependent on time. ‘[T]he Self is not 
an object,’ Deleuze suggests, ‘but that to which all objects are related as to the 
continuous variation of its own successive states, and to the infinite modulation of its 
degrees at each instant’56. The term ‘modulation’ as a reference to the realm of 
sound indicates the extent to which Heidegger and Deleuze here strike a very similar 
note, so to say, in underlining the relational nature of this concept of self. Deleuze’s 
Self is thus a relative, ever evolving reference point giving meaning to the objects 
surrounding it, just as Heidegger’s Dasein relates to the world through a continuously 
processual attunement that is constitutive for Being-in-the-world. 
 In this respect, time and development play a crucial role in what is defined as 
the self. Deleuze proceeds by stating that the grammatical ‘I’ is subject to a temporal 
structure of affectedness: 
[i]f the I determines our existence as a passive self changing in time, time is the formal 
relation through which the mind affects itself, or the way we are internally affected by 
ourselves. Time can thus be defined as the Affect of the self by itself, or at least the formal 
possibility of being affected by oneself57. 
Again, Deleuze’s terminology points towards Heideggerian thought as he elaborates 
on the role of affect in generating a sense of subjectivity. In Kant’s redefinition of 
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time, which Deleuze here glosses on, the term ‘time’ does, then, not refer to a pre-
existing condition of the self but to the way in which the self relates to itself and 
affects itself, thereby constituting a structure of attunement. A similar concept of time 
is developed in Heidegger’s previously mentioned notion of Sorge [‘care’], which 
characterises the simultaneity of past, present and future in the way Dasein relates to 
itself, to the world and to others. 
Deleuze’s post-structuralist project of undermining the Cartesian notion of 
the unified subject in favour of a changeable, multi-faceted subject-position 
ultimately leads him to a renouncement of the concept of a subject in the first place. 
Together with Félix Guattari, he concludes that ‘there is no subject, only collective 
assemblages of enunciation’58. The unified, static subject is thus replaced by a 
collection, an assemblage, of subject-positions, which is over time bundled into the 
place of enunciation called ‘I’. Emphasising the processual nature of this ‘I’, Deleuze 
states, in another context, that ‘[t]here’s no subject, but a production of 
subjectivity’59. The Deleuzian ‘Self’ is thus as interdependent with the world as the 
Heideggerian Dasein, although it is decidedly less stable. Bradford Vivian rightly 
summarises Deleuze’s manner of resolving the paradigm of the interior/exterior 
binary of subjectivity by echoing Heidegger’s concept of Being-in-the-world: 
 Vis-à-vis his interpretation of Foucault, Deleuze […] identifies a very different space and 
morphology of thought than the one embodied by the self-same subject of the cogito. The 
exercise of encountering the outside is therefore an exercise by which one simultaneously 
hollows out a space for self-knowledge, self-reflection, and self-mastery. This self-knowledge, 
however, is not founded upon the identity of the thinking subject. By Deleuze’s account, the 
admonishment to ‘know thyself’ is actually a command to know one’s self in the world, as part of 
the multiplicity of the world, since one’s self cannot be separated from, but is indeed enfolded 
among, the world60. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the Cartesian distinction between the subject and 
the world was thus increasingly countered by a reconfiguration of the self that defines 
it through an originary sense of multiplicity and vicissitude. This redefinition of the 
relationship between self and world, which extends Heidegger’s existential 
philosophy, shows world and subject to be intrinsically related and dependent on one 
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another through a process of attunement that generates the production of subjectivity 
and the notion of the ‘world’ as such. 
The concept of the self emerging from this discourse thus fashions the subject 
position as the result of an attunement that takes place between the ‘I’, which is an 
acquired position rather than a unified, static locus of identity, and its surroundings. 
As this attunement is by definition an ongoing process, the twentieth-century 
discourse on the self thus redefines the subject as an ever evolving position within and 
in relation to the world that allows for meanings and intentions to develop, rather 
than as a fixed locus of subjectivity. Furthering the sense of fracture emblematic of 
the modern condition, this notion of the subject is relative to its spatio-temporal 
situational context and marked by a sense of directedness and affectedness as well as 
by a concern with itself which is constitutive not only for the possibility of any kind of 
directedness but also for the definition and identification of the subject position itself. 
In this sense, the attunement of the subject and its affectedness in time generate the 
concepts of self and world. Stimmung, in a sense derived from Heideggerian 
philosophy, is thus an ontically primary precondition for subjects to be able to 
identify a self in the first place and to then locate it within the world. Post-
structuralism thus induces an inversion of the structure of attunement as it was 
previously defined in section I, transforming it from a product of the negotiation 
between world and subject into the process that produces those very categories. 
 
 
 
IV. Conceptualising Stimmung in Literature 
The philosophical implications of Stimmung as they have been explored above are 
inextricably connected to its central role in aesthetics. Wellbery’s historical overview 
compellingly illustrates that in modern German philosophy, Stimmung was first 
established as an aesthetic concept and then transferred into the realm of existential 
philosophy. Capitalising on this significant interrelationship, I will now turn to the 
role of attunement in literature to develop an approach for reading Stimmung in the 
following chapters. 
The recent monograph Atmosphere, Mood, Stimmung: On a Hidden Potential of 
Literature (2012) by literary theorist Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, which has played an 
essential role in putting Stimmung on the map of current-day aesthetics, opens by 
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critiquing a perceived sense of stagnation in contemporary literary criticism through 
the opposition of two predominant schools of thought that have emerged in the 
course of the twentieth century: Deconstruction on the one hand and Cultural 
Studies on the other hand. Gumbrecht suggests that, since these positions 
fundamentally refute one another, literary theory remains prone to the danger of 
being stuck between two opposing viewpoints until it produces alternative ways of 
approaching literature: 
 To overcome such dangers—which have already materialized in part—we need ‘third 
positions’. The German word Stimmung […] gives form to the ‘third position’ I would like to 
advocate. In analogy to the notion of ‘reading for the plot’ that Peter Brooks set forth some 
years ago, I would like to propose that interpreters and historians of literature read with 
Stimmung in mind61. 
When Gumbrecht proposes a new approach to reading literature that is predicated 
upon the aesthetic notion of Stimmung, he simultaneously implies that critics and 
readers are always already reading ‘with Stimmung in mind’, that this phenomenon – 
which has remained in the background of literary theory for most of the past century 
– is thus a vital part of any form of aesthetic reception. He further argues that, as 
opposed to Deconstruction and Cultural Studies, both of which place the question of 
representation and representability at the centre of their analyses, an approach to 
literature that focuses on Stimmung can shift critical attention to the reading 
experience: 
 [T]he dimension of Stimmung discloses a new perspective on—and possibility for—the 
‘ontology of literature.’  […] [A]n ontology of literature that relies on concepts derived from 
the sphere of Stimmung does not place the paradigm of representation front-and-center. 
‘Reading for Stimmung’ always means paying attention to the textual dimension of the forms 
that envelop us and our bodies as a physical reality—something that can catalyze inner 
feelings without matters of representation necessarily involved62. 
Addressing the fundamental ways in which literature operates, Gumbrecht’s 
important contribution to the study of Stimmung puts mood at the core of the study of 
literature in order to account for an immediacy of the aesthetic experience that is 
often overlooked in current debates. His approach thus opens up important questions 
in relation to the school of reader-response criticism (or, in German, Rezeptionsästhetik 
and Wirkungsästhetik, respectively), theories of literary affect and cognitive poetics, 
which I shall explore further below. 
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Gumbrecht’s proposition that Stimmung is always at work in our encounter 
with a work of art is corroborated by certain aesthetic reflections by nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century philosophers and critics. Among such thinkers is Fichte, whose 
aforementioned definition of Stimmung as the transmission of the author’s affect to the 
reader by means of the literary text is a key example. The notion that art makes the 
dimension of Stimmung communicable and sets out to produce moods that envelop 
the recipient is pervasive in modern aesthetics, as exemplified in Gumbrecht’s study. 
He therein defines mood as a ‘universal category’63 that is present in any work of art 
and allows for the recipient to encounter the moods of different times and ages 
through the aesthetic process. Forms of Stimmung in literature, Gumbrecht argues, 
allow readers to access these historical moods through ‘an encounter—an 
immediacy, and an objectivity of the past-made-present’64. According to this 
position, literary texts thus evoke an objective material ‘presence of the past’ that 
enables readers to experience the specific moods of their times. 
 Works of art are thereby conceptualised as vehicles of Stimmung that preserve 
and contain moods, which then unfold in the aesthetic process and envelop the 
recipient. Michel Haar’s study of Stimmung is in line with this notion and suggests that 
moods ‘emanate’ from works of art and other objects in the world rather than from a 
place of subjectivity: 
More exactly, it is what we occupy ourselves with, what we read or watch that interests us, 
stimulates us, bores us—in short, that always produces these often changing dispositions. 
Phenomenologically speaking, Stimmung, the atmosphere, emanates from the things 
themselves and not from our subjectivity or from our bodiliness65. 
Existing aesthetic theories on Stimmung thus suggest that works of art ‘exude’ the 
moods emerging in aesthetic experience and render the reader a rather passive 
recipient of these forms of affectedness. However, the dimension of aesthetic mood 
harbours far more interactive and experiential potential than all existing previous 
studies betray. If we are indeed to grasp the full extent of the literary power of 
Stimmung, we must extend the logic further, and attend more fully to the actual 
process of reading itself. 
To this end, and by utilising Heidegger’s existential definition of Stimmung, I 
will propose a different view on the modes of attunement in the reading process. 
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Through reference to concepts from reader-response criticism, I will demonstrate to 
what extent the moods created through art correspond to the existential process of 
attunement derived from Heideggerian Stimmung in the previous section. In doing so, 
I define the reading process as being fundamentally structured through an 
attunement between the reader and textual forms of affect, which renders Stimmung a 
critical new paradigm in literary studies, one that illuminates the conditions of our 
encounter with literature and that will attend properly to its experiential, affective 
and existential functions. 
 
 
 
Transferring Stimmung to the Aesthetic Process 
Heidegger’s concepts of affectedness and attunement can make a pivotal 
contribution to the establishment of Stimmung as a constitutive element in the process 
of reading literature. As an existential of Being-in-the-world, Heidegger suggests, forms 
of affectedness permeate our experience of the world and the perception of our own 
existence. This fundamental role is reflected and exhibited in literature which, firstly, 
re-enacts and establishes forms of attunement in the aesthetic process and, secondly, 
through its capacity for fictional ‘worldmaking’66, becomes an arena for ontological 
reflection and experimentation with the notion of Stimmung. 
Fritz Kaufmann’s study ‘Die Bedeutung der künstlerischen Stimmung’ (1929) 
is the first attempt that seeks to apply Heidegger’s philosophy of Stimmung to aesthetic 
reception. Kaufmann therein proposes that concentrated, aesthetic forms of Stimmung 
enable ontological insights about the nature of existence and the originary 
attunement of Dasein that are otherwise occluded in everyday articulations of mood67. 
Furthermore, Kaufmann’s study, importantly, moves away from the dominant 
notion of an artificially pre-configured mood that is ‘transmitted’ in the aesthetic 
process. Instead of this, he suggests that genuine forms of aesthetic Stimmung emerge 
out of the process of aesthetic reception and cannot be predicted or purposefully 
induced. Kaufmann thus states: ‘Ich werde in die Stimmung versetzt, die mir das 
Werk mit-teilt’68 [‘I am put into the mood that the work of art con-veys to me’ (my 
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translation)]. Kaufmann’s particular use of the word ‘mitteilen’ [convey, transmit] 
singles out the dimension of shared affect in separating the prefix ‘mit’ [with] from 
the verb ‘teilen’ [share], thus underscoring the collaborative act between the work of art 
and the recipient. Aesthetic mood is not transmitted from a work of art onto a 
passive recipient; rather the mood that emerges is of a dialectical nature. 
Developing Kaufmann’s line of thought further, my analysis of literary 
Stimmung will add a new dimension to the discourse on aesthetic affect by 
foregrounding the mutual dependence and relationality of the moods emerging in 
the reading process. The notion of a constant negotiation between the self and the 
world and the question of how mood, as a phenomenon that connects these two, can 
be perceived and transmitted intersubjectively as part and parcel of a ‘literary 
ontology’, will be at the centre of my discussion. More specifically, rethinking literary 
mood through Heidegger’s ontology requires that we consider the act of reading as a 
process that, in some way, re-enacts the basic modes in which we find and 
conceptualise our Being-in-the-world. Our affectedness through a text and the sense 
of perceiving the ‘atmosphere’ of a fictional world predicate on the implied forms of 
ontic Being-in-the-world to which we are always already subject through the 
originary structure of existence. In that sense, Stimmung – as the condition for 
establishing a subject position and for orientating oneself in the world – is also the 
prerequisite for our ability to make sense of fiction in the first place; to use Ratcliffe’s 
words, it is constitutive for the ‘intelligibility’ of a text69. 
 Since Stimmung establishes the ground for meaning-production in literature, it 
is a crucial element for the development of an ontology of literature as Gumbrecht 
suggests it. On the first level of this ontology, the ways in which literature 
conceptualises characters in relationship to the fictional worlds they find themselves 
‘thrown into’ frequently mirror forms of Dasein’s existential self-interpretation. 
Depicting characters as attuned to the world, literature therefore commonly 
addresses the interaction of consciousness and the ‘outer world’ and negotiates 
clashes emerging between these two. By re-enacting human subjectivity, agency and 
consciousness, literature thus oftentimes implicitly or explicitly portrays Dasein’s self-
understanding in relation to its situatedness within the world, or a struggle thereof. 
What is more, in line with Kaufmann’s argument, Stanley Corngold observes that 
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the realm of the literary offers insights into ontological concerns that might be 
obscured in most contexts of ontic Dasein: 
 The point is plausible, I think, if one grasps the literary work as a world. In an exemplary 
way the human beings ‘in’ it are delivered over to that world and none other. The interpreter 
of literature who shares the existence of its ‘characters’ has the exemplary experience of what 
it is to be enthralled by a world. At the same time he maintains an interpretative distance 
from his experience. This distance permits him to grasp the fact of his thralldom to his own 
world and at the same time to reorient himself toward it. Literature thus becomes the vehicle 
of a possible authenticity. […] Poetic discourse seeks to share that articulation of moods 
which would amount to a disclosure of existence. It thus aims at Dasein’s most authentic 
disclosedness, for ‘the most primordial, and indeed most authentic, disclosedness in which 
Dasein […] can be is the truth of existence’70. 
The attunement that is always implicitly regulating Dasein’s Being-in-the-world can 
thus become more observable in literature, which then allows readers to venture into 
explorations their own thrownness (or, in Corngold, ‘thralldom’) into the world. 
Poetic discourse, which Corngold here – in reference to Heidegger’s later works on 
poetry and language – names as the ‘scene’ of ontological disclosure, signifies not 
only poetry but any kind of speaking that stems from authentic language. To 
Kaufmann and Corngold, literature thereby gains an exceptional position for 
exploring the conditions of human existence. 
 While literary fiction thus displays an inherent affinity with ontological 
reflection, the study of Stimmung in literature cannot be based on a mere application 
of Heideggerian thought to the aesthetic process. Crucially, the specifics of an 
‘aesthetic ontology’ must be taken into account and integrated into pre-existing 
discourses on aesthetic reception, the most crucial being the field of reader-response 
criticism and its inquiry into the dynamics of the reading process. The 
phenomenological study of Stimmung in literature, while inspired by the philosophical 
dimension of this concept, must develop its own modalities and analytical categories. 
 
 
 
Articulations of Stimmung 
In conceptualising the role of attunement in literature, the different articulations of 
this phenomenon in private and public contexts can shed a light on the ways in 
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which Stimmung manifests itself in fiction. According to Dreyfus, ‘mood’ as it is 
defined by Heidegger appears in at least five different forms: 
As Heidegger uses the term, mood can refer to the sensibility of an age (such as romantic), the 
culture of a company (such as aggressive), the temper of the times (such as revolutionary), as well 
as the mood in a current situation (such as the eager mood in the classroom) and, of course, 
the mood of an individual71. 
Stimmung thus articulates itself on various phenomenological levels, the most specific 
of which is the notion of individual mood, while the most extensive aspect attempts 
to grasp the sensibility of an entire historical period. Oscillating between the realm of 
the social and the private, this definition continues to render the phenomenon rather 
elusive. In another attempt to categorise the different types of Befindlichkeit, Dreyfus 
then identifies three domains:  
What Heidegger should have done, I suggest, is distinguish three types of affectedness: a 
world type (cultural sensibility); a situation or current world type (mood); and the specific 
directedness mood makes possible (affect)72. 
This distinction hinges on the degrees of pervasiveness of different forms of 
affectedness, locating Stimmung at the intersection of the levels of private and public 
experience. Cultural sensibility or the ‘mood of an age’ as a transsubjective 
phenomenon encompasses, amongst other things, the predominant opinions, 
sentiments, beliefs, social conventions and forms of artistic expression of a culture in 
a certain historical period. Mood as it is defined here, as ‘a situation or current world 
type’, constitutes a bridge between the subjective and the transsubjective. A situation 
can involve several people or only one person; regardless, the expression to be in a 
situation suggests that whoever is involved is spatially contained in a larger context, 
one that transcends individual experience. Thus becoming a spatial denominator for 
a context of meaning which contains a human being or human beings, a situation 
marks the juxtaposition of subjectivity and transsubjective affectedness. What 
Dreyfus defines as affect is then the smallest unit of Befindlichkeit, the notion of having 
a specific affective response in a given context. Dreyfus’s discussion of the different 
types of mood is thus largely quantitative as it identifies different categories of 
attunement based on their duration on the one hand and on their preponderance on 
the other hand. 
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This significant move away from Heidegger’s abstract discussion of Stimmung 
and towards a more applied study of its factual articulations makes a helpful 
contribution to describing and qualifying forms of attunement. Dreyfus further 
argues that the aforementioned levels of Stimmung are, by definition, intertwined and 
interdependent: ‘[m]y mood, while possibly at a given time mine alone, is not 
essentially private; another person in my culture could share the same mood’, he 
proposes; and further, ‘I can have only the sort of moods one can have in my culture; 
thus the public is the condition of the possibility of personal moods’73. Dreyfus’s 
proposition of an interdependence between individual and cultural moods questions 
Heidegger’s notion of the possibility of an ‘authentic’ being that is detached from 
society – in Heidegger’s terms, the Man – since the attunement of the individual is 
described as being pre-configured through cultural means. 
 I consider Dreyfus’s notion that different people can independently enter ‘the 
same’ mood questionable as I have previously outlined the spatio-temporal specificity 
and contingency of attunement; however, the cultural influence on forms of Stimmung 
that Dreyfus calls attention to rightly foregrounds attunement’s dependence on the 
world and at the same time opens up the question of the relationship between 
attunement, culture and cultural production. In view of these considerations, 
aesthetic attunement is then, by definition dependent on cultural parameters – e.g. 
the shared semiotic system it is based upon, aesthetic modes and genre conventions 
and established art forms – that pre-configure the forms of Stimmung emerging in the 
aesthetic process. To be able to critically discuss the role of mood in literature 
further, I will now outline the different articulations of Stimmung in this medium in 
correspondence to Dreyfus’s description of the types of attunement in private and 
public contexts.  
Literature has the capacity to negotiate Stimmung on several levels: on the 
most elementary level, fiction can depict characters and their forms of attunement to 
the fictional world, to other characters and to specific narrative situations and events, 
thus formulating an implicit or explicit ontology of Stimmung. On the second level of 
aesthetic affect, literature also creates a plane of attunement in the narrative act, 
through the relationship it creates with the reader, a pivotal dimension I will explore 
more fully below. Thirdly, genre and other literary conventions, as essential forms of 
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literary meaning-making, are predicated upon specific forms of Stimmung that are 
constitutive for textual understanding. For instance, in a thriller, the conventional 
mode of Stimmung stipulates that murder and suspense would be ‘in tune’ with the 
fictional world, while slapstick comedy would not be. The juxtaposition of these two 
can be used to create a sense of comic incongruity, which then produces a mood in 
its own right. Finally, every text relates to the mood of its age – what Heidegger 
describes as epochal Grundstimmung74 – by means of representation, rejection or 
negotiation. Satire, for instance, oftentimes imitates the epochal climate it is 
produced in for the sake of critiquing it, thus inverting and undermining its own 
epochal Stimmung. In addition to these aspects, literature can implicitly and explicitly 
reflect on the nature of mood, thus establishing a potential additional level of 
negotiating Stimmung in fiction.  
In the following chapters of this study, each of these levels of mood-related 
negotiation will be taken into account in tracing modernity’s concern with Stimmung 
as a foundational element of subjective, existential and aesthetic experience. Special 
attention will be paid to the depiction of modes of attunement in the medium of 
literature and to the Stimmung that is created between text and reader, while the 
question of epochal Grundstimmung will considerably inform my analysis of all three 
chosen authors since their works will be read against the backdrop of the 
epistemological category of modernity. In addition to this, the notion of genre as a 
form of convention predicated upon mood will be a recurrent aspect of enquiry. 
First, however, to clarify the conditions of literary attunement further, we should 
examine in more detail the dynamics between reader and text in the context of 
aesthetic Stimmung. 
 
 
 
Self and World, Reader and Text 
In order to bridge the gap between the philosophical theory of Stimmung outlined 
above and the study of literary forms of attunement, we can now turn to a proper 
understanding of the relationship between reader and text. Their rapport, I suggest, 
structurally corresponds to the relationship between the self and the world which I 
have already outlined above through refence to Heideggerian and Deleuzeian 
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theory. The reader-text relationship has been subject to considerable attention in the 
context of twentieth-century poetics and criticism, most compellingly in the reader-
response criticism of Stanley E. Fish and the Vienna or Konstanz schools, including 
the works of Hans Robert Jauss and Wolfgang Iser, and more recently, in the critical 
analysis of affect by scholars such as Teresa Brennan. Iser’s influential contribution 
to the field has redefined the role of the reader and elevated it from the position of a 
passive recipient to that of an active subject that is complicit in generating the 
meaning of a text. In Der implizite Leser (1972) and Der Akt des Lesens (1976), he 
introduced a new concept of textuality that shifted the critical focus from the written 
text to the process described in title of the latter, the act of reading, thus causing a 
paradigm shift that would eventually lead from New Criticism to the cognitive turn 
in literary criticism. Iser’s significant work redefined the literary text through the 
process of interaction between the reader and the text75, thus implying that the place 
of literature, which is a phenomenon generated by the convergence of reader and 
text, is outside the text and in the reader’s mind. 
  Iser’s ‘participating’ reader is constitutive for the meaning of the literary work 
since the reading experience is shaped by his participation: 
participation means that the reader is not simply called upon to ‘internalize’ the positions 
given in the text, but he is induced to make them act upon and so transform each other, as a 
result of which the aesthetic object begins to emerge76. 
At the same time, the text produces an effect on the reader, thereby constituting a 
structure of affectedness [Betroffenheit], which is, according to Iser, impossible to 
express in theoretical terms:  
Sinn als Wirkung macht betroffen, und eine solche Betroffenheit ist durch Erklärung gar 
nicht aufhebbar, sondern läßt diese eher scheitern. Wirkung kommt über die Beteiligung des 
Lesers am Texte zustande77.  
[Meaning as impact affects the reader, and such affectedness cannot be revoked through 
explanation, but instead causes the explanation itself to fail. The impact is brought into being 
through the reader’s participation in creating the text (my translation).] 
Textual meaning is thus generated through the reader’s participation in creating the 
text, and at the same time, this participation is constitutive of an emotive affectedness 
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that cannot be accounted for through reason. Iser here posits the literary work as 
something that matters to the reader and affects him due to his own complicity in 
generating its meaning in an event that is defined as the coming-to-being of the text. 
In Heideggerian terms, one could speak of a structure of ‘care’ being generated 
through the reader’s participation in the actualisation of the text. By participating in 
the process of meaning-construction, the reader is drawn into a temporal structure of 
affectedness which is marked by ‘caring’ about the text. 
 An even more radical position was developed by Stanley Fish, who 
introduced the concept of ‘affective stylistics’ as a way of describing the readerly 
contribution to textual meaning. To Fish, there is no such thing as an objective text, 
although this notion has continued to exist in the cultural consciousness as a 
‘dangerous illusion’78. Freed from the idea of being a fixed entity consisting of 
historically invariable, written signs, the literary text is thus re-conceptualised as a 
process, as an ‘event’79 only emerging and taking place when it is read. The important 
turn in the argument Fish makes is that the meaning of a text – which Iser still holds 
on to – is dismissed in favour of the dimension of experience: since semantic textual 
meaning is unstable, the experience of reading the text itself becomes its meaning80. 
The literary text is thus marked by a structural openness that allows readers to have 
different experiences of the same text as the semantic plane of meaning is replaced by 
the experiential dimension of the aesthetic process. 
 Taking Iser’s and Fish’s work as a stepping stone for a reconsideration of the 
reader-text relationship, I want to suggest a position which establishes the reader not 
as a participating subject but as the condition for the existence of any meaning while 
simultaneously dissolving the reader, as a stand in formula of the transcendental 
‘self’, into the transsubjective worldliness of Stimmung. As outlined above, the process 
of negotiation taking place between reader and text is structurally similar to the 
attunement between the self and the world. What we call the ‘reader’ shall be 
redefined as a subject position corresponding to the self as inflected through 
Heidegger and Deleuze, i.e. as an ever-evolving negotiation between the locus of the 
self and the world. In this context, the (written) text represents the world, as a 
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linguistic structure of reference that draws on a historically and culturally defined 
semiotic system, and in relation to which the reader-position is established. 
At the same time, however, literature – as a fictional way of ‘worldmaking’ – 
often problematises our implicit ontological notions of the self and of the world. 
Literature can thus be regarded as both a vehicle of (ontic) implicit cultural notions of 
the self and the world and as a ‘playground’ for ontological possibilities. This 
complicates the attunement that takes place between the reader and the text: on the 
one hand, this form of Stimmung draws on the attunement taking place between the 
self and the world as a reference point for worldmaking in the medium of fiction; it 
creates a world in accordance with the way in which we construct the physical world 
as opposed to our subjective selves. On the other hand, this very attunement can be 
explored, modified and manipulated by the literary text. I shall return to these 
possibilities and the ways in which they are implemented in the substantive 
engagements with the texts that constitute the body of my argument in the following 
three chapters of this study. 
 Despite certain similarities between what I have philosophically defined as 
the world and the fictional worlds created in literary texts, it is crucial to bear in 
mind the differences between the ways in which Dasein encounters them: the form of 
participation that the reader exerts in the text differs from her active participation in 
Being-in-the-world. She is, beyond the experiential process of meaning-making, not 
actively involved in the events depicted in the literary text, but, in most cases, 
remains an observer – although, once again, this position will be shown to be relative 
in some of the texts under discussion. Nevertheless, her relationship to the text is 
marked by the existential structure of ‘care’ as she becomes an accomplice to the 
process of generating the meaning of a text. To a certain extent, a ‘suspension of 
disbelief’, as it was famously defined by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, is required for the 
reader to become involved in what is depicted in a narrative text. Even though she 
remains an observer, she has to give herself up to the text in a certain way in order to 
engage with and ‘attune to’ it. The aim of this attunement is a form of convergence 
which, according to Iser, brings the literary work into being: ‘The convergence of 
text and reader brings the literary work into existence’81. The sense of convergence, 
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of literary meaning production, is, however, not a fixed product or a result of the 
interaction between reader and text, but an ongoing process taking place in the act of 
reading: the process of Stimmung. The sense of affectedness, of care, which Iser defines 
as – in Heidegger’s words – equiprimordial to the interaction between reader and 
text, results from a negotiation between the reading self and the literary work as it is 
constructed by the reader in the process of aesthetic attunement. 
 In this context, the reader, as a specific function of the self, is defined in 
analogy to the concept of self in the previous section. She is the ever-evolving subject-
position generated by the attunement between subjectivity and worldliness, a 
worldliness which, in the reader function of Dasein, is represented by the text. As 
Donald Hall explains, recent philosophical explorations of subjectivity have even 
conceptualised the self itself as a text: 
the textuality of the self as a system of representations has, itself, become a singularly 
important area of investigation and speculation. Thus in exploring subjectivity, we are in 
effect exploring the ‘self’ as a text, as a topic for critical analysis, both in and beyond its 
relationship to the traditional texts of literature and culture82. 
If we conceptualise the self as a text in Iser’s sense of the literary work, we arrive at a 
definition that emphasises the processual nature of the self as something that emerges 
from the negotiation of forces as described in reference to Heidegger’s attuned Dasein 
and Deleuze’s concept of inconsistent subjectivity. While the self-text analogy might 
be heuristically helpful in terms of grasping the ways in which culture inscribes itself 
in the self, I shall, however, maintain a terminological and conceptual difference 
when speaking of the ‘self’ and the ‘text’ in the analyses that will follow this 
theoretical chapter. 
 
 
 
V. Stimmung and the Literature of Modernity  
The historical view on the concept of Stimmung outlined at the beginning of this study 
underlines a pivotal caesura in the way attunement was conceptualised in aesthetics, 
which took place in the sixteenth century. Whereas the classic idea of world harmony 
dominated aesthetics from Pythagorean philosophy to the Renaissance age, the 
epoch that has been defined as modernity has established a much more unstable and 
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complicated relationship with the concept of Stimmung. However, the affinity between 
art and harmony is still very deeply ingrained in the European aesthetic tradition. 
Augustine’s declaration that harmony is at the core of art and beauty still strikes a 
chord familiar to present-day notions of the purpose of art: 
The source of pleasure in any art is harmony, which alone is responsible for the beauty and 
wholesomeness of all things. At the same time, harmony aspires to equality and unity, either 
through the similarity of even parts or through a regular progression of uneven83. 
This idea of harmony as the ultimate purpose of art has continued to inform 
discourses on aesthetics beyond the outset of modernity. In his 1899 essay ‘Die 
Stimmung als Inhalt der modernen Kunst’, the art historian Alois Riegl suggests that 
the main aim of modern art – as opposed to previous historical eras – is to create 
moods. He therefore defines modern art as ‘Stimmungskunst’84 [‘mood art’], which 
seeks to re-establish order and harmony where it is lacking in life, thus constituting 
an aesthetic corrective for the chaotic modern world85. According to Riegl, the desire 
for the lost harmonious form of Stimmung thus establishes the fundament of modern 
aesthetics86. Writing over a century later, Gumbrecht, conversely, proposes that in 
the modern age the concept of Stimmung is no longer associated with the dimension of 
harmony87. Resulting from this vacillating position of harmony in modern literature 
is a fundamental sense of instability, which reinforces my previously stated 
proposition: the question of attunement becomes ever more pressing in the age of 
modernity as this epoch fashions itself as one of radical disintegration and 
transformation, thus adding to the disorientating notion of thrownness that marks the 
human condition.  
In her book Lamentation and Modernity in Literature, Philosophy, and Culture, 
Rebecca Saunders suggests that aesthetic moods in literature and philosophy are not 
just representative of the dominant moods of modernity but also actively create and 
disseminate such moods88. Taking into account Jameson’s notion of the discourse of 
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modernity as a narrative rather than a representation of historical reality, my analysis 
of key works by Dostoevsky, Beckett and Bernhard is thus not based on the 
assumption that they mimetically represent the historical realities they were written 
in, but that those texts in themselves fashion a sense of modernity that is not merely 
descriptive; instead, they actively have contributed to the emergence of the notion of 
modernity and its cultural meaning. 
The following chapters of this study shall focus on the different articulations 
of the concept of Stimmung in European works of narrative fiction spanning from 
1864 to 1985. I have concentrated upon the genre of narrative fiction as my main 
corpus for examining the modes of Stimmung in literature since, in my view, it 
harbours the most sustained and intense relationship between the text and the 
reader. Forms of Stimmung are, beyond doubt, just as important in drama and poetry, 
but for the purpose of keeping the field of enquiry for this study as well-defined as 
possible, I will mainly confine my analysis to the narrative texts of the chosen 
authors. 
 My analysis starts with the novels of Fyodor M. Dostoevsky, whose work 
temporally coincides with Baudelaire’s inauguration of the self-aware epoch of 
modernity. Writing from the Russian ‘outsider’ perspective on the emergence of 
European modernity, his novels express a dialectical relationship with the notion of 
the modern: although they are to some degree arrested in the nostalgia of a 
Slavophile anti-modernity, they, at the same time, indicate of a strong sense of being 
propelled into the existential and aesthetic condition of the modern. From this 
relationship springs an emphasis on existential questions as well as the emergence of 
new, intense forms of aesthetic affect that would shape modern literature and which I 
will analyse through the lens of Stimmung. 
Chapter 3 shifts the focus to the narrative works of Samuel Beckett. 
Continuing and enforcing the existential perspective that is introduced in 
Dostoevsky’s works, Beckett’s early novels in particular display an overt interest in 
the question of attunement, situating it within the discourse of musical and aesthetic 
harmony as well as within the question of the modern existential condition. This 
juxtaposition of aesthetic and existential concerns creates a potential for ontological 
reflection, which, on another level, also deeply affect the relationship between the 
text and the reader. 
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 Finally, the last chapter in this overview of how Stimmung articulates itself 
within modern European fiction looks at the late narrative œuvre of Thomas 
Bernhard, an author whose works are deeply entrenched in an understanding of art 
that revolves around forms of Stimmung and affectedness. I will relate Bernhard’s 
prose to an aesthetic notion of musicality in the medium of literature that is shaped 
by the idea of attunement and will outline to what extent Bernhard’s later novels 
engender and exemplify an art theory that centres on Stimmung and significantly 
prioritises the aesthetic experience. In all my readings, what I call the experience of 
the reader will be constructed phenomenologically, on the basis of observable textual 
structures rather than based on empirical data regarding reader responses. 
Although the dimension of Stimmung plays a role in all works of art, as 
Gumbrecht has pointed out, I have focused attention here on a number of texts that 
render the structures and modes creating forms of attunement more observable and, 
in doing so, either implicitly or explicitly reflect on this fundamental aesthetic 
category. All of the three canonical authors under discussion display a distinct 
preoccupation with the question of existence in relation to the notion of modernity, 
which they pose via the issue of attunement. At the same time, the existential 
dimension of this phenomenon significantly informs their approach to aesthetic form 
and to the reading process, thus offering new ways of thinking about the nature of 
Stimmung and its existential and aesthetic dimensions. I will therefore not simply 
attempt to apply the concept of literary attunement, as I have developed it in this 
chapter, to these texts. Instead, I aim to significantly develop this concept further and 
to shed a light on its role and articulations in the context of modern fiction through 
my reading of the chosen works. Not only will I thus critically discuss the 
manifestations of the aesthetic concept of Stimmung in the context of literary 
modernity; I will also make a contribution to the scholarship on Dostoevsky, Beckett 
and Bernhard by outlining a dimension in their work that has, thus far, been largely 
overlooked.
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Chapter 2 
Stimmung in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Poetics of Modernity 
I. Introduction: Modernity and Affect 
In his excellent study Petersburg Fin de Siècle (2011), Mark D. Steinberg sheds light on 
the relationship between urban modernity and social mood in late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century Europe, detecting ‘a darkening, even despairing, public 
mood in the face of many troubling conditions’1 in fin-de-siècle Saint Petersburg. 
Describing the crammed, intense urban modernity of Tsarist Petersburg, Steinberg 
argues that the public developed an awareness of the moods that shaped social reality 
and actively integrated them into a discourse on modern life: 
Anxious talk of emotion filled the urban public sphere in Russia during these years of 
disorder, drift, and uncertainty. Questions about mood, feeling, and affect—particularly what 
was called the ‘public mood’ or ‘social mood’ (obshchestvennoe nastroenie)—became literally the 
talk of the town, concerning not only particular problems like street life or death or 
debauchery, but the very nature of modern times. This emotion talk was intensely social: 
shared, circulated, and analyzed in the periodical press and other public spaces and 
interpreted as having social location, causes, and effects. And talk about public emotions was 
itself emotional: not simply a description of the feelings of others, but an anxious, obsessive, 
even panicked part of the public mood (indeed, it helped shape that mood)2. 
Mood in urban Petersburg thus became a crucial subject matter in its own right, and 
one that deeply informed the social imagination as well as artistic production and 
reception. In this chapter I will argue that, through its dependence on urban space 
and intersubjective experience, the notion of aesthetic modernity that developed in 
the nineteenth century is fundamentally intertwined with articulations of and 
reflections on the concept of Stimmung. Modernity’s urbanity, its emphasis on the 
crowds and their coalescing, often colluding, forms of affect, were the backdrop 
against which the dominant current-day notions of mood as we know them – social, 
individual, aesthetic and existential – emerged. 
I will exemplify this primarily through reference to the works of Fyodor 
Dostoevsky (1821-81), whose novels are as deeply embedded in this modernity as 
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they are concerned with the influence it exerted on the individual in a psychological, 
social, political and spiritual sense. Dostoevsky was one of the first writers to 
recognise the fundamental interdependence of existentialist questions and forms of 
Stimmung and he thus became a key contributor to the development of a modern 
aesthetic of attunement, pioneering ways of enacting and negotiating moods that 
would shape the development of modern fiction through an emphasis on space and 
modes of affect. 
As one of the most influential novelists of early modernity, Dostoevsky 
comprehensively examined the human condition and the nature of being in his 
works, to such an extent that he is commonly considered a founding father of 
aesthetic existentialism. Walter Kaufmann considers Dostoevsky’s novella Notes from 
Underground («Записки из подполья», 1864) as ‘the best overture for existentialism 
ever written’3, while Jeff Malpas finds that ‘[f]rom a purely literary perspective, the 
key figure in the development of existentialism is not so much Kierkegaard or 
Nietzsche as Feodor Dostoevsky’4. By executing a pathological study of human 
existence on the edge of sanity and reason, Dostoevsky was simultaneously also 
intensely concerned with the effect of modernity on the human psyche. In All That Is 
Solid Melts into Air, Marshall Berman allots Dostoevsky an eminent position in the 
development of modern literature5, describing him both as an heir and aesthetic 
antipole to Baudelaire’s modernité. While Berman recognises the influence of the 
aesthetic fluidity and ‘gaseousness’6 of space and atmosphere championed by 
Baudelaire’s writing in Dostoevsky’s works, he considers the latter’s late nineteenth-
century Saint Petersburg as the underdeveloped, Eastern twin to the former’s 
dazzling modern metropolis Paris. Modernity, Berman argues, divided Dostoevsky’s 
Russia between the old capital Moscow and the superficially Westernised façade of 
Petersburg, which was founded as a new and modern capital, between the higher 
classes’ desire for European progress and modernisation and the lower classes’ 
bewilderment with their effect. According to Berman, modernity in nineteenth-
century Tsarist Russia was hence ‘something that was happening only in the most 
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jagged, halting, blatantly abortive or weirdly distorted ways’7, a notion that 
permeates Dostoevsky’s portrayals of Petersburg and of the ‘modern condition’. 
As a result, many Russian intellectuals developed anti-Western, Slavophile 
sentiments, emphasising the uniqueness of the Russian spirit in opposition to their 
Western European counterparts, as expressed in Dostoevsky’s musings in A Writer’s 
Diary («Дневник писателя», 1873-81). Nevertheless, according to Berman, the 
urban aesthetics of Dostoevsky’s texts, like Baudelaire’s, offer ‘primal modern scenes’ 
with ‘everyday encounters in the city street that are raised to first intensity […], to 
the point where they express fundamental possibilities and pitfalls, allures and 
impasses of modern life’8. Despite Dostoevsky’s own scepticism regarding Western 
modernisation, Berman therefore considers him part of the first wave of writers 
responding to the newly developed mode of experience that he calls modernity. The 
notion of intensity that Berman – and before him Alex de Jonge9 – observes in 
relation to the Russian novelist’s works will provide the point of departure for my 
analysis of Dostoevsky’s aesthetics of Stimmung as part and parcel of a modern inquiry 
into human experience that is inextricably tied up with existential concerns. The 
‘comorbidity’ of a budding existentialism and an emergent modernity in 
Dostoevsky’s œuvre points towards the ways in which the far-reaching epistemological 
paradigm shifts that modernity represents called for a re-evaluation of the conditions 
of existence and, by implication, of Stimmung that materialises in the novels. I will 
demonstrate that Dostoevsky’s preoccupation with the human condition in the 
context of modernity stylistically results in literary actualisations and explorations of 
affect and attunement, and that these elements constitute one of the most central 
elements in his writing and in the aesthetic reception thereof, while simultaneously 
setting the scene for a modern aesthetic of Stimmung that would considerably 
influence twentieth-century literature. 
 After his life-changing near-death experience and imprisonment in a labour 
camp in Siberia – which were the consequences of his involvement with the 
progressive Petrashevsky Circle – Dostoevsky entered the most prolific phase of his 
writing career in the 1860s, a decade which ‘brought to the fore nearly all the 
                                                            
7 Ibid., p. 175. 
8 Ibid., p. 229. 
9 Cf. Alex de Jonge, Dostoevsky and The Age of Intensity (London: Secker & Warburg, 1975). 
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problems with which modern man has grappled ever since’10. During this middle 
period of his artistic career, which was informed by extensive travels through Europe, 
the loss of his first wife and his brother Mikhail, gambling addiction and constant 
financial anxiety, he composed a number of what would become his most influential 
works: Notes from Underground, Crime and Punishment («Преступление и наказание», 
1866), The Gambler («Игрок», 1867) and The Idiot («Идиот», 1868-9). The aesthetics 
developed in these texts, and their portrayal of the human psyche in particular, 
demonstrate to what extent Dostoevsky ‘both anticipates and, through his enormous 
influence on twentieth-century art and thought, helps to shape modern 
consciousness’11. My analysis of forms of attunement as, firstly, an integral element of 
existentialist concerns and, secondly, a crucial defining element of aesthetic 
modernity in Dostoevsky’s works structurally aligns itself with a division suggested by 
Sarah J. Young, who proposes that up until The Idiot, Dostoevsky’s aesthetic focus lies 
with the minds of solipsistic individuals, whereas from The Idiot onwards, the 
psychological dynamics of social interaction take centre stage in his texts12. I will 
therefore start by examining the subjective psychology and spatial poetics displayed 
in earlier works, with a focus on Notes from Underground and Crime and Punishment, and 
will then proceed to analysing forms of intersubjective affect in The Idiot to conclude 
with an outline of the distinctly modern aesthetics of transsubjectivity in Dostoevsky’s 
narrative fiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
10 Richard Freeborn, ‘The Nineteenth Century: The Age of Realism, 1855–80’, in The Cambridge 
History of Russian Literature, ed. by Charles A. Moser, revised ed. (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pp. 248-332 (p. 249). 
11 Robert Russell, ‘The Modernist Tradition’, in The Cambridge Companion to the Classic Russian Novel, ed. 
by Malcolm V. Jones and Robin Feuer Miller (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
pp. 210-29 (p. 214). 
12 Sarah J. Young, ‘Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881): Fantastic Realism’ in The Cambridge Companion to 
European Novelists, ed. by Michael Bell (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 259-
76 (p. 266). 
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II. Alienation and the Modern Experience: Notes from Underground and 
Crime and Punishment 
A ‘song of songs on individuality’ 
Both the novella Notes from Underground and the accomplished novel Crime and 
Punishment instigate a perspective on the intensity and immediacy of a single mind: 
that of the ‘underground man’, as he has been named by readers and critics, a 
spiteful former government clerk and self-declared ‘sick man’13 [человек больной14], 
and that of Rodion Romanovich Raskolnikov, an ex-student who commits double 
murder to prove a philosophical theory, respectively. Considered two of the greatest 
characters Dostoevsky created15, both men are isolated, discontented and nihilistic 
outsiders living in urban Petersburg. The texts take us into their idiosyncratic, 
obsessive minds, representing consciousness in new and innovative ways through 
forms of ‘intensely internalised discourse’16 that considerably influenced the 
development of forms of portraying subjective experience in twentieth-century 
aesthetic modernism.  
The first-person narrative of the Notes gives readers the sense of having direct 
insight into the thought processes of the underground man, while the third-person 
narrator of Crime and Punishment, though also intermittently depicting the perspectives 
of other characters such as Raskolnikov’s friend Razumikhin, his sister Dunya and 
the virtuous prostitute Sonya Marmeladova, very much revolves around 
Raskolnikov’s delirious, solipsistic point of view. The fact that the novel was initially 
also intended as a first-person narrative17 articulates itself in its intense focus on 
                                                            
13 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, trans. and annotated by Richard Pevear and Larissa 
Volokhonsky (London: Vintage, 2006), p. 3. 
14 Dostoevsky, «Записки из подполья» (Санкт-Петербург: Издательский Дом Азбука-классика, 
2008), p. 43. 
15 Cf. Bernard J. Paris, Dostoevsky’s Greatest Characters: A New Approach to ‘Notes from the Underground’, ‘Crime 
and Punishment’, and ‘The Brothers Karamazov’ (New York and Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), p. xi. 
16 Young, ‘Fyodor Dostoevsky’, p. 266. 
17 In his edition of Dostoevsky’s Notebooks for ‘Crime and Punishment’ (London and Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1967), Edward Wasiolek describes the difficulty Dostoevsky encountered 
in settling on a narrative perspective for the novel: 
[In the Notebooks, Dostoevsky] experiments with three forms, the first-person as diary and as 
memory, and the third-person, which in a kind of limited omniscience constitutes the 
narrative manner of the finished version. He also briefly considers two other forms: the first-
person as ‘confession’ and a mixed form of drama and diary. He left the ‘I-form’ with 
reluctance, taking it through several variations and leaving us with two large fragments in the 
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Raskolnikov, encompassing stream-of-consciousness techniques and surreal, dream-
like sequences. At the same time, the radical subjectivity of both texts and their 
concern with fundamental questions of existence are intimately connected with the 
poetics of space they display: both in the Notes and in Crime and Punishment, Petersburg 
takes on a major role that permeates the characters’ thoughts and actions. In the 
following, I will explore the motif of existential solipsism and individual psychology in 
relation to the significance of space in both texts, aiming to outline the nature of 
spatial affectivity in Dostoevsky’s depiction of the modern condition. 
The underground man speaks to us from the underbelly of society. As 
becomes apparent in the course of the novella, his ‘underground’ is not an actual 
subterranean space but the metaphor the narrator uses for his antisocial, disillusioned 
mode of existence and the failure of revolutionary and utopian idealism. While the 
first part of the novella introduces the underground man and his views on various 
philosophical and societal issues, in the second part the narrator relates a series of 
events he experienced as a younger man, most notably his encounter with the 
prostitute Liza, whom he first opens up to but then humiliates and drives away. 
Walter Kaufmann considers the Notes as ‘an unheard-of song of songs on 
individuality: not classical, not Biblical, and not at all romantic’18. He goes on to 
argue that, unlike the Romantic concept of the individual genius, the notion of the 
individual construed in the text is not at all a positive or attractive one: ‘No, 
individuality is not re-touched, idealized, or holy; it is wretched and revolting, and 
yet, for all its misery, the highest good’19. Indeed, the unnamed underground man 
seems to revel in his own squalor and dissects himself in the harshest manner; and 
yet, he celebrates his individuality, even indulges himself as he notes at the end of the 
first chapter: ‘А впрочем: о чем может говорить порядочный человек с 
наибольшим удовольствием? Ответ: о себе. Ну так и я буду говорить о себе’20 
[‘But anyhow: what can a decent man speak about with the most pleasure? Answer: 
                                                                                                                                                                        
notebooks. […] Dostoevsky, I hazard, thought of the ‘I-form’ as a way of gaining immediacy, 
of dramatizing the self in touch with its own crisis, but the long extended passage in the 
second notebook shows us that the ‘I-form’ took him away from the immediacy he sought, 
turning what was meant to be immediate into something analyzed, self-conscious, and 
schematic (Wasiolek in Dostoevsky, The Notebooks for ‘Crime and Punishment, p. 9). 
18 Kaufmann, ‘Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre’, p. 12. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Dostoevsky, «Записки из подполья», p. 47. 
 52 
about himself. So then I, too, will speak about myself’21]. His distinctive narrative 
voice and musings about his life thus dominate the narrative, which is infested by an 
uncompromising, obsessive solipsism only relativised through the preface and 
afterword signed by the author, indicating that the underground man and his notes 
are merely fictional. In this excessive rendition of the Cartesian ‘cogito’, the self 
becomes the axis of any form of reflection but also of its own destruction. 
Similarly, the opening sequence of Crime and Punishment portrays Raskolnikov’s 
intense isolation, equalling that of the underground man: ‘Он до того углубился в 
себя и уединился от всех, что боялся даже всякой встречи, не только встречи с 
хозяйкой’22 [‘He had become so completely absorbed in himself and isolated from 
his fellows that he dreaded meeting not only his landlady, but anyone at all’23]. The 
verbs углубиться [‘to become engrossed’] and уединиться [‘to isolate oneself’] both 
contain the prefix ‘у,’ which express a move away from something, while the reflexive 
suffix ‘ся’ describes Raskolnikov’s turn away from everything and everyone and in 
onto himself. More specifically, the noun ‘глубь’ contained in the first verb signifies 
‘depth’ and interiority, echoing the notion of the ‘underground’, whereas уединиться 
derives from единый, which means ‘single’ or ‘one’, and thus underlines the sense of 
singularity. From this isolation, which is an integral part of Raskolnikov’s conviction 
of his existential singularity, setting him apart from the ‘normal’ people, he develops 
the idea that extraordinary figures, like Napoleon Bonaparte, are above the law and 
are therefore allowed to commit any action they deem necessary. To prove his point, 
Raskolnikov, whose telling names echoes раскол, ‘split’ or ‘schism’24, murders an old 
pawnbroker named Alyona Ivanovna, and in the heat of the moment also kills her 
innocent simple-minded sister Lizaveta when she walks in on the crime. Following 
his deed, Raskolnikov undergoes an intense, feverish delirium. Once recovered, he 
finds himself confronted with the alcoholic Marmeladov and his innocent daughter 
Sonya, who became a prostitute to support her impoverished family, his mother and 
sister, who have come to see him in Petersburg, and the detective Porfiry Petrovich, 
whose investigation soon begins to close in on Raskolnikov. Plagued by his 
conscience and pressured by the amoral Svidrigaylov, his sister’s former employer, 
                                                            
21 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, p. 6. 
22 Dostoevsky, «Преступление и наказание» (Кишинев: Издательство Лумина, 1969), p. 3. 
23 Dostoevsky Crime and Punishment, trans. by Constance Garnett (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth 
Classics, 2000), p. 3. 
24 Cf. Charles E. Passage, Character Names in Dostoevsky’s Fiction (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1982), p. 58. 
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Raskolnikov first confesses to Sonya and then to the authorities, and is ultimately sent 
to Siberia to serve his sentence, where Sonya aids him in atoning for his crime. 
 Both the Notes and Crime and Punishment thus examine the dark, twisted and 
ugly side of the human condition, its metaphorical underground, exploring the 
existentialist notion that human beings create themselves from their freedom, as is 
shown in Raskolnikov’s attempt to prove his individuality and freedom through the 
murder of the old pawnbroker25. Though both protagonists isolate themselves from 
society and encounter it only with reluctance and disgust – thus anticipating Jean-
Paul Sartre’s exploration of existential and physical nausea – their states of mind are 
inextricably connected to the social and physical environment modern Petersburg 
produces. My argument aims to counteract the common notion that Dostoevsky’s 
writing is best interpreted on a metaphysical plane, which was first and most 
succinctly expressed in Dmitry Merezhkovsky’s essay ‘L. Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky’ 
(1900/1901). Merezhkovsky therein argues that Tolstoy’s materially grounded 
realism and representations of consciousness render him a ‘seer of the flesh’, whereas 
Dostoevsky’s concern with the human psyche makes him a ‘seer of the mind’26 with a 
limited interest in the level of physical existence. As opposed to this dichotomy, in my 
view Dostoevsky’s intense spatial poetics strongly ground the metaphysical aspect of 
his work in physically concrete environments and the materiality of a pervasive 
modern form of Stimmung. 
 A closer look at the role of space in the two texts reveals the significance and 
physicality of Petersburg as their setting: as the lawyer Luzhin, who intends to marry 
Raskolnikov’s sister, suggests, Petersburg is the Russian centre of the new, modern 
way of life, the breeding ground for modern ideas and reforms: ‘Я, видите ли, уже 
десять лет не посещал Петербурга. Все эти наши новости, реформы, идеи – все 
это и до нас прикоснулось в провинции; но чтобы видеть яснее и видеть все, 
надобно быть в Петербурге’27 [‘You see, it’s ten years since I visited Petersburg. All 
the novelties, reforms, ideas have reached us in the provinces, but to see it all more 
clearly one must be in Petersburg’28]. As both the Notes and Crime and Punishment 
                                                            
25 Cf. Patrick Lyall Bourgeois, ‘Dostoevsky and Existentialism: An Experiment in Hermeneutics’, 
Journal of Thought, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1980), 29-37 (p. 34). 
26 Merezhkovsky qtd. in Kenneth Lantz, The Dostoevsky Encyclopedia (London and Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 2004), p. 437. 
27 Dostoevsky, «Преступление и наказание», p. 127. 
28 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, p. 128. 
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portray, Petersburg’s modernity – which manifests itself, on the one hand, materially 
in the concrete spatial environment of the city, influenced by modern technology, 
architecture and capitalism, and, on the other hand, immaterially through the 
dissemination of Western ideas – severely impacts the psychological and spiritual 
condition of the individual, producing a sense of alienation and disintegration that 
would become an existential and aesthetic Grundstimmung emblematic of the modern 
experience. 
 
 
 
The Abstract Concreteness of Dostoevsky’s Petersburg 
Мне говорят, что климат петербургский мне становится вреден и что с моими 
ничтожными средствами очень дорого в Петербурге жить. Я все это знаю, лучше всех 
этих опытных и премудрых советчиков и покивателей знаю. Но я остаюсь в 
Петербурге; я не выеду из Петербурга! Я потому не выеду… Эх! да ведь это 
совершенно все равно - выеду я иль не выеду29. 
[I’m told that the Petersburg climate is beginning to do me harm, and that with my negligible 
means life in Petersburg is very expensive. I know all that, I know it better than all these 
experienced and most wise counsellors and waggers of heads. But I am staying in Petersburg; 
I will not leave Petersburg! I will not leave because… Eh! but it’s all completely the same 
whether I leave or not30.] 
Thus describes the underground man his relationship to Petersburg: although the 
city is detrimental to his health and despite his claim that it makes no difference to 
him, he cannot – and will not – live anywhere else. It is the ‘climate’ [климат], in 
Dostoevsky’s works a recurrent term signifying a spatialised transsubjective mood, of 
the capital in particular that puts him on edge, its meteorological characteristics 
being symbolic of the urban and social atmosphere that conditions the underground 
man’s mode of existence. His disgust with himself and society emerges as a response 
to the social disparities of urban life, the experience of an anonymous modern society 
in the busy Petersburg streets, especially on Nevsky Prospect, and his crammed, 
unsightly quarters. Physical concreteness of space and metaphysical meaning 
converge as the underground man describes Petersburg as the ‘most abstract’ [самом 
отвлеченном] and ‘intentional’ [умышленном] city in the world: 
Для человеческого обихода слишком было бы достаточно обыкновенного 
человеческого сознания, то есть в половину, в четверть меньше той порции, которая 
достается на долю развитого человека нашего несчастного девятнадцатого столетия 
                                                            
29 Dostoevsky, «Записки из подполья», p. 46. 
30 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, p. 6. 
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и, сверх того, имеющего сугубое несчастье обитать в Петербурге, самом отвлеченном 
и умышленном городе на всем земном шаре31. 
[For a man’s everyday use, ordinary human consciousness would be more than enough; that 
is, a half, a quarter of the portion that falls to the lot of a developed man in our unfortunate 
nineteenth century, who, on top of that, has the added misfortune of residing in Petersburg, 
the most abstract and intentional city on the entire globe32.] 
In Dostoevsky’s texts, the urban geography of nineteenth-century Petersburg 
juxtaposes allegorical meaning with lived actuality. After he seized the territory it was 
built on from the Swedish, Peter the Great intended the city as a symbolic new 
capital opening Russia to Europe and had it minutely planned by architects such as 
Domenico Trezzini. Its intended symbolic value and geometric design suggest the 
way in which the city of Petersburg materialises an idea – one of progress, modernity 
and grandeur – that is, however, contrasted with a manifest reality dominated by 
bleakness, squalor, poverty and illness, creating a modern ‘inferno’33 in the shape of a 
metropolis. Perceiving life in Petersburg as a curse to his consciousness, the 
underground man’s existential condition, simultaneously, emerges as a product of 
Petersburg’s urban modernity. As Abraham Akkerman points out in his discussion of 
the relationship between urban space and mood disorders, nineteenth-century 
Petersburg became the epitome of the ‘winter-city’ that was associated with urban 
alienation and depersonalisation, a circumstance that resulted from its specific 
geography and climate as well as its societal configuration34. 
 A similar depiction of the city can be found in Crime and Punishment, which 
represents Raskolnikov’s ‘sick, hallucinatory apprehension of reality’ in a ‘crowded, 
fetid, urban ant-heap of a world, packed with “voices” and given to a baroquely 
detailed authenticity’35. Critics have meticulously identified the locations described in 
the novel as actual historical places in Petersburg36, discovering the ways in which 
Dostoevsky used the space of his own lived experience as a setting for Raskolnikov’s 
narrative. Underlining the gloom, misery and poverty of the lower classes living off 
the illustrious Nevsky Prospect, the novel suggests that Raskolnikov’s aberrant 
                                                            
31 Dostoevsky, «Записки из подполья», p. 47. 
32 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, p. 7. 
33 George Steiner, Tolstoy or Dostoevsky: An Essay in Contrast (London: Faber & Faber, 1980), p. 93. 
34 Abraham Akkerman, Phenomenology of the Winter-City: Myth in the Rise and Decline of Built Environments 
(Heidelberg et al.: Springer, 2016), p. 186. 
35 Freeborn, ‘The Classic Russian Novel’, in The Routledge Companion to Russian Literature, ed. by Neil 
Cornwell (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 101-10 (p. 106). 
36 Cf. Robert Belknap, ‘St. Petersburg’, in Dostoevsky in Context, ed. by Deborah A. Martinsen and Olga 
Maiorova (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 168-75 (pp. 173f.). 
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philosophical considerations and feverish delinquency may result from his living in 
the Petersburg of the ‘unfortunate nineteenth century’. The morally depraved 
Svidrigaylov, who is suspected of having murdered his wife and who then blackmails 
Raskolnikov’s sister, describes the city as a breeding ground for different kinds of 
maladies and pathological behaviour:  
 [Я] убежден, что в Петербурге много народу, ходя, говорят сами с собой. Это город 
полусумасшедших. Если б у нас были науки, то медики, юристы и философы могли бы 
сделать над Петербургом драгоценнейшие исследования, каждый по своей 
специальности. Редко где найдется столько мрачных, резких и странных влияний на 
душу человека, как в Петербурге. Чего стоят одни климатические влияния! Между тем это 
административный центр всей России, и характер его должен отражаться на всем37 
(my emphasis). 
[I’m convinced there are lots of people in Petersburg who talk to themselves as they walk. 
This is a town of crazy people. If only we had scientific men – doctors, lawyers and 
philosophers – they might make most valuable investigations in Petersburg each in his own 
line. There are few places where there are so many gloomy, strong and queer influences on 
the soul of man as in Petersburg. The mere influences of climate mean so much. And it’s the 
administrative centre of all Russia and its character must be reflected on the whole country38 
(my emphasis).] 
The ‘gloomy’ [мрачный] influence that Petersburg and its ‘climate’ exert on the 
human mind is reflected in particular in Rakolnikov’s destitute, oppressive lodgings, 
which he alternately describes as a ‘den’ [каморка] or ‘kennel’ [конура]. When he 
eventually confesses his crime to Sonya, he depicts the time leading up to the 
murders as one during which he completely isolated himself in his room, 
exacerbating his agitated mental state, although he was very much aware of the effect 
his isolation had on him: 
Я тогда, как паук, к себе в угол забился. Ты ведь была в моей конуре, видела… А 
знаешь ли, Соня, что низкие потолки и тесные комнаты душу и ум теснят! О, как 
ненавидел я эту конуру! А все-таки выходить из нее не хотел. Нарочно не хотел! По 
суткам не выходил, и работать не хотел, и даже есть не хотел, все лежал. Принесет 
Настасья – поем, не принесет – так и день пройдет; нарочно со зла не спрашивал! 
Ночью огня нет, лежу в темноте, а на свечи не хочу заработать. Надо было учиться, я 
книги распродал; а на столе у меня, на записках да на тетрадях, на палец и теперь 
пыли лежит. Я лучше любил лежать и думать. И все думал… И все такие у меня были 
сны, странные, разные сны, нечего говорить какие! Но только тогда начало мне тоже 
мерещиться, что…39 
[I sat in my room like a spider. You’ve been in my den, you’ve seen it… And do you know, 
Sonia, that low ceilings and tiny rooms cramp the soul and the mind? Ah, how I hated that 
garret! And yet I wouldn’t go out of it! I wouldn’t on purpose! I didn’t go out for days 
                                                            
37 Dostoevsky, «Преступление и наказание», pp. 403f. 
38 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, p. 392f. 
39 Dostoevsky, «Преступление и наказание», p. 361. 
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together, and I wouldn’t work, I wouldn’t even eat, I just lay there doing nothing. If Nastasya 
brought me anything, I ate it, if she didn’t, I went all day without; I wouldn’t ask, on purpose, 
from sulkiness! At night I had no light, I lay in the dark and I wouldn’t earn money for 
candles. I ought to have studied, but I sold my books; and the dust lies an inch thick on the 
notebooks on my table. I preferred lying still and thinking. And I kept thinking… And I had 
dreams all the time, strange dreams of all sorts, no need to describe! Only then I began to 
fancy that…40] 
The room is portrayed as the root of Raskolnikov’s mental state being aggravated to 
the extent that makes him commit the murders; only as his isolation and the 
oppressiveness of his surroundings start to throng [теснят] his mind, Raskolnikov’s 
obsession with his theory that he stands above the law ‘normal’ people must follow, 
begins to flourish. 
At the same time, however, Raskolnikov’s plan to murder the old pawnbroker 
is fuelled by economic necessity and the dehumanising experience of urban poverty. 
The connection between urban modernity and material need pervades the entire 
novel, in which only characters travelling to Petersburg from other parts of Russia – 
Luzhin and Svidrigaylov – are not afflicted by financial troubles. The city thus 
generates a structure of existential deficiency and lack in the context of civic life that 
is associated with modern capitalism and the development of a dehumanising, 
radically uneven modernity, adding a financial level of concrete materialism to the 
spiritual erosion depicted in the text. In his poverty-stricken Petersburg existence, 
Raskolnikov describes himself as a spider, an image that is part of a recurrent trope 
of dehumanisation through modern life in Dostoevsky’s writing: elsewhere, he calls 
himself – and the old pawnbroker – a ‘louse’, and likewise, the underground man 
repeatedly refers to being an ‘insect,’ while the surreal 1865 short story ‘The 
Crocodile’ («Крокодил») describes a man being swallowed alive by a crocodile and 
continuing to live inside of it (and, naturally, the image of the alienated, 
dehumanised modern individual would later prominently resurface in Franz Kafka’s 
Die Verwandlung in 1915). 
Bizarrely, both Raskolnikov and the underground man display an awareness 
of the effect the urban environment takes on them; but nevertheless, they both 
remain in Petersburg and in their claustrophobic lodgings, as if to intentionally 
intensify their existential crises. In this ‘suffocating psychological enclosure from 
                                                            
40 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, p. 351. 
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which escape seems impossible’41, the characters’ violent individuality and solipsism, 
as well as their intensity of experience and affect, are supplied by the materiality of 
urban modernity, a modernity which thus becomes both an affliction and an 
addiction. Consequently, Raskolnikov eventually only experiences true atonement 
and a spiritual ‘resurrection’ away from Petersburg, in the Siberian labour camp, as 
he overlooks the landscape from a river bank. This critical mode of existence thus 
seems contingent on the urban experience and on being in the condition of modern 
alienation [Entfremdung], defined as an estrangement from one’s own self as originally 
described by Hegel and then adapted by Karl Marx in his critique of modern 
capitalism42. Indeed, both Raskolnikov and the underground man are estranged 
from their own identities, the former being marked by his eponymous schism of the 
self, while the latter is not even identified by name and takes on several identities and 
voices in the course of his narrative. The loss of a sense of self, as it is repeatedly 
portrayed in Raskolnikov’s feverish state, and an anonymity that borders on non-
identity thus become symptomatic of a distinctive new mode of experience. 
Robert Alter, in Imagined Cities: Urban Experience and the Language of the Novel, 
suggests that 
the filth, disorder, and oppressiveness of the city are repeatedly seen from Raskolnikov’s 
fevered point of view, but there is also an implicit overview of the modern city as something 
that objectively has become a site of social and moral pathology43. 
Alter relates this notion to the aesthetics of urban space in the novels of Charles 
Dickens, whose work exerted an important influence on Dostoevsky’s writing44. 
Indeed, Dickens pioneered an aesthetic of the urban environment in his portrayal of 
nineteenth-century London, which foregrounded a sense of alienation and 
uncertainty as well as the experience of the urban squalor and of the crowds45, and 
which strongly resonates in Dostoevsky’s depiction of Petersburg. The city as a space 
of uncertainty and possibility, of contingency and transience, thus takes on a crucial 
role in Dostoevsky’s existential study of the modern condition: the characters do not 
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exist independently from their urban milieu and are inextricably entangled in the 
modern space of their lived experience, which defines their existential mode of being, 
rendering them ‘symptoms’ of the modern city. In Heideggerian terms, Dostoevsky’s 
depiction of Petersburg replaces essential being with necessarily contingent Being-in-
the-World. However, the spatial poetics in the texts exceed a straightforward 
materialist determinism: the underground man and Raskolnikov are not mere 
products of Petersburg’s ‘distorted’ modernity. Instead, they engage quite literally 
with the spatial dynamics of the city through the Heideggerian notion of Dasein, 
through presence and projection into their concrete physical environment as a mode 
of ‘being-there’. 
 Space and consciousness thus become the two elements negotiated in a 
process of disharmonious attunement emerging from Dostoevsky’s Petersburg texts 
in particular. Perhaps it is this specific historical moment that consolidated the 
disturbed relationship between self and world that Heidegger would come to 
describe: not only did the infrastructural vicissitude of the modern world impact on 
individuals, but it is also the erosion of religion, philosophy and belief systems in 
general that is demonstrated in the figures of the underground man and Raskolnikov, 
who thinks of himself as a form of Nietzschean46 Übermensch, that makes Dostoevsky’s 
modernity collapse into an existential abyss. As the investigator Porfiry Petrovich 
observes, Raskolnikov’s case is a specifically ‘modern’ one, the result of a ‘climate of 
mind’47: ‘Тут дело фантастическое, мрачное, дело современное, нашего 
времени случай-с, когда помутилось сердце человеческое; когда цитуется 
фраза, что кровь «освежает»; когда вся жизнь проповедуется в комфорте. Тут 
книжные мечты-с, тут теоретически раздраженное сердце’48 [‘This is a fantastic, 
gloomy business, a modern case, an incident of today when the heart of man is 
troubled, when the phrase is quoted that blood “renews”, when comfort is preached 
as the aim of life. Here we have bookish dreams, a heart unhinged by theories’49]. 
Resulting from the nihilistic notion that to him, all is permitted, Raskolnikov’s crime 
betrays a societal crisis in nineteenth-century thought and existence, in which Karl 
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Marx and Friedrich Engels’s famous description of industrial modernity – which 
Berman uses as the theoretical backdrop for his definition of the modern – aptly 
portrays an ethic and existential dilemma:  
All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and 
opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All 
that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face 
with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind50. 
Through this lack of existential stability, characters find themselves ‘thrown’ into a 
dizzying world of uncertainty and constant change that seems, at the same time, 
inescapable. The human subject is made to face the conditions of its own existence as 
well as its fundamental relationality with others. Here, in the absence of universally 
applicable norms or modes of existence, the notion of the individual and the 
concreteness of material presence become the axes around which experience 
revolves. Cultural Stimmung, or ‘climate,’ as it is denominated in the texts, thus 
becomes part and parcel of a new paradigm of presence, perception and contingency 
that structures experience, while presupposing a singularity of being that betrays a 
larger societal pathology51.  
 
 
 
Solipsism and Company 
In Dostoevsky’s works, spatiality and self are thus inextricably tied up in a structure 
of co-dependence that is, however, marked by disharmony. They neither posit a 
form of idealism nor of materialism: while his characters’ minds are shown to be 
unreliable, distorted and contingent on their physical environment, the material 
dimension of existence can nevertheless only be accessed through forms of individual 
subjectivity and the relationship established between the mind and the spatial 
geography surrounding it. The term ‘climate’ therein comes to signify a concrete 
material and transsubjective affective impact on the subject: in his mood-oriented 
analysis of Thomas Mann’s Der Tod in Venedig (1912), Gumbrecht notes that in 
Mann’s novella, the weather and physical climate converge with the protagonist 
Aschenbach’s consciousness, indicating a tangible form of material affect that 
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transcends the individual52. Likewise, the notion of an epochal climate or 
Grundstimmung that Dreyfus derives from Heidegger’s ontology of mood is related to 
concrete physical actuality, and thus becomes a cornerstone of the material and 
affective structures in Dostoevsky’s Petersburg texts. The particular climate, 
infrastructure and social dynamics of Petersburg exert a sense of gloom and sickness 
on their characters, which is internalised and given expression to via the pervasive 
images of illness and pathological behaviour: Raskolnikov’s fever, the underground 
man’s liver and tooth pain, Marmeladov’s alcoholism, the consumption of his wife 
Katerina Ivanovna and Svidrigaylov’s moral depravity and eventual suicide all 
constitute a physical attestation of the diseased surface of the process of 
modernisation. 
The notion of solipsism in both the Notes and Crime and Punishment is thereby 
relativised by the fact that modernity is presented as a disease affecting the entire 
civic body of Petersburg as the diseased characters, in turn, reflect the pervasive 
cultural climate back onto the scenery, and in a second move, extend it to readers by 
taking them into the inner workings of their minds and mental geographies. Malcolm 
V. Jones therefore suggests – aptly enough, given this structure – that ‘there are other 
places where the city also becomes an instrument for Dostoevsky to reproduce in us 
what his character is experiencing at the moment’53 (my emphasis). Through the 
transsubjective materiality of the climate as well as the implied presence of a reader 
in the narrative act54, particularly in the Notes, where the narrator frequently 
addresses the reader and anticipates her responses to his narrative, the possibility of 
breaking the spell of radical solipsism is thus put forward: since the underground 
man speaks to the reader and adjusts his discourse to her imagined presence, the text 
is given an implied dialogic structure55, which undermines the apparent solipsism of 
the modern experience generated in Dostoevsky’s texts. 
A similar notion of encountering and attuning to an other can be discerned in 
Crime and Punishment. At the beginning of the narrative, just after he commits the 
murders, Raskolnikov feels as if violently cut off from all other human beings: ‘Ему 
показалось, что он как будто ножницами отрезал себя сам от всех у всево в эту 
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минуту’56 [‘It seemed to him, he had cut himself off from everyone and from 
everything at that moment’57]. The classic English translation by Constance Garnett 
here leaves out the word ‘ножницами’, which translates as ‘with a pair of scissors,’ 
further underlining the violence implied in Raskolnikov’s isolation and feeding into 
the novel’s pervasive imagery of forms of violence implied in the notion of 
modernity58. While an intense sense of isolation thus dominates the novel, Porfiry 
Petrovich disrupts Raskolnikov’s perceived detachment by, as it were, getting into his 
head: immediately after the murders, Raskolnikov gives the detective reason to 
suspect him as the murderer, and once the common ground – the knowledge that he 
is indeed the culprit – is established between the two characters, an attunement 
between them takes its course. As Raskolnikov consistently attempts to anticipate 
Porfiry’s next move, Porfiry’s ‘mind games’ eventually lead Raskolnikov to confess to 
the murders as the detective becomes the hermeneut to Raskolnikov’s deeds, thus 
stepping into the position of a reader and interpreter to the murderer’s psychology. 
Raskolnikov’s gradual attunement to others is extended through his 
relationship with Sonya, and towards the end of the novel, he eventually feels as if 
there may be a possibility of being with others: on his way to confess the crime, he 
takes in the world around him intently and, significantly, looks at a sign saying 
‘Товарищество’59 [‘company,’ ‘comradeship’ or ‘fellowship’] – an image that will, in 
the latter part of this study, be explored further with regard to the idea of company 
in Beckett. Following this symbolic encounter, ultimately, Raskolnikov succeeds in 
overcoming his isolation and alienation during his imprisonment in Siberia through 
his love for Sonya, which reintegrates him into a form of human company. 
The mode of existential crisis associated with the emergence of modernity in 
Dostoevsky’s fiction is thus intimately connected with a pathology of the cultural 
sensibility of this age that manifests itself physically and metaphysically. The air of 
uncertainty surrounding Raskolnikov is translated into a narrative in which the 
protagonist, for most of the plot, himself does not even know what he is going to do – 
one moment, his plan to murder Alyona Ivanovna seems like madness to him, the 
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next moment he finds himself on the way to her house to commit the crime. The 
reader and Raskolnikov thus discover the events and, later on, their true motivation 
together as the reader becomes involved in Raskolnikov’s feverish thoughts and 
general sense of uncertainty, which implicates her in his moral conundrum. 
Positioning herself ethically in relation to the murders turns into a challenge as 
Raskolnikov’s inconsistency impedes the reader’s ability to form a persistent moral 
stance based on consonance or dissonance towards his actions. The same holds true 
for the underground man: while he overtly anticipates that the reader will loathe him 
as much as he loathes himself, his shifting sense of identity and inconsistent 
behaviour render an attunement to him mutable and inherently processual. The 
experiential dimension of the narrative thus comes to the fore in both texts, wherein 
the process of negotiating the reader’s attunement to the respective protagonist takes 
on a pivotal role and unsettles any fixed ethical and existential position. 
 The solipsism of Dostoevsky’s antiheroes, which simultaneously indicates the 
notion of the ‘unity of the modern self and the modern environment’60, is thus 
countered with the presence of an other, either on a textual level or in the narrative 
communication with the reader, whose significance in the process of aesthetic 
interaction significantly increases in the texts to follow the two works discussed in this 
section. The Idiot, in the chronology of Dostoevsky’s œuvre the second of the so-called 
‘great novels’, replaces the notion of the individual dominant in its predecessors with 
a focus on group dynamics and shared forms of affect. As Sarah J. Young observes, 
[f]rom The Idiot onwards, attention shifts from the workings of a single consciousness to the 
dynamics of the crowd and the external interplay between characters. Internalised dialogue 
becomes much less frequent, and instead the characters’ self-presentation dominates, in the 
form of inserted narratives and speeches directed towards the external other61. 
In this context, ‘climate’ and affect no longer remain phenomenona reflecting in the 
individual, as they largely do in Raskolnikov’s delirium and the underground man’s 
nausea: as I will demonstrate in the following section, in The Idiot, individual 
psychology is transcended by shared forms of mood and attunement, even more so 
than in the collective sense of disease already latent in its predecessors, which 
generates an intensely mood-driven relationship between reader and text. 
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III. The Intensity of Aesthetic Experience in The Idiot 
From Christology to Aesthetic Immediacy 
The Idiot has received a number of superlatives from critics, such as being the ‘most 
challenging and obscure of Dostoevsky’s novels’62, ‘perhaps the strangest and most 
problematic of [his] major fictional works’63, his ‘darkest and most tragic novel’64 and 
even ‘the strangest of the world’s great novels’65. As such, although it is commonly 
included in the pentad of Dostoevsky’s ‘great novels,’ it is generally lesser known than 
for example Crime and Punishment and his monumental last novel The Brothers 
Karamazov («Братья Карамазовы», 1879-80), the reason for which may lie in The 
Idiot’s frenzied, dream-like, disordered narrative. According to Konstantin 
Mochulsky, the novel constitutes a continuation, and even exacerbation, of the 
existential crisis depicted in Raskolnikov’s struggle: 
in Crime and Punishment the crisis of consciousness is concentrated in one soul, which has 
plunged out of the old world-order. In The Idiot all the dramatis personae are drawn into this 
crisis, all belong to a perishing world. […] The world of the novel The Idiot is more terrible 
and more tragic than the world of Crime and Punishment. People rush in a fever, talk in 
delirium, groan, and gnash their teeth. The two novels are two stages of the same illness: in 
the first the illness is in germ; in the second, in full development66. 
Two aspects of Mochulsky’s assessment of the two texts are particularly significant. 
Firstly, he considers the crisis portrayed in the two novels as being inextricably tied 
up with a change in the world order and in the ‘perishing’ of the old world the new 
paradigm of modernity had begun to replace during Dostoevsky’s life-time. 
Secondly, the transition he observes between Crime and Punishment and The Idiot moves 
from the isolated struggle of an individual to that of a whole group of characters: in 
between the texts, a contagion of the mood of modernity is brought about, feeding 
further into the notion of a pathology of the modern condition that Dostoevsky’s 
works engender. 
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The novel depicts the events following the arrival of Prince Myshkin, a pure 
and saint-like character afflicted with epilepsy, in Saint Petersburg after having spent 
several years in a sanatorium in Switzerland. Myshkin, whose naivety and meekness 
render him the eponymous ‘idiot’ of the novel, is soon drawn into the affairs, 
scandals and interests of various figures of the Petersburg upper middle-class and, as 
the plot unfolds, makes the acquaintance of the Yepanchins, a wealthy family with 
three young daughters, Nastasya Filippovna, the beautiful former mistress of the 
socialite Totsky, and Parfyon Rogozhin, a merchant and heir of a multi-million ruble 
fortune. Myshkin feels instantly drawn to Nastasya Filippovna, whom he pities for 
regarding herself as a fallen woman, and offers to marry her, but she believes that she 
would only destroy the kind and innocent Prince and takes off with the violently 
passionate Rogozhin. Myshkin and the youngest Yepanchin daughter Aglaya fall in 
love and become engaged, but the betrothal is terminated as Myshkin fails to stay 
away from Nastasya Filippovna due to his urge to ‘save’ her. Torn between the 
Prince and her fear of ruining him on the one hand and Rogozhin and his 
destructive passion for her on the other hand, Nastasya Filippovna again elopes with 
Rogozhin, who then murders her. After Rogozhin and the Prince are found holding 
vigil by the side of her dead body, the former is sent to Siberia, while the latter, who 
has once again regressed into a state of stupor and ‘idiocy,’ is taken back to the Swiss 
sanatorium. 
The Idiot was written during an especially dark phase in the author’s life as the 
writing of the novel was frequently interrupted – and, as Dennis Patrick Slattery67 
argues, considerably influenced – by epileptic fits. Dostoevsky’s letters to his friend 
Apollon N. Maikov indicate that he was afflicted by physical and emotional strains 
while he was working on the novel during his journey through Germany, 
Switzerland and Italy. In a letter dated December 31, 1867 / January 12, 1868 he 
states that he ‘[has] been working and suffering’68, while a letter dated July 19 / August 2, 
1868 displays his despair after the death of his infant daughter Sonya:  
I have been very unhappy all this time. Sonya’s death has been torture to my wife and to me. 
My health is nothing to brag about—attacks, the climate of Vevey sets my nerves on edge. 
[…] I am dissatisfied with my novel to the point of disgust. I have desperately tried to work 
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but I haven’t been able to—my soul is sick. […] If I straighten out the novel, I will straighten 
out myself, if not—I am finished69. 
Thus The Idiot was conceived out of the author’s ‘sick soul,’ and while it is neither 
particularly revealing nor reliable to reconstruct an author’s mood and state of mind 
at the time of working on a novel, it is worth taking into account how this 
constitution is expressed in the densely affective narrative and how it may impact the 
transmission of mood in The Idiot. 
I will argue that, perhaps inspired by Dostoevsky’s own state of mind at the 
time as well as by his concern with aesthetic forms of responding to modernity and its 
effect on the human condition, The Idiot showcases an increased interest in and 
concern with emotional states and forms of Stimmung, and that these affective 
phenomena determine both the novel’s plot and its effect on readers. One might 
even go so far as to say that the novel is driven by Stimmung as it is marked by 
particularly tangible intersubjective moods and atmospheres which govern the plot of 
the narrative and its particular reader-text dynamic. The novel therefore represents 
the epitome of a newly found aesthetic response to the modern condition and the 
affective structures resulting from this mode of experience. In The Idiot, Stimmung is 
presented as the main catalyst of human decisions, actions and desires, thus positing 
the principle of affect as an anti-Enlightenment paradigm of both human experience 
and aesthetic manifestations thereof. The novel’s ‘dreamlike’ quality, which has 
puzzled and fascinated readers for more than a century now, can partly be 
accounted for by the employment of the volatile, by definition processual principle of 
Stimmung as a plot-developing device. Rather than making rational decisions, the 
main characters base their actions on their passions, inclinations and moods, 
therefore rendering Stimmung the main principle governing the narrative 
development of the novel and the reader’s reception of it. The novel thus juxtaposes 
the first three planes of attunement in fiction that I have outlined in Chapter 1: that 
of the attunement of characters to their fictional worlds and to one another, that of 
the attunement between reader and text, and that of the literary conventions and 
modes shaped by forms of Stimmung, all three of which I will explore further below. 
Jacques Catteau suggests that Dostoevsky’s works are defined by the aesthetic 
totality they constitute and that the scholarship on his œuvre can be divided into three 
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major categories: criticism focusing on biographical elements, interpretations based 
on philosophical and theological ideas and text-centred readings examining deep 
structures in the works70. Traditionally, many of the interpretations of The Idiot in 
particular have focused on its allegorical Christian undercurrent, most prominently 
on the protagonist’s role as a Christ-like figure or ‘holy fool.’ Such interpretation is 
mainly inspired by Dostoevsky’s own comments on the subject matter of The Idiot, 
most notably by his much quoted letter to his niece Sonya A. Ivanova, dated January 
1/13, 1868: 
The main idea of the novel is to portray a positively good man. There is nothing more 
difficult in the world, and this is especially true today. All writers—not only ours but 
Europeans as well—who have ever attempted to portray the positively good have always given 
up. Because the problem is a boundless one. The perfect is still an ideal, whether it is ours or 
that of civilized Europe, it is still far from having been worked out. There is only one 
positively good figure in the world—Christ—so that the phenomenon of that boundlessly, 
infinitely good figure is already in itself an infinite miracle71.  
In his study Dostoevsky: Language, Faith, and Fiction, Rowan Williams therefore construes 
the novel as part and parcel of ‘Dostoevsky’s implicit Christology’72, discussing the 
role and nature of Christian faith in the author’s major works and, importantly, 
emphasising the instability of the notion of a Godly form of harmony in the novel. 
Similarly, Robert Lord, Murray Krieger, Michael Holquist and Bruce A. French 
interpret the role of Prince Myshkin, the saint-like protagonist and self-declared 
‘idiot’ of the novel’s title, on an allegorical level as a failed Christ figure against the 
backdrop of Dostoevsky’s own religious convictions73. Holquist in particular focuses 
on a cluster of interrelated symbols dominating the narrative, strongly relying on the 
figurative level of meaning in his reading. In line with this approach, Harriet Murav’s 
book Holy Foolishness: Dostoevsky’s Novels and the Poetics of Cultural Critique (1992) 
examines the figure of the ‘holy fool’ as a recurrent image in the Orthodox church 
and in Russian culture, the main feature of which is ‘the assumption of madness or 
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folly as an ascetic feat of self-humiliation’74 for religious reasons. Liza Knapp further 
observes that the characteristics of the holy fool, who is ‘associated with saintliness, a 
lack of worldliness (or otherworldliness) [and] marginality to society’75, are 
transferred onto the figure of Myshkin. The notion of ‘idiocy’ applied to him thus 
reflects the way in which Myshkin, in his unmaterialistic and societally inacceptable 
behaviour, represents the traditional Orthodox ascetic model of ‘foolishness for 
Christ’ [«юродство во Христе»], a helpful insight illuminating the protagonist’s 
position in relation to the other characters that will also become relevant to my 
reading. 
 In Dostoevsky, the motif of idiocy is thus associated with naivety and 
innocence, but also with being an outsider to society, as it is presented by Myshkin as 
well as Lizaveta, the pawnbroker’s sister and Raskolnikov’s second victim, in Crime 
and Punishment. According to Clément Rosset, the figure of the idiot, which 
etymologically relates to the notion of uniqueness and singularity through its root in 
the Ancient Greek ἰδιώτης [idiôtēs] and translates as ‘private person’ or ‘individual’, is 
connected to the idea of the ‘real’ as that which cannot be represented and exists 
merely for itself76. The figure of the idiot is thus marked by a lack of worldliness – as 
it is reflected in Myshkin’s ignorance of societal conventions – as well as by a form of 
existential singularity that separates him from the other characters in the novel. 
While the predominant interpretations of the novel offer valuable and fruitful 
insights into its symbolic dimension, they threaten to overlook a pivotal, equally 
important phenomenon at work in the text: its affective and reader-oriented 
structure. The first comprehensive examination of this aspect can be found in 
Elizabeth Dalton’s excellent psychoanalytical reading of the novel in Unconscious 
Structure in ‘The Idiot’: A Study in Literature and Psychoanalysis (1979). While I do not fully 
subscribe to the psychoanalytical framework she uses in reading the novel’s 
characters and plot as, in my view, the psychopathology of the fictional characters 
attests to a critique of modernity rather than to mimetic human experience and 
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psychology, Dalton’s observations regarding the intense affective involvement The 
Idiot stimulates in its readers are central to my interpretation. Grasping the intense 
nature of the novel very adequately, Dalton observes that  
the notion of the book as simply recording the fate of the Russian Christ does not account for 
what one actually feels when reading the novel. The Idiot presents itself first of all as an 
emotional experience of an extraordinarily concentrated kind; it arouses in many readers an 
almost unbearable excitement and intensity of feeling. Perhaps more consistently in The Idiot 
than anywhere else in Dostoevsky’s work, our emotions are forced again and again to the 
breaking point. The action of the novel seems headed constantly toward hysteria and frenzy. 
The characters themselves lose control of their emotions frequently […]. To understand the 
novel, it is necessary to take account of these phenomena within the book itself and of their 
effects on the emotions of the reader77. 
Reading The Idiot is, then, first and foremost an aesthetic and an emotional rather 
than a religious or otherwise ideological experience, which is overlooked by many of 
the most canonical interpretations of the novel. In the same vein as Dalton’s reader-
oriented analysis, Robin Feuer Miller’s seminal book Dostoevsky and ‘The Idiot’: Author, 
Narrator, and Reader (1981) analyses the stages of development in narrative structure in 
the novel, distinguishing between four different modes of narration used by the 
narrator78. In the course of the novel, Miller finds, the changes between these voices 
become more and more abrupt and confusing, rendering the reader increasingly 
bewildered79, a notion that also features prominently in Malcolm V. Jones’s 
Dostoyevsky after Bakhtin: Readings in Dostoyevsky’s Fantastic Realism (1990). Jones therein 
suggests that the ways in which the text draws the reader in and lets her partake in 
the affective commotion depicted in it through the use of stylistic and narrative 
devices results in forms of ‘considerable emotional involvement in the text’80. The 
narrative structure of The Idiot, Jones argues, is then aimed at ‘driving the reader 
crazy’81 as it continuously augments the anxiety produced in readers throughout the 
aesthetic process. Due to these significant contributions to the criticism on the novel, 
a reading of The Idiot that foregrounds its affective immediacy for readers does not 
only suggest itself but, indeed, becomes indispensable for an interpretation revolving 
around the concept of modernity and its affinity to aesthetic modes of Stimmung. 
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A Shared Illness: Modernity  
The idea of a transsubjective form of experience, as suggested by Mochulsky in 
relation to the fictional characters of the novel and by Dalton, Miller and Jones in 
relation to the reader, is already hinted at in the opening paragraph of The Idiot, 
which sets the scene for Myshkin’s arrival in Saint Petersburg:  
В конце ноября, в оттепель, часов в девять утра, поезд Петербургско-Варшавской 
железной дороги на всех парах подходил к Петербургу. Было так сыро и туманно, что 
насилу рассвело; в десяти шагах, вправо и влево от дороги, трудно было разглядеть 
хоть что-нибудь из окон вагона. Из пассажиров были и возвращавшиеся из-за 
границы; но более были наполнены отделения для третьего класса, и всё людом 
мелким и деловым, не из очень далека. Все, как водится, устали, у всех отяжелели за 
ночь глаза, все назяблись, все лица были бледножелтые, под цвет тумана82. 
[At around nine in the morning toward the end of a thawing November, the Warsaw train 
was approaching Petersburg at full steam. The weather was so dank and misty that it was a 
long time getting light; anything beyond a dozen yards to left or right of the track could 
hardly be made out from the carriage windows at all. Among the passengers were some 
returning from abroad, but it was the third-class compartments which were really crowded—
for the most part with ordinary folk and business-people, not travelling long distance. As 
usual, everyone was tired and heavy-eyed after the night, everybody was chilled through, 
their faces wan-yellow to match the fog83.] 
Describing a foggy November morning in Saint Petersburg after a cold, sleepless 
night spent on the train, the atmosphere of the paragraph is characterised by the 
external circumstances, the foggy and cold weather, as well as by a sense of a shared 
affective and spatially determined experience as the passengers have all spent the 
night on the train; all of them are tired and cold. The outer world and the 
passengers’ Befindlichkeit are merged in that moment, constituting a single 
intersubjective mood of weariness and obscurity as the narrator states: ‘у всех 
отяжелели за ночь глаза, все назяблись, все лица были бледножелтые, под 
цвет тумана’ [‘everyone was tired and heavy-eyed after the night, everybody was 
chilled through, their faces wan-yellow to match the fog’]. As the opening reveals just 
as little to the reader about the scenery, people and surroundings as the fog betrays to 
the passengers, the reader is invited to enter into a similar state of mind, anticipating 
the unknown that Dostoevsky’s texts associate with the state of modernity. Opening 
the plot of the novel on a train, a symbol of Western progress entering into Russian 
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culture84, the author thus propels the narrative into the experience of a modernity 
whose impact on societal structures and individual states of mind would be 
irreversible (an image that would, not long after, famously resurface in the most 
accomplished work by Dostoevsky’s great contemporary and aesthetic counterpart 
Lev Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, which was published between 1873 and 1877). 
Thus is the scene for Prince Myshkin and Rogozhin’s first, fateful encounter 
on the train, which is precipitated by a number of similarities in them and an 
attraction to one another:  
В одном из вагонов третьего класса, с рассвета, очутились друг против друга, у самого 
окна, два пассажира — оба люди молодые, оба почти налегке, оба не щегольски 
одетые, оба с довольно замечательными физиономиями, и оба пожелавшие, наконец, 
войти друг с другом в разговор85.  
[In one of the third-class carriages, two passengers had found themselves opposite each other 
by the window since daybreak—both young men, both travelling light, both plainly dressed, 
both with rather striking features, and both at length desirous of engaging the other in 
conversation86.]  
Familiarities, shared mental states and a sense of common ground mark the entire 
opening section, which repeats the pronouns все [‘all’] and оба [‘both’] in an 
emphatic fashion that is diametrically opposed to Raskolnikov’s isolation at the 
beginning of Crime and Punishment. However, despite the similarities between 
Rogozhin and the Prince, they are simultaneously designed as opposites to one 
another. While the Prince is gentle and kind, with fair hair and blue eyes, Rogozhin 
is fierce, passionate, dark-haired and grey-eyed. To Rogozhin’s ridicule, Myshkin is 
dressed in Swiss winter clothing, a thin cloak and European-style shoes and gaiters – 
‘всё не по-русски’87, ‘all very un-Russian’88. Having lived in the isolation of a Swiss 
clinic for the past years, Myshkin is not in tune with the way of life in a rapidly 
evolving modernity; what is more, he is not at all attuned to the material realities of 
the Saint Petersburg society and, like the underground man, anticipates that the 
‘climate’ of his native country may be to the detriment of his health: ‘говорят, 
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здешний климат мне будет вреден’89 [‘they say the climate here won’t be good for 
me’90]. Once again, the climate, i.e. the epochal Grundstimmung of the 1860s, thus 
materialises in the protagonist’s modes of affect and experience, and, at the same 
time, is shown to be hostile and detrimental to his existential condition. 
However, it is not just Myshkin who experiences forms of discord and 
discontent with the world he finds himself in. Almost all of the characters in the novel 
are, to some degree, out of tune with the narrative world, while those that are in tune 
with it (Totsky, Yepanchin, Ganya) are depicted as greedy, superficial or 
manipulative as the Petersburg of The Idiot itself is dominated by financial interests 
and social prestige. The Prince, through his saintly ‘idiocy,’ is not the only character 
who disrupts its social norms: a number of characters, including Nastasya Filippovna, 
Aglaya, Rogozhin, Madame Yepanchina and the consumptive youth Ippolit 
Terentyev, threaten the conventions of upper class society by acting out publicly and 
transgressing boundaries of societal decorum. The seemingly progressive world of 
mid-nineteenth century Russia is called into question as numerous characters clash 
with the social realities of capitalist modernity. As Terras argues, in The Idiot ‘[t]he 
irresoluble contradiction between two opposing principles is underlined by recurrent 
bursts of strident dissonance, scandal and violence that disturb the otherwise placid 
world of middle-class St. Petersburg’91. As in Crime and Punishment and the Notes, the 
clash of the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ world produces a state of tension and dislocation that 
results in a fundamental sense of dissonance at the heart of the modern condition 
portrayed in The Idiot. 
In the past, the various intensely emotional, discrepant forms of attunement 
in Dostoevsky’s novel have been identified by critics as forms of mental illness:  
A charge—one Dostoevsky had heard as early as at the appearance of The Double in 1846—
was advanced time and again—that his characters were all psychopaths and hence irrelevant 
to the real world of normal people. Nikolai Leskov […] reviewed The Idiot anonymously and 
observed that ‘all of the acting characters of the novel, as if even on purpose, are afflicted 
with mental illnesses’92. 
Dostoevsky’s characters and their oftentimes pathological behaviour – from 
Golyadkin’s paranoid psychosis in the early novella The Double («Двойник», 1846) to 
Smerdyakov’s nihilistic murder-suicide in The Brothers Karamazov – can easily be 
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dismissed as instances of individual madness, but may indeed point to a larger issue 
within the existential condition of modernity: an ‘illness,’ as Mochulsky puts it, or in 
Heidegger’s sense, as a form of existence that is shaped by having been thrown into 
an inhospitable modern world. Rather than making the (often futile) attempt to 
‘diagnose’ fictional characters with mental illnesses, I therefore suggest that the ways 
in which Dostoevsky’s characters, as previously discussed in the Notes and Crime and 
Punishment, and here evident in The Idiot, strike readers as insane or ‘dissonant’ 
disclose a relationship to the narrative world that is marked by a shared failure of 
attunement to the condition of modernity. As noted above, the notion of sickness, 
which permeates Dostoevsky’s texts, conceptualises the modern condition as an 
affliction whose origin is so deeply anchored in existential concerns that it is no 
longer available to his modern characters. The underground man opens his narrative 
thus: ‘Я человек больной… Я злой человек. Непривлекательный я человек. Я 
думаю, что у меня болит печень. Впрочем, я ни шиша не смыслю в моей 
болезни и не знаю наверно, что у меня болит’93 [‘I am a sick man… I am a 
wicked man. An unattractive man. I think my liver hurts. However, I don’t know a 
fig about my sickness, and am not sure what it is that hurts me’94]. Likewise, the 
extreme mental states of the characters in The Idiot insinuate a modern condition in 
which an individual mood or state of mind (in Russian: расположение духа) becomes 
emblematic of a cultural climate. As I will argue, the novel’s pronounced aesthetic 
significance lies in extending this state of mind to the experiential realm of the 
reader. 
 
 
 
Nastasya Filippovna’s Party 
The most intense and rapidly changing affective episodes of the novel, as well as the 
greatest source of the general sense of disorder that the text creates, are the multiple 
scandal scenes, which stimulate an intense emotional involvement in the reader. The 
first scandal occurs in the Ivolgin household when Nastasya Filippovna visits the 
family of the young, aspiring Ganya Ivolgin, who wants to marry her in order to 
receive a large amount of money from Totsky. Nastasya Filippovna insults and 
mocks Ganya and his family, causing Ganya to lose his temper and slap the Prince in 
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the face. The second incident, which has been described as ‘a crescendo of 
scandalous grotesquerie’95, occurs on the same day at Nastasya Filippovna’s name-
day party as Myshkin convinces the hostess not to marry Ganya and proposes to her 
instead. There are also two minor scandals, one taking place at the Prince’s birthday 
party in the societal summer retreat of Pavlovsk, the other at the Prince’s and 
Aglaya’s engagement party at the Yepanchin’s house, but the scandals featuring 
Nastasya Filippovna are by far the scenes with the highest density of emotional 
outbursts and changes in mood and the highest degree of excitation. Peter Conradi 
observes that 
[i]t is hard to convey, in any bald account of the plot, the feverish excitement of such scenes, 
and how convincingly Dostoevsky evokes the deep chaos inside the human mind. He shows 
how, in moments of high emotion, his characters act out roles that are incomprehensible 
even to themselves, and does all this with an art that is immediate, accidental in feeling, 
open-ended and absurd; and which yet convinces us that things could not easily have been 
otherwise. No other writer can so well convey the necessary, dizzy-making incompleteness of 
all moment-to-moment experience96. 
At Nastasya Filippovna’s name-day party, a variety of strong emotions collude, 
creating a sense of immediacy and a tense and suspenseful atmosphere, in which the 
hostess’s rapidly changing moods and her capriciousness stand out as affective 
extremes. This immediacy of the moment-to-moment experience in the context of a 
party as a stage for colluding and converging forms of transsubjective affect would 
become an important plot device in modern fiction that resurfaces, for instance, in 
the works of Virginia Woolf97 as well as Thomas Bernhard, whose texts will be 
discussed in the fourth chapter of this study. As an initial step in establishing the 
structural condition of such texts, I will first of all, here, examine the party scene in 
The Idiot, which is perhaps the most intense affective moment in the novel, and its 
textual dynamics of Stimmung in more detail. In doing so I aim to uncover the plot-
developing function of mood in The Idiot and to point out the mode of affective 
involvement the novel stimulates in its readers. 
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Before the Prince arrives at the party, the atmosphere among the party guests 
is rather uneasy: Totsky and General Yepanchin are both intently awaiting Nastasya 
Filippovna’s decision regarding Ganya’s proposal of marriage. Ganya himself is 
sullen and unfriendly, while Nastasya Filippovna is silent and attentive. None of the 
attendees seem to be in the mood for a party, and they struggle to keep the 
conversation going. The only person who is in a festive mood is the Ivolgins’ lodger 
Ferdischenko, who takes on the role of the jester: ‘Один Фердыщенко состоял из 
всех гостей в развеселом и праздничном расположении духа и громко хохотал 
иногда неизвестно чему, да и то потому только, что сам навязал на себя роль 
шута’98 [‘Ferdischenko alone of all the guests was in high spirits and festive mood, 
laughing loudly on occasion for no particular reason, and then only because he had 
assumed the role of court jester’99]. Myshkin’s unexpected arrival – he was not 
invited and resolved to come on his own account – causes a general commotion 
among the party guests. While most of them are amused, Nastasya Filippovna is 
pleased to see him and her mood instantly improves. The party gains momentum 
and soon a merry atmosphere emerges as Ferdischenko starts to make fun of the 
Prince. When the hostess invites her guests to drink champagne with her, the 
atmosphere changes from exuberance to unease as Nastasya Filippovna starts to 
deviate from her usual role: 
Предложение пить, и особенно в таких наивных выражениях, показалось очень 
странным от Настасьи Филипповны. Все знали необыкновенную чинность на ее 
прежних вечерах. Вообще вечер становился веселее, но не по-обычному. От вина, 
однако, не отказались, во-первых, сам генерал, во-вторых, бойкая барыня, старичок, 
Фердыщенко, за ними и все. Тоцкий взял тоже свой бокал, надеясь угармонировать 
наступающий новый тон, придав ему по возможности характер милой шутки. Один 
только Ганя ничего не пил. В странных же, иногда очень резких и быстрых выходках 
Настасьи Филипповны, которая тоже взяла вина и объявила, что сегодня вечером 
выпьет три бокала, в ее истерическом и беспредметном смехе, перемежающемся вдруг 
с молчаливою и даже угрюмою задумчивостью, трудно было и понять что-нибудь. 
Одни подозревали в ней лихорадку; стали наконец замечать, что и она как бы ждет 
чего-то сама, часто посматривает на часы, становится нетерпеливою, рассеянною100 
(my emphasis). 
[An invitation to drink, especially couched in such naïve terms, sounded queer coming from 
Nastasya Filippovna. Everyone recalled the high degree of formality which had prevailed at 
her previous parties. Indeed, the party did liven up, but in a rather unusual fashion. Nobody 
refused the wine, however: first came the general himself, then the sprightly lady, the old 
man, then Ferdischenko, followed by the rest. Totsky took his goblet too, hoping to modulate 
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the new tone the evening was taking by giving it, as far as possible, the character of a pleasant joke. 
Ganya alone drank nothing. It was difficult to make sense of Nastasya Filippovna’s oddly 
brusque, rapid outbursts, as she took her wine and announced that she would drink three 
glasses that evening, or her hysterical, pointless laughter, abruptly interspersed with silence 
and moody depression. Some guests supposed she was feverish; they began to notice at length 
that she too seemed to be expecting something, frequently consulting her watch and 
becoming irritable and preoccupied101 (my emphasis).] 
At this point in time, Nastasya Filippovna’s drawing room develops a dynamic that 
suspends the usual social norms and conventions of the Petersburg society. Totsky, 
one of the characters that is usually in tune with the narrative world of the novel, 
becomes uneasy and needs to ‘attune to the new tone’ of the evening [угармонировать 
новый тон] as Nastasya Filippovna’s mood becomes more and more unpredictable. 
One moment she seems almost hysterical, the next moment she is thoughtful and 
silent, then she starts being impatient, insinuating that her decision regarding 
Ganya’s proposal will soon be announced. 
When one of the guests suggests playing a parlour-game, Ferdischenko comes 
up with the idea of playing a curious, socially almost ‘impossible’ game: Each of the 
attendees is meant to recount the single worst action they have ever performed to the 
other party guests. Although the party guests, especially Totsky, are alarmed, the 
hostess, in a near-delirious state, insists that the game be played: ‘И теперь она 
была как в истерике, суетилась, смеялась судорожно, припадочно, особенно на 
возражения встревоженного Тоцкого’102 [‘Now she was in a state verging on 
hysteria, bustling about, convulsed by fits of laughter, especially at Totsky’s nervous 
protestations’103]. After Ferdischenko tells the others about his worst action, stealing 
three rubles at a dinner party and having a maid take the blame for it, the guests are 
disgusted, but General Yepanchin and Totsky retain the company’s good spirits by 
recounting stories of their chivalry. 
When it is Nastasya Filippovna’s turn, she demands that the Prince decide for 
her whether or not she should marry Ganya. Myshkin tells her not to marry him and 
she subsequently turns the proposal down, much to Totsky’s and General 
Yepanchin’s dismay. Shortly after this decision, Rogozhin and his drunk entourage 
arrive with 100,000 rubles in cash, which Rogozhin promised to bring to Nastasya 
Filippovna’s party in exchange for her. Declaring herself as ‘Rogozhin’s woman’, she 
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prepares to take off with the drunk party, but Myshkin proposes to her instead and 
reveals that he just inherited a fortune from a distant relative. From this moment 
onward Nastasya Filippovna seems to lose her mind: At first she accepts the Prince’s 
proposal and starts to celebrate, then she declares that she changed her mind again 
and would never ruin an innocent ‘infant’ like the Prince by marrying him, 
prompting the General to call out: ‘Это содом, содом!’104 [‘This is Sodom, 
Sodom!’105]. In a frenzy-like state, the hostess takes Rogozhin’s parcel with the 
money and throws it into the fireplace, challenging Ganya to save the money with his 
own hands to make it his own. Ganya refuses to do so, provoking Nastasya 
Filippovna to rescue the money and give it to him. She then takes off with Rogozhin 
and his entourage, leaving her guests in profound consternation. 
As Conradi states, it is almost impossible to express the excitement and 
immediacy of this forty-page long scene by merely summarising its events, but this 
description may at least suggest the frenzy, twists and turns and the high degree of 
agitation the sequence depicts and provokes in its readers. In regards to this scene, 
Holquist proposes that ‘[n]o essence can withstand the battering of the moments as 
they pass by. The structure of a single moment’s promise broken under the onslaught 
of a series of other such moments following upon it, constitutes the novel’s central 
pattern’106. The dramatic immediacy created by these scenes thus draws the reader 
into a notion of presence related to experience and affect that establishes a pivotal 
pattern in the text. In its intensity, the scene of the name-day party turns the 
conventions of the Petersburg society upside down, resulting in a form of disorder 
and frenzied carnival marked by the suspension of social conventions. 
In his landmark study Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (1984), Mikhail Bakhtin 
introduces the concept of the carnivalesque, which, derived from folklore, describes a 
ritualistic comedic and chaotic suspension of societal conventions and a temporary 
undermining of serious forms of representation; a tradition from which parody and 
satire have emerged107. In relation to The Idiot, Bakhtin further points out that 
Nastasya Filippovna and Prince Myshkin are the two centres of what he calls the 
‘carnivalistic play’ of the novel:  
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[A]round these two central figures of the novel—the ‘idiot’ and the ‘madwoman’—all of life 
is carnivalized, turned into a ‘world inside out:’ traditional plot situations radically change 
their meaning, there develops a dynamic carnivalistic play of sharp contrasts, unexpected 
shifts and changes; secondary characters in the novel take on carnivalistic overtones, form 
carnival pairs. A carnivalistic-fantastic atmosphere permeates the entire novel. But around 
Myshkin this atmosphere is bright, almost joyful. Around Nastasya Filippovna it is gloomy, 
infernal108. 
The ‘carnival heaven’ surrounding Myshkin and the ‘carnival hell’109 surrounding 
Nastasya Filippovna thus constitute the area of tension out of which the trajectory of 
the novel develops. The structure of carnival that envelops the two protagonists of 
the novel affects the plot development of The Idiot considerably. Not only does the 
phenomenon of carnival subvert social norms, it also subverts the narrative 
conventions of the nineteenth-century realist novel and the notion of realism in 
literature itself. Therefore, even though Dostoevsky’s works are generally considered 
part of the canon of Russian nineteenth-century realism, Terras observes that despite 
some realist features, The Idiot cannot be considered as a realist novel in the strict 
sense110.  
After the novel was criticised for being too ‘fantastic’ when it was first 
published, Dostoevsky explained his views on reality in his correspondence, stating 
he had ‘[his] own peculiar view of reality (in art)’111. ‘Reality above everything’, 
Dostoevsky further remarked in the notebooks for the novel. ‘It is true perhaps that 
we have a different conception of reality, a thousand thoughts, prophecy—a fantastic 
reality. It may be that in the Idiot man is visible in a truer light’112, thus suggesting a 
notion of ‘fantastic’ and highly subjective realism that undermined conventions of 
mimetic representation. In line with this, Walter Koschmal, who observes that the 
aesthetic dimension of The Idiot has been neglected in favour of its themes, proposes 
that the novel is marked by a mode of writing in which the represented reality is less 
significant than its modes of representation113. 
In the context of ‘fantastic’ subjectivity, mood plays a crucial role in 
captivating the reader in the aesthetic process. The main characters, especially 
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Nastasya Filippovna, act on the spur of the moment, intuitive spontaneity rather than 
reason or intellectual calculation governing their actions. They are subject to their 
moods and, to some extent, they are fundamentally the vehicles of the moods that 
govern the novel’s plot-development and that transcend the individual subject. In the 
scene of the name-day party, this implies that the reader’s expectations and emotions 
are frustrated and turned upside down at every instant. As the narrator denies 
readers access to Nastasya Filippovna’s inner life, they are exposed to her moody fits 
of hysteria, melancholy and frenzy without being able to anticipate or understand 
them. The main objective of this carnivalistic mood is, then, the immediacy of 
experiencing the moment in all its intensity. 
Just like Totsky and the other party guests, readers are forced to attune to the 
moods of the hostess, modulating their expectations and emotions in every instant of 
the party scene. In one moment, it seems perfectly plausible for Myshkin and 
Nastasya Filippovna to get married, which would be the somewhat romantic ending 
many readers might be hoping for. In the next moment, this idea is merely 
considered a sick joke worthy of Totsky, as the hostess decides that she would ruin a 
saintly man like Myshkin if they were to get married. The ontological status of the 
events at Nastasya Filippovna’s party is as unclear to the reader as it is unpredictable: 
Is any of this meant seriously, or is it all just an impossible parlour-game? Is this 
realism, or is it carnival? Are we meant to care about these characters, or are they 
just playing (us)? 
By attuning to the moods that govern the plot of the novel, the reader 
constantly needs to adjust her horizon of expectation concerning the development of 
the narrative and the ontological status of the events related, thus becoming the 
vehicle of an aesthetic attunement that is borne from the convergence of her 
aesthetic experience and the textual modes of negotiating affect. The very fact that 
readers can hardly decide if the scenes depicted in the novel are comic or tragic 
keeps them in constant limbo. Malcolm V. Jones fittingly observes that  
in Notes from Underground the narrator openly draws the reader into the dialogue. This 
experience, together with his exploitation of techniques for creating emotional and 
perceptual confusion, is put to new and original use in The Idiot. So much so that it is 
justifiable not only to speak of readers not knowing where they stand in relation to the text, 
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but also of the deployment of strategies for confusing the reader. These were present also in 
earlier texts, but nowhere so highly developed as in The Idiot114. 
Confusing the reader both intellectually and emotionally, the text presents a 
challenge and generates great emotional investment in the narrative. The novel thus 
forces us to attune ourselves, our emotions and our mood – in the Heideggerian 
sense – to the existential possibilities we see opening up for the characters and the 
development of the plot; and this happens in every moment while we are reading it. 
Hence the attunement taking place between the reader and the text is a continuous, 
intense and rapidly changing negotiation of emotion, expectation and involvement 
driven and orchestrated by the ambivalent, unpredictable and carnivalistic nature of 
affective structures in The Idiot. 
 
 
 
Epileptic Narration 
In his essay ‘Seized by the Muse: Dostoevsky’s Convulsive Poetics in The Idiot’ (1999), 
Dennis Patrick Slattery argues that Dostoevsky’s epilepsy was not only the inspiration 
but also the main aesthetic principle behind the structure of The Idiot115, a notion that 
is corroborated by Robert Lord, who considers the novel ‘primarily an exploration of 
the epileptic mode of being, which was also Dostoevsky’s own’116. Indeed, in his 
correspondence, Dostoevsky describes that the process of writing the scene of the 
name-day party saw a heightened state of emotional arousal and two epileptic fits: ‘I 
wrote this finale in a state of inspiration, and it cost me two fits in a row’117. Elizabeth 
Dalton considers the epileptic seizure the affective paradigm structuring the scenes of 
distress portrayed in the novel, finding that amongst the scandal scenes, the scene at 
Nastasya Filippovna’s party in particular follows an ‘epileptic pattern’118:  
One has the sense in reading The Idiot that the action of the novel is balanced quite perilously, 
that just beyond or beneath its precarious coherence is a kind of maelstrom or abyss in which 
emotion might lose its connection with intelligible form and manifest itself in some 
unimaginably direct, ‘raw’ state; here ordinary coherent speech and gesture might give way 
to frenzy or blankness. And indeed the novel does present us with the image of this extremity 
in the epileptic seizure. In fact, the seizure is a sort of paradigm of the emotional progression 
in the book’s great scenes. In most of these scenes there is a pattern of rising excitement 
focused upon one central figure whose consciousness becomes more and more strained and 
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116 Lord, Dostoevsky: Essays and Perspectives, p. 101. 
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exalted, until a moment of unbearable tension, when there is a loss of control, followed by 
physical and mental collapse119. 
The epileptic seizure thus becomes a symbol of an existential condition on the edge 
of reason and reality; it is indeed symptomatic for the ‘maelstrom’ of modernity 
Berman describes120.  
Turning to the effect this aesthetic has on readers, Dalton argues that  
[i]n the great scenes of climactic emotion or violent confrontation, the reader is led to 
participate in a kind of loss of control: the ego of the protagonist, under the assault of 
repressed impulses, gives way to energies and fantasies usually inaccessible to it and 
undergoes an enormous expansion of its capacity for perception and feeling121. 
In this sense, the loss of control that is associated with actualisations of mood as the 
driving force behind the development of the plot heightens and intensifies the 
reader’s immediate experience of the novel. Dalton goes on to point out that  
[i]n these scenes the reader feels as if he is being forced to know more, as if the mind is being 
wrenched out of its limits and into those areas of experience of which no rational 
understanding is possible. The aim of these passages seems to be to push consciousness to and 
beyond the breaking point122. 
Pushing the reader further and further, the novel explores the forms of affective 
response that narrative immediacy can generate in its readers and thereby allows 
them to partake in the intense emotions the characters experience. As, in most cases, 
the reader will not have experienced the sensation of an epileptic fit, the novel 
approximates this particular mode of experiential intensity and mental collapse as an 
aesthetic reflection of the modern condition and as a means to implicate the reader 
in a circulation of intense transsubjective affect. 
Dalton further argues that since his seizures give the epileptic Myshkin a 
feeling of oneness with the world, in which the boundaries between self and other are 
suspended, the notion of Sigmund Freud’s oceanic feeling is evoked123. Myshkin’s 
‘oceanic feeling,’ which Freud defines as ‘a feeling of indissoluble connection, of 
belonging inseparably to the external world as a whole’124, metaphorically represents 
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the transmission of affect that the novel aims for and at the same time constitutes an 
affective counter-model to the radical solipsism that I discussed in the previous 
section above. As the experiential lines between self and other are blurred, 
transsubjective Stimmung thus becomes the paradigm of the aesthetic process in The 
Idiot. Transferring this notion to the psychoanalytical context, Dalton argues that the 
reader herself experiences the loss of ego controls that she finds in the characters: 
Nowhere else in Dostoevsky are we taken so far beyond intellectual speculation about and 
description of these states into the actual experience itself. The wild beauty and terror of the 
great scenes, the suffocating excitement that we feel through identification with the 
protagonists and through the dramatic rhythms of tension and abrupt release, are our own 
experience of the loosening of ego controls as we read125. 
For this aim to be fulfilled, mood – in the sense of an existential attunement to the 
narrative world and its characters – becomes the driving force behind the internal 
logic of the plot, and the creation of a processual, temporal structure of Stimmung 
between reader and text, which is continuously destabilised by affective intensity and 
volatility, becomes the most pivotal aspect of its aesthetic effect. 
 
 
 
Polyphony and Transsubjective Affect 
In addition to the concept of the carnivalesque, Bakhtin’s interpretation of 
Dostoevsky’s works in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics famously introduced the concept 
of polyphony to describe the multiplicity of independent voices and points of view 
that are combined and collude in the narrative texts, perhaps most prominently in 
The Brothers Karamazov126. Bakhtin considers Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel as a new 
genre, suggesting that prior to the publication of his works, the European novel was 
‘fundamentally monologic’127 with an emphasis on single minds rather than collective 
forms of consciousness. As opposed to this, polyphony, as well as Bakhtin’s related 
notion of the ‘dialogic’ nature of Dostoevsky’s narrative fiction, by definition 
postulate plurality against singularity, both in an ontological and in an aesthetic 
sense: ‘A single person, remaining alone with himself, cannot make ends meet even 
in the deepest and most intimate spheres of his own spiritual life, he cannot manage 
without another consciousness. One person can never find fullness in himself alone’128. 
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This is what Bakhtin finds with regard to Dostoevsky’s aesthetics in the Problems, 
suggesting that this mode of existence even applies to the most solipsistic of 
Dostoevsky’s alienated characters. As mentioned previously, every word written in 
the Notes is by definition dialogic in nature as the underground man directs his entire 
speech to an imagined audience, anticipating their responses and adjusting his 
discourse accordingly. The presence of an imagined other thus renders the text by 
definition intersubjective, postulating a primacy of ‘coexistence and interaction’129. 
The ‘dialogic’ nature of affective structures, as described above, uncovers a 
fundamental relatedness between the notions of polyphony and dialogism on the one 
hand and Stimmung on the other hand: as Dostoevsky’s characters, narrators and 
readers are always, by definition, oriented towards another consciousness – be it that 
of another character, the author, implied author etc. – individual states of mind and 
affect are never, as it were, singular in nature. Bakhtin further explains that  
the orientation of one person to another person’s discourse and consciousness is, in essence, 
the basic theme of all of Dostoevsky’s works. The hero’s attitude toward himself is 
inseparably bound up with his attitude toward another, and with the attitude of another 
toward him130.  
The characters in Dostoevsky’s works are thus always contingent on another, and 
relate to that other through notions of harmony and dissonance (an idea that will, 
later in this study, be revisited in relation to Beckett’s aesthetic search for harmony). 
In this sense, the fundamental category of personality only comes into being through 
its relationship with others, John Bayley suggests in The Characters of Love131.  Literary 
characters thus emerge out of a constitutive relationality to others, in Bayley’s 
analysis through the structure of his specific and particular construction of ‘love’.  
In The Idiot, a less straight-forward polyphonic layering of voices than in other 
works by Dostoevsky comes into play, leading Jones to conclude that due to the 
disorganised design of the text and the sudden changes in voice and generic patterns, 
particularly in the second half of the novel, ‘polyphony becomes cacophony’132. 
Young, however, offers a new interpretation of The Idiot in Dostoevsky’s ‘The Idiot’ and 
the Ethical Foundations of Narrative: Reading, Narrating, Scripting (2004), in which she 
introduces the concept of ‘scripting’ in analysing the characters and the multi-layered 
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structure of voices in the text. She suggests that the novel is marked by frequent 
collaborative and interactive scenes of storytelling, in which stories are related in 
social situations that define their very trajectory. Young defines these acts as 
‘scripting’. As individual characters orient their narratives toward others, the 
narrative process in itself becomes intersubjective and dialogic in nature:  
The interactive aspect of scripting is fundamental; the success of a particular script depends 
on the characters’ ability to persuade another to give it a concrete reality through 
participating in its realization. Protagonists thus invite or coerce others into accepting 
supporting roles in their own dramas, thereby elevating the status of their own stories within 
the text and taking over the function of guiding the plot, as characters move in accordance 
with the demands of each others’ scripts, not the author/narrator’s design133. 
Since each character becomes contingent on the fellow inhabitants of the narrative 
world, the self is shown to be, by definition, dependent on the attunement to others: 
‘At the same time, the self only comes into being, and the idea is only realized, 
through dialogic activity with the other, through a “communion of 
consciousnesses”’134. Although Young’s analysis focuses on the characters within the 
text rather than reader-text-interaction, this phenomenon affects not only the 
fictional characters of The Idiot but also the text’s readers, who are dialogically 
attuned to the novel’s frenzied affective intensity. 
 Stimmung thereby becomes constitutive not only for the relationships between 
characters and the narrative world, becoming the driving force behind the novel’s 
plot-development, but also for the relationship between the reader and the text. The 
fundamental category of affective and existential intersubjectivity, which underlies 
the aesthetic composition of the novel, thus stimulates a process of attunement 
between the text and its readers, not only by approximating their affective states to 
that of the characters, but also by actively ‘scripting’ the presence of the reader into 
the narrative trajectory of the text. Bakhtin’s description of Dostoevsky’s implied 
understanding of lived experience therefore also dictates the way in which his texts 
engage readers in the aesthetic process, and it holds true for The Idiot in particular:  
‘For [Dostoevsky], to get one’s bearings on the world meant to conceive all its 
contents as simultaneous, and to guess at their interrelationships in the cross-section of a single 
moment’135, a description reminiscent of Heidegger’s definition of the continuous 
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spatio-temporal attunement of existence. Dalton’s analysis of The Idiot underlines the 
destabilising existential potential of this reading experience as she speaks of ‘the 
loosening of ego controls’ in the process of aesthetic reception. The reader’s subject 
position is thus replaced by an ever-evolving subject-position, to relate this to the 
theory of aesthetic Stimmung developed in the previous chapter, whose development is 
contingent on an attunement to the textual modes of affectedness and possibility. 
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion: Dostoevsky’s Aesthetic Intensity and the Modern 
Condition 
The considerations in this chapter have outlined Dostoevsky’s preoccupation with 
modernity, both experiential and aesthetic, and the poetic response to the cultural 
climate of industrial and epistemological modernisation he found himself in. By 
focusing on the works from his middle period throughout the 1860s, I aimed to 
unearth the relationship between the ‘modern condition’ and the emergence of the 
notions of Stimmung discussed in the previous section. As the Notes from Underground and 
Crime and Punishment demonstrate, the transformation of experience, lived space and 
other fundamental existential conditions resulted in a pervasive cultural 
Grundstimmung of alienation and crisis, one that was strongly associated with questions 
of material space and urban modernity. Both texts, and the modes of existence 
presented in them, are inextricably linked to their setting Saint Petersburg and its 
particular, material climate, shaped by the ethos of modernisation, the concreteness 
of space and the actuality of urban misery, violence and disillusionment. Dostoevsky 
thereby ‘emphasized, with exceptional complexity and pathos, this city’s 
modernity—its tangible modernization, […], as well as the philosophical significance 
of this modernity’136. The solipsism of the characters portrayed in these texts betrays 
a consistent struggle with the notion of the other and with its own isolation in a 
structure of fundamental dislocation and dissonance with the modern world – 
ultimately, Raskolnikov finds human company again, while the underground man is 
submerged in his existential squalor – while at the same time dialogically reaching 
out to a reader implicated in a relationship that relativises his perceived solitude. 
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The Idiot, meanwhile, refocuses its existential concerns onto the notion of 
intersubjective experience. As discussed above, the novel engages Stimmung as a plot-
developing element in order to facilitate a transsubjective experience of attunement 
that involves the reader in the intense immediacy of the narrative. Not only are 
Dostoevsky’s characters out of tune with their narrative world; the narrative structure 
of the novel aims at getting the reader out of step with the plot by progressively 
frustrating her expectations and emotions in order to open up a mode of experience 
that approximates the modern experience of uncertainty, transience and immediacy. 
Malcolm Jones aptly summarises this by suggesting that ‘Dostoevsky […] keeps his 
readers constantly on the verge of losing their balance, on the threshold of out-of-text 
normality’137. The novel generates an intensity of affect that is closely related to the 
notion of genre as a framework for meaning-production as the reader’s experience of 
the mood of the novel becomes the breaking point for her ability to make sense of the 
plot. If she considers the mood of The Idiot as carnivalistic, the novel becomes a 
comedy; if she perceives the events as disturbing, it becomes horror or a tragedy, a 
notion that will be explored further in Chapter 4 of this study. Maintaining this 
ambivalence until the very end, until the tragic outcome of the narrative, the novel 
forces its readers to get invested on an intellectual as well as on an emotional level, 
and it also suspends their ontic attunement in aid of an aesthetic attunement to the 
text that revolves around a fundamental sense of ‘out-of-tuneness’. 
All of the above argues against a reading of Dostoevsky’s works on a purely 
metaphysical plane. More than a ‘seer of the mind’, his novels showcase a strong 
affinity with materiality, embodied affect and modes of aesthetic response. In 
concurrence with this notion, Alex de Jonge, in his 1975 study Dostoevsky and The Age 
of Intensity, interprets the immediacy of experience employed in The Idiot as part and 
parcel of an aesthetic agenda that foregrounds the motif of intensity:  
Dostoevsky seeks to capture the spirit of his age through an aesthetic code built upon the 
need to provoke a reaction at all costs. Its aim is neither beauty nor harmony of form, but 
sensation and intensity. […] [F]rom Baudelaire and Dostoevsky onward, we see artists 
beginning to turn their backs on meaning, reducing their work to the cultivation of mere 
meaningless sensation, a sensation which is described by twentieth-century aesthetics as a 
‘pure aesthetic response’138. 
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In this sense, de Jonge proposes, Dostoevsky’s novels thus address their readers more 
directly on an aesthetic and experiential level rather than on an intellectual level. 
Attunement, as an integral aspect of an aesthetic modernity that grew out of the 
poetics of urban space and transsubjective affect, becomes the key principle in the 
reader-text relationship and in Dostoevsky’s texts narrative plot fosters this complex 
temporal relationship by foregrounding affect, mood and inclination instead of 
reason or aesthetic form as its main catalysts. The levels of attunement in the works I 
have discussed thus consistently intersect: the attunement between characters and 
their worlds is conditioned by a cultural climate, a fundamental Grundstimmung of the 
modern the texts project into their aesthetic design. At the same time, the 
attunement between the reader and the text, its modes of vicissitude and instability, 
aims to convey that very cultural climate into the experiential realm of the reader. 
 Both expressive and constitutive of an aesthetic pathology of this age, 
Dostoevsky’s narrative fiction is decidedly embedded in the larger context of the 
modern condition; it is, paradoxically, as modern as it is distrustful of the notion of 
modernity. ‘Dostoevsky’s fiction undoubtedly makes a major contribution to the 
collapse of the enlightened “modern” subject’, Rowan Williams proposes. And, 
further: 
through its suspicion of easy harmonics, [The Idiot] puts in question the simple narrative 
resolutions of an earlier age. But by doing so, it ranges that kind of narrative naivety 
alongside the ‘truth’ that threatens to turn into violence.139 
In The Idiot, the ‘maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and 
contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish’140 that modernity propels individuals into 
reaches from the text into the aesthetic experience of the reader, aiming to turn an 
intellectual discomfort with the modern condition into an affective experience of it. 
Dostoevsky’s works and their distinctly modern Stimmung indeed invite to think of him 
as a ‘prophet’ of modernity141; to say the least, his claim in a draft for a letter to M. 
N. Katkov, in which he pitched the idea that lead him to writing Crime and Punishment, 
rings very true: ‘In short, I am convinced that my subject matter is in part justified by 
our times’142. 
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Chapter 3 
Aesthetic Attunement in Samuel Beckett’s Narrative Fiction 
I. Introduction: Modes of Modernity from Dostoevsky to Beckett 
As we have come to see in the previous chapter, Dostoevsky’s aesthetic articulations 
of attunement are very much defined through a reliance on the existential, affective 
and spatial aspects inherent in the concept of Stimmung. Therein, the musical origin of 
attunement, which I have discussed in the introductory section of this study, remains 
mostly covert; however, in a crucial section in Notes from Underground, the connection 
between existence and the realm of the musical surfaces. In discussing the ways in 
which scientific thinking has affected modes of existence in the modern world, the 
underground man comments on the idea that in light of modern-day rationalism 
human beings are depicted as mere ‘piano keys’ that are governed by the laws of 
nature. The underground man, however, suggests that this concept would not suffice 
for the establishment of the individual’s sense of self and that if man was truly happy 
and prosperous as such a ‘piano key’ in the larger scheme of existence, he would 
destroy that happiness in order to prove his free will: 
Именно свои фантастические мечты, свою пошлейшую глупость пожелает удержать за 
собой единственно для того, чтоб самому себе подтвердить (точно это так уж очень 
необходимо), что люди все еще люди, а не фортепьянные клавиши, на которых хоть и 
играют сами законы природы собственноручно, но грозят до того доиграться, что уж 
мимо календаря и захотеть ничего нельзя будет1.  
[It is precisely his fantastic dreams, his most banal stupidity, that he will wish to keep hold of, 
with the sole purpose of confirming to himself (as if it were so very necessary) that human 
beings are still human beings and not piano keys, which, though played upon with their own 
hands by the laws of nature themselves, are in danger of being played so much that outside 
the calendar it will be impossible to want anything2.] 
Threatened by the notion of being subject to the laws and mechanisms of nature, 
man would – according to the underground man – rather destroy a content existence 
than submit to being controlled from without. He further suggests that even if it was 
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scientifically proven that man is a mere ‘piano key’ of nature, he would insist on his 
individuality and violently demonstrate his free will: 
Да ведь мало того: даже в том случае, если он действительно бы оказался 
фортепьянной клавишей, если б это доказать ему даже естественными науками и 
математически, так и тут не образумится, а нарочно напротив что-нибудь сделает, 
единственно из одной неблагодарности; […]! Я верю в это, я отвечаю за это, потому 
что ведь все дело-то человеческое, кажется, и действительно в том только и состоит, 
чтоб человек поминутно доказывал себе, что он человек, а не штифтик!3 
[And more than that: even if it should indeed turn out that he is a piano key, if it were even 
proved to him mathematically and by natural science, he would still not come to reason, but 
would do something contrary on purpose, solely out of ingratitude alone; essentially to have 
his own way. […] I believe in this, I will answer for this, because the whole human enterprise 
seems indeed to consist in man’s proving to himself every moment that he is a man and not a 
sprig!4] 
In this context, the image of the piano key marks an important choice: as opposed to 
other common metaphors implying a sense of machination – as for example those of 
the clockwork or puppet – the image of the piano key is fundamentally connected to 
the question of musical tuning and to the notion of an existential attunement to 
others. Human beings are thus depicted as piano keys that are attuned to one 
another and to the world from without, lacking control and self-determination. 
However, instead of submitting to an attunement that would grant a harmonious 
existence, the narrator reflects, modern man would rather shatter this harmony to 
prove his individual and free will. There is a notion of violence implied in the 
underground man’s metaphor of the piano keys: musical attunement thereby 
becomes an imposition of a mechanical structure from without that obliterates 
individual subjectivity and free will. Since harmony is thus perceived as threatening 
and oppressive, dissonance becomes the fundamental stance the modern individual 
takes in order to posit its own subjectivity. 
 In his study Stages of the Clown: Perspectives on Modern Fiction from Dostoevsky to 
Beckett (1970), Richard Pearce chronicles a particular line of development in the 
literature of modernity that begins with Dostoevsky and leads up to Beckett’s fiction. 
Pearce therein focuses on the mode of the comical in key works of aesthetic 
modernity, including those of Dickens, Kafka and William Faulkner, and traces its 
development as a particular articulation of the modern in these texts. In doing so, he 
describes Beckett as an heir to Dostoevsky’s existential concerns, who, at the same 
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time, developed this latent trajectory in Dostoevsky’s works further. In describing this 
relationship, Pearce himself resorts to the musical metaphor: ‘Beckett has taken 
Dostoyevsky’s figure of man as a piano key and has explored the imaginative 
possibilities of man, not escaping his situation by capricious action, but capriciously 
playing the key himself’5. Beckett’s engagement with the existential attunement 
between self and world thus continues Dostoevsky’s enquiry into the modern 
condition, taking a playful approach to exploring the modes and possibilities of that 
attunement. 
J.M. Coetzee, too, sees a connection between the aesthetic existentialism of 
Dostoevsky and Beckett as he describes the as latter ‘echoing’6 the former’s mode of 
metafictional self-reflection and self-scrutiny in the Notes. Beckett indeed displayed a 
fascination with the Russian novelist and at one point proposed an essay on his works 
to his publisher Charles Prentice, which was, however, never written7. His lectures 
on the modern novel given in 1930 – which are only preserved in fragmentary form 
and were largely influenced by André Gide’s work on Dostoevsky – underline that 
Beckett considered Dostoevsky as an eminent author in the development of modern 
literature. In his analysis of these lectures, John Bolin describes this perspective as 
follows: 
Dostoevsky is […] introduced in Beckett’s lectures as a counter-paradigm—again, not simply 
to French literary tendencies, but to what is described as the ‘European’ novel. This 
otherness essentially consists in Dostoevsky’s treatment of subjectivity. In contrast to the 
Naturalists, Dostoevsky posits the ultimate incomprehensibility of the actions and 
personalities of his characters8. 
Dostoevsky’s brand of affectively charged, anti-rational poetics thus, in Beckett’s 
view, marked an incision in the development of the novel form, and he located his 
own writing in this tradition. However, Beckett’s aesthetics of the existential crisis at 
the heart of the modern experience would differ considerably from Dostoevsky’s, 
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and, in doing so, rephrase the fundamental dissonance in the conditions of human 
existence through close reference to the musical dimension of Stimmung. 
It might appear counterintuitive to investigate the role of moods that are 
depicted in fiction in the writing of an author who is known for subverting the notion 
of aesthetic mimesis as radically as Samuel Beckett is. How is one to examine the role 
of affect in novels that deconstruct character, plot, setting and narrative as well as the 
very idea of the possibility of depicting the world authentically, if not the idea of 
authenticity itself? In fact, as I will show, the question of mood needs to be reframed 
even more radically than we have previously seen when reading Beckett’s prose 
works, and my contention will be that his texts even consciously force readers to 
reframe this question and similar related categories that are often accepted as 
constitutive and integral parts of fiction as we know it. Stimmung in Beckett is not a 
representational matter, but a question of convergence, of whether the aesthetic 
process is capable of creating a shared state of mind in the deserted space of what I 
have above described as Heidegger’s ‘thrown’ mode of being. 
The idea of the modern subject plays a crucial role in Beckett’s narrative 
works. From his early texts through to the ‘trilogy’, his protagonists and narrators 
first reflect the struggle to establish subjectivity and eventually represent the complete 
disintegration of the concept of the subject, as it is depicted in The Unnamable 
(L’Innomable, 1953; English version published in 1958). Their strained relationships to 
the world express a deep sense of dissonance and distress within the modern 
experience as the project of modernity creates an existential Grundstimmung of 
uncertainty, vicissitude and, as we have seen in Dostoevsky, illness. In a letter written 
in German in 1937, Beckett reflects on a sense of ‘Dissonanz von Mitteln und 
Gebrauch’9, a ‘dissonance between means and their use’, which he saw at the heart 
of modern literature and which aims to express that very condition. Following this 
line of thought, this chapter will examine the correlations between the existential and 
aesthetic concept of Stimmung and Beckett’s narrative fiction, focusing on the question 
of how the notion of attunement can not only be applied to, but also developed 
further through a reading of Beckett’s narrative fiction. 
                                                            
9 Samuel Beckett qtd. in John Pilling, ‘A Critique of Aesthetic Judgment: Beckett’s “Dissonance of 
Ends and Means”’, in A Companion to Samuel Beckett., ed. by S.E. Gontarski (Chichester et al.: Wiley-
Blackwell), pp. 63-72. (p.63). 
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My analysis will revolve around what critics often refer to as Beckett’s pentalogy 
of novels, comprising Murphy (1938), his first published novel, Watt (1953) and the 
trilogy consisting of Molloy (1951; English version first published in 1955), Malone Dies 
(Malone meurt, 1951; English version published in 1956) and The Unnamable. As I will 
demonstrate, Beckett’s narrative texts redefine and invert the relationship between 
their narrators and readers even more radically than Dostoevsky’s, producing a 
dissolution of subjectivity that results in a circulation of mood between reader and 
text. In doing so, they undermine traditional ideas of fictional setting and character, 
challenging the concepts of self, world and attunement that I have sought to develop 
thus far. Tracing the notion of Stimmung and attunement through Beckett’s major 
novels, I will show the extent to which they depict the modern human condition as 
being shaped by a sense of dissonance and unstable self-identity within the world that 
echoes Dostoevsky’s conception of modernity and develops its aesthetic articulations 
further. 
 
 
 
Strange Bedfellows: Beckett and Heidegger 
Beckett himself claimed that he made no specific effort to engage with Heidegger’s 
philosophy. In an interview with Tom Driver, he mentioned that Heidegger (and 
Sartre) ‘may be right’ about certain things, but that their language was ‘too 
philosophical’10 for him. In his article ‘Beaufret, Beckett, and Heidegger: The 
Question(s) of Influence’ (2010), Rodney Sharkey, however, indicates that Beckett 
was familiarised with Heidegger’s philosophy through his friend and mentor Jean 
Beaufret, who had worked with Heidegger and played a major role in French 
Heidegger reception11. Beckett’s affinities with Heidegger have been explored in 
more detail in Lance St John Butler’s Samuel Beckett and the Meaning of Being12 (1984) as 
well as Steve Barfield’s ‘Beckett and Heidegger: A Critical Survey’13 (2002). St John 
                                                            
10 Beckett qtd. in Tom Driver, ‘Interview with Samuel Beckett in Columbia University Forum, Summer 
1961’, in Samuel Beckett: The Critical Heritage ed. by Lawrence Graver and Raymond Federman (London 
et al.: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 217-23 (p. 219). 
11 Cf. Rodney Sharkey, ‘Beaufret, Beckett, and Heidegger: The Question(s) of Influence’, Samuel Beckett 
Today / Aujourd’hui, Vol. 22, Samuel Beckett: Debts and Legacies (2010), 409-22. 
12 Cf. Lance St John Butler, Samuel Beckett and the Meaning of Being: A Study in Ontological Parable (London: 
Macmillan, 1984). 
13 Cf. Steve Barfield, ‘Beckett and Heidegger: A Critical Survey’, Beckett and Philosophy, ed. by Richard 
Lane (Houndsmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 154-65. 
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Butler considers Heidegger and Beckett to be ‘linked by a common ontology’14 and 
interprets Beckett’s works as ‘ontological parables’15 for the problems of existence 
Heidegger puts forward. The human condition as one marked by ‘thrownness’ into 
the world is indeed a frequent motif in Beckett’s works. His characters seem to be 
‘thrown’ into their textual existence, with no sense of belonging or purpose: ‘Where 
now? Who now? When now?’16 is their originary state of being; many of them are 
homeless, wandering creatures that do not – in Heideggerian terms – occupy a space 
of dwelling in the world. Despite such overlaps, Barfield considers the relationship 
between Beckett and Heidegger ‘uncanny and unsettling’17. He contends that 
Beckett’s works cannot be considered to be mere literary applications of 
Heideggerian ontology; rather, Barfield finds, Beckett’s engagement with 
existentialist ideas goes beyond Heidegger’s ontology in its ‘pulling down the 
trousers/skirts of being’18.  
The general mode of caution most critics display when connecting Heidegger 
and Beckett indicates that while there are clear affinities, a simple ‘application’ of 
Heidegger’s philosophy in the form of ‘ontological parable’ is not the whole story 
behind Beckett’s aesthetics. In an article in the recent collection Beckett and 
Phenomenology (2009) – the first comprehensive volume investigating Beckett’s 
aesthetics alongside Heidegger as well as other central figures of phenomenology – 
Shane Weller describes Heidegger and Beckett as ‘a strange literary-philosophical 
pseudocouple’19, who share a number of pertinent existential concerns despite a lack 
of direct or obvious influence. As Weller points out, both writers address key 
questions of phenomenology, such as temporality, perception, the conditions of 
existence and, as an integral part of the latter, ‘the “fundamental moods”’20 of being. 
So far, however, the connection between Heidegger’s Stimmung and Beckett’s works 
has not been studied in more detail. In the following, I will test the notion of 
attunement that I have developed on the basis of Heidegger’s philosophy against 
                                                            
14 St John Butler, Samuel Beckett and the Meaning of Being, p. 7. 
15 Ibid., p. 151. 
16 Beckett, The Unnamable, in The Beckett Trilogy: Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable (London: Picador, 
1979), pp. 265-382 (p. 267). 
17 Steve Barfield, ‘Beckett and Heidegger’, p. 156. 
18 Ibid., p. 163. 
19 Shane Weller, ‘Phenomenologies of the Nothing: Democritus, Heidegger, Beckett’, in Beckett and 
Phenomenology, ed. by Ulrika Maude and Matthew Feldman (London and New York, Continuum, 
2009), pp. 39-55 (p. 45). 
20 Ibid., p. 45. 
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Beckett’s narrative fiction to determine to what degree the concept of Stimmung 
upholds as an existential and aesthetic category, and to what extent it needs to be 
attuned to Beckett’s poetics. Focusing on forms of attunement in Beckett’s major 
novels and in his late story Company (1979), I will seek to not only explore the role of 
mood in Beckett’s fiction, but – in turn – to develop the aesthetic concept of Stimmung 
further through Beckett’s textual practice. 
 
 
 
II. Attunement and the (Pre- and Post-)Cartesian Subject in Murphy 
and Watt 
Murphy’s Quest for Harmony 
The philosophical implications of attunement are first, and to a certain degree 
polemically, explored in Murphy, a novel written during the interwar years and 
influenced by Beckett’s time in London. Just as the eponymous ‘idiot’ from 
Dostoevsky’s novel, Murphy is a character who is deeply out of tune with his times 
and the world he lives in. Unemployed and solipsistic, he tries to escape from the 
physical world by tying himself to a chair and thereby silencing his body, which is 
meant to ‘set him free in his mind’21, thus parodying the Cartesian separation of 
body and mind. When his lover Celia urges him to find a job in order to make a 
living, he is disturbed by the capitalist ethos governing the world around him, but 
eventually finds work as an attendant at the Magdalen Mental Mercyseat (M.M.M.), 
a psychiatric hospital, where he can relate to the patients as kindred spirits. Murphy’s 
inability to establish a harmonic relationship in the ‘outside’ world is countered by 
the sense of being kin to the rejects of society at the M.M.M. He feels respect for the 
patients and recognises his own desire to disengage from the world in their ‘self-
immersed indifference to the contingencies of the contingent world which he had 
chosen for himself as the only felicity and achieved so seldom’22. His ‘kinship’ with 
his patient Mr Endon, ‘a schizophrenic of the most amiable variety’23, exceeds any 
other human connection he forms in the course of the novel, and yet this relationship 
of familiarity ultimately fails in the process of the notorious chess game between 
                                                            
21 Beckett, Murphy, ed. by J.C.C. Mays (London: Faber & Faber, 2009), pp. 3f. 
22 Ibid., p. 106. 
23 Ibid., p. 116. 
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Murphy and Mr Endon24. Eventually, while being searched for by a group of 
acquaintances he is romantically entangled with, Murphy’s disturbed relationship to 
the world culminates in his bizarrely comical, accidental death caused by a gas leak. 
As I will argue, the search for harmony or attunement is the central concern of 
the novel, and as such is introduced early on in Murphy. During the exposition of the 
novel, it is related that Murphy’s former mentor Neary has developed the ability to 
control his heartbeat through his mind, which enables him to stop his heart. He also 
attempts to mediate the extremes of activity he has detected in Murphy’s heart: 
For Murphy had such an irrational heart that no physician could get to the roof of it. 
Inspected, palpated, ausculated, percussed, radiographed and cardiographed, it was all that a 
heart should be. Buttoned up and left to perform, it was like Petrouchka in his box. One 
moment in such labour that it seemed on the point of seizing, the next in such ebullition that 
it seemed on the point of bursting25. 
The text here references the second tableau of Igor Stravinsky’s ballet Petrushka 
(«Петрушка», 1910-11), in which the eponymous hero, a puppet brought to life by 
his owner, the Charlatan, is locked away in his box and – torn between despair and 
anger fuelled by rejected love and the Charlatan’s treatment of him – performs a 
dance alternating between agitation and silent desperation. The musical score of the 
scene is marked by frequent shifts, accelerations and decelerations in tempo, varying 
from lento to furioso. Being subject to sudden alterations, Murphy’s physiological 
disposition lacks a constant rhythm and a middle ground between affective extremes, 
a reflection of Beckett’s own heart condition, as a result of which his heart would 
intermittently start to race at night-time26. 
This search or desire for a steady rhythm is related to the novel’s opening 
scene, in which Murphy is swaying back and forth on his rocking chair, having tied 
his naked body to it. The swaying of his body is translated into a swaying, back-and-
forth rhythm in the syntax of the famous opening lines: ‘The sun shone, having no 
alternative, on the nothing new. Murphy sat out of it, as though he were free, in a 
mew in West Brompton’27. In this sequence, the punctuation marks create rhythmic 
                                                            
24 For a detailed analysis of this chess game and its philosophical implications, see Richard Marshall’s 
article ‘The Illusory Nothing of Endon’s Affence’, in Samuel Beckett and the Encounter of Philosophy and 
Literature, ed. by Arka Chattopadhyay and James Martell (London et al.: Roman Books 2013), pp. 271-
89, and Angela Moorjani’s Abysmal Games in the Novels of Samuel Beckett (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 75-80. 
25 Beckett, Murphy, p. 4. 
26 Cf. Knowlson, Damned to Fame, pp. 64; 214f. 
27 Beckett, Murphy, p. 3. 
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segments of language that suggest a swaying movement, thereby establishing a 
connection between the motion of Murphy’s body and the acoustic dimension of 
language. In Beckett’s works, the image of the rocking chair, which reappears in his 
late play Rockaby (1980), connects the rhythm of language with a form of soothing, 
rhythmical motion in space, and particularly in a non-performative piece such as 
Murphy, this technique serves as a way of simulating motion through the acoustics of 
language. The material dimension of language is thus foregrounded in a way that 
anchors the novel in the materiality and movement of the narrative world, which is a 
world of sound and rhythm, despite Murphy’s desire to escape it. This underlying 
structure and other aspects of materiality have recently prompted critics to re-
evaluate Beckett’s texts as ‘a literature of the body’28. Furthermore, already in these 
opening lines, we can detect the reader-oriented trajectory of Beckett’s aesthetics as 
the structure of these lines seeks to rhythmically attune the reader’s breath to his 
prose. 
Neary, ‘at that time a Pythagorean’29, makes it his objective to establish a 
balance between the extremes of agitation in Murphy’s heart: ‘It was the mediation 
between these extremes that Neary called the Apmonia. When he got tired of calling 
it the Apmonia he called it the Isonomy. When he got sick of the sound of Isonomy 
he called it the Attunement’30. ‘Apmonia’ is Beckett’s misreading of ἁρμονία [armonía], 
a term from Pythagorean acoustics theory meaning ‘harmony’ or ‘octave,’ while 
‘isonomy,’ again, derived from an ancient Greek term, ἰσονομία [‘isonomia’], is now 
chiefly associated with equality before the law, but as coined by Alkmaion refers to a 
notion of medical harmony in the body31 that influenced the Hippocratic theory of 
the four humours. According to this theory, the human body is governed by four 
humours – blood, phlegm, black bile and yellow bile – the balance of which 
determines the body’s health32. This notion would later develop into the theory of 
the four temperaments or character types associated with the humours that, as the 
first psychosomatic theory of mood, remained influential until the modern age. 
                                                            
28 Ulrika Maude, ‘Beckett, Body and Mind’, in The New Cambridge Companion to Samuel Beckett, ed. by 
Dirk Van Hulle (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 170-84 (p. 170). 
29 Beckett, Murphy, p. 4. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Cf. C.J. Ackerley and S.E. Gontarski, The Grove Companion to Samuel Beckett: A Reader’s Guide to His 
Works, Life, and Thought (New York: Grove Press, 2004), p. 15. 
32 Jacques Jouanna, Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen: Selected Papers, ed. by Philip van der Eijk, 
trans. by Neil Allies (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2012), p. 335. 
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Rather than an intentional error in transcribing ἁρμονία that may showcase 
Neary’s inaptitude, it seems that Beckett unintentionally mistook the Greek letter ρ 
[‘rho’] for a Latin ‘p’ as his ‘Philosophy Notes’ on Presocratic thinking also use the 
term ‘Apmonia’ instead of ‘Armonia’: ‘Harmony (Apmonia) in classical Greek music 
refers not to chords but to melodic progressions, and means, first “tuning” and then 
“scale”’33. Against the grain of common interpretations of Murphy as a novel about 
Cartesianism, according to Eugene Webb, Matthew Feldman and Peter Fifield, 
Beckett’s affinity to Pythagorean philosophy, which finds expression in the character 
of Neary, and other pre- and post-Cartesian thinkers shaped the ideas explored in 
Murphy as much as, or perhaps even more, than Cartesianism did34. Fifield thus 
suggests that 
the novel’s broader philosophical debt is revealed as that owed to the early Greek 
philosophers such as Pythagoras and Democritus, and post-Cartesians such as Nicolas 
Malebranche and Arnold Geulincx, rather than to Descartes himself. Adequate knowledge of 
these more obscure sources allows us to see that Murphy’s dualism is not a straightforward 
Cartesianism but something altogether more subtle and more strange35. 
Rather than simply emulating or parodying Cartesianism, Beckett’s exploration of 
the division between mind and matter thus situates the Cartesian dualism among 
pre- and post-Cartesian approaches to the philosophy of the self, in doing so 
complicating the relationship between the physical world and the mind. As Michael 
E. Mooney argues, the connection to early Greek philosophy in particular 
complements the Cartesian thought commonly cited as a source that influenced 
Beckett’s take on the human condition36. 
Beckett’s indebtedness to Pythagoreanism gives the concepts of harmony and 
attunement a central role in his first published novel, in which they are used both as 
a structuring device and as a theme. Neary’s attempted mediation between extremes 
in Murphy’s physiology to reach a point of cardiac ‘Apmonia’ or Attunement follows 
the Pythagorean definition of harmony, which Leo Spitzer – as I have outlined in 
Chapter 1 – considers as the origin of the philosophical paradigm of harmony. In 
                                                            
33 Beckett qtd. in Matthew Feldman, Beckett’s Books: A Cultural History of Samuel Beckett’s ‘Interwar Notes’ 
(London and New York, NY: Continuum, 2006), p. 69. 
34 Cf. Eugene Webb, Samuel Beckett: A Study of His Novels (London: Peter Owen, 1970), pp. 27f.; 
Feldman, Beckett’s Books, p. 69; Peter Fifield, ‘Samuel Beckett with, in, and around Philosophy’, The 
New Cambridge Companion to Samuel Beckett, ed. by Dirk Van Hulle (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), pp. 145-57 (p. 150). 
35 Fifield, ‘Samuel Beckett with, in, and around Philosophy’, p. 150. 
36 Michael E. Mooney, ‘Presocratic Scepticism: Samuel Beckett’s Murphy Reconsidered’, English 
Literary History, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1982), 214-34 (pp. 214f.). 
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Pythagorean thinking, armonía is defined as the negotiating force between the two 
classes of entities the world consists of, unlimited entities like space and time, and 
their limiters, for instance measures of length and duration. Due to the lack of 
written records of Pythagoras’s own thought, the surviving fragments authored by his 
follower Philolaus (ca. 470-385 BC) are often used as the first reference point for the 
Pythagorean theory of harmony37.  
According to Philolaus, the world is composed of three aspects, that is 
unlimiteds, limiters and the bond between them, harmony:  
Concerning nature and harmony the situation is this: the being of things, which is eternal, 
and nature herself admit of divine and not human knowledge—except that it was impossible 
for any of the things that are and are known by us to have come to be, if the being of the 
things from which the cosmos came together, both the limiters and the unlimiteds, did not 
preexist. But since these beginnings preexisted and were neither alike nor even related, it 
would have been impossible for them to be ordered, if a harmony had not come upon them, 
in whatever way it came to be. Well then, like things and related things did not require any 
harmony additionally, but things that are unlike, being neither related nor of equal speed—it 
is necessary that such things be bonded together by harmony, if they are going to be held in 
order38. 
Although Philolaus does not specify how (and when) harmony came to be established 
between the two categories of existence, he defines it as the mandatory bond that 
allows for a sense of order between them, as that which creates a relation between 
the unlimited elements of the world and its limiters and thereby introduces a 
connectedness between entities that would otherwise be disparate, random and 
chaotic. The initial ontological status of these elements is thus unclear, but the 
fragment under discussion implies that within the Pythagorean world picture, the 
concept of harmony is given a primacy of being. Horky further expounds this:  
[a]ccording to Philolaus, ‘being,’ which is prior to the two other primary forces (limiters and 
unlimiteds), is a necessary precondition for the existence of all things in the cosmos, which 
have been constituted through the ‘harmonization’ of limiters and unlimiteds. One might 
speculate that the ‘being of things’ and ‘harmony,’ for Philolaus, could be the same thing, or 
at least strongly related to one another; this would account for the surprising supervenience of 
‘harmony,’ which is not described as ontologically prior, and seemingly appears out of 
nowhere in the fragment39. 
The strong relationship, perhaps even equivalence, between being and harmony 
Horky detects in this fragment is reminiscent of Heidegger’s primacy of Stimmung in 
                                                            
37 Leonid Zhmud, Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans, trans. by Kevin Windle and Rosh Ireland 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 289. 
38 Philolaus qtd. in Phillip Sidney Horky, Plato and Pythagoreanism (Oxford et al.: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), p. 144 (translation after Carl A. Huffman). 
39 Horky, Plato and Pythagoreanism, pp. 145f. 
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human existence, but it renders harmony an even more fundamental phenomenon. 
While in Heidegger, attunement more specifically describes the relationship between 
Dasein and the world, in this interpretation of Philolaus, the idea of an orderly world 
can only emerge if any form of being is negotiated, and established, through 
harmony or a process of harmonisation. In this sense, harmony comes in the form of 
a relation, a negotiating force between disparate and epistemologically inaccessible 
elements that only become meaningful and identifiable through harmonisation. 
 A prime example of this structure is musical tuning as in musical theory ‘[a]n 
unlimited (the continuum of sound) is combined with limiters (points on that 
continuum)’40. Carl A. Huffmann further explains that in Pythagorean tuning  
this combination is governed by a fitting together according to whole number ratios 1:2, 2:3, 
3:4 that define the central musical concords of the octave, fifth, and fourth respectively, so 
that the result is no chance set of notes but the diatonic scale41. 
In Pythagorean philosophy, the concept of harmony was thus strongly associated 
with both the realm of music and acoustics and with mathematics, establishing a 
strong link between the two as numerical ratios were used as the basis for musical 
intervals42. Through this relation, the Pythagorean tuning system, which relies on a 
diatonic scale constituted by ‘pure’ fifths, was created43. As opposed to equal 
temperament, which tempers the fifths constituting the octave slightly by narrowing 
them to allow for an evenly sounding octave – and which has been the universal 
musical tuning standard since the first half of the twentieth century – Pythagorean 
tuning uses untempered fifths and relies on natural acoustic proportions44.  
In accordance with this notion, Andrew Barker points out that in the original 
sense, the Pythagorean term for harmony refers to the structure of the octave: ‘What 
Philolaus now calls harmonia is the interval of an octave, structurally integrated by 
relations between the notes inside it’45. Thus, in the musical sense, harmony is first 
and foremost a relationship of similarity or ‘kinship’ between notes that is defined by 
equivalent acoustic ratios. Beckett’s aforementioned observation that Pythagorean 
                                                            
40 Carl A. Huffmann, ‘The Pythagorean Tradition’, The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, 
ed. by A.A. Long (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 66-87 (p. 81). 
41 Ibid. 
42 Cf. Zhmud, Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans, p. 292. 
43 Cf. Ross W. Duffin, How Equal Temperament Ruined Harmony (And Why You Should Care) (New York and 
London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), pp. 23; 38. 
44 Cf. ibid., p. 27. 
45 Andrew Barker, ‘Pythagorean Harmonics’, in A History of Pythagoreanism, ed. by Carl A. Huffman 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 185-203 (p. 191). 
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harmony ‘refers not to chords but to melodic progressions’ documents the temporal, 
processual dimension of the concept: harmony first describes a progression of musical 
notes rather than their simultaneity. Consequently, it ‘means, first “tuning” and then 
“scale”’; it designates first and foremost a process of harmonisation rather than a 
firmly established relationship between fixed musical elements. 
In Philolaus’s writings, the ‘mathematical harmonics’46 of the acoustic realm 
thus serve as an analogy for the relationship between elements of being, including the 
human body. Leonid Zhmud suggests that Philolaus considered the soul as the 
harmony or attunement of the elements of the body47. The soul thus designates the 
balance and equilibrium between the bodily functions and, as Zhmud suggests, the 
occurrence of illness could indicate a disturbance of this harmony48 – as later on the 
cause of physical and mental afflictions would be seen in an imbalance of the four 
humours. Whereas reason and the mind were associated with the brain, some of the 
                                                            
46 Zhmud, Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans, p. 286. 
47 Cf. ibid.: 390f. The concept of the soul as a form of attunement reappears in Plato’s Phaedo [in Meno 
and Phaedo, ed. by David Sedley and Alex Long, trans. by Long (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010)], as expressed by the character Simmias when he addresses Socrates. Simmias 
suggests that the body is analogous to a tuned lyre and, just as the attunement ceases when the lyre is 
destroyed, the soul comes to an end when the human body dies: 
‘In the following respect, I think,’ he said. ‘One might say the same thing about attunement 
too, and a lyre and strings: that the attunement is something invisible, incorporeal, and 
utterly beautiful and divine in the tuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are bodies, 
corporeal, composite and earthy, and akin to the mortal. So when someone either smashes 
the lyre or cuts and snaps its strings, what if one were to insist, with the same argument as 
yours, that the attunement must still exist and not have perished? For there would be no way, 
when the lyre still exists with its strings snapped, and when the strings themselves, which are 
of a mortal kind, still exist, that the attunement, which is akin to and of the same nature as 
the divine and immortal, could have perished, and perished before the mortal did. No, he’d 
say, the attunement must still exist on its own somewhere, and the bits of wood and the 
strings must rot away before anything happens to the attunement. In actual fact, Socrates, I 
think that you yourself are well aware that we take the soul to be something of precisely this 
kind, since our body is made taut, so to speak, and held together by hot, cold, dry, wet and 
certain other such things, and our soul is a blend and attunement of those very things, when 
they are blended properly and proportionately with one another. Anyway, if the soul really is 
a sort of attunement, obviously when our body is loosened or tautened beyond proportion by 
illnesses or other evils, the soul must perish at once, however divine it may be, just like other 
sorts of attunement […]’ (pp. 78f.). 
The body and the lyre are physical entities, Simmias argues, that need to pre-exist in order to enable 
an attunement. Once the material aspects are destroyed, the attunement, an invisible and incorporeal 
element, is extinguished. In response to this, Socrates debunks Simmias’s analogy by stating that the 
attunement is the last element to come into being once the parts of the instrument or the human body 
are already assembled, whereas the soul is the governing principle of the body, having primacy over it, 
which is why the soul cannot equal an attunement (cf. ibid.: 89). Both speakers portray attunement as 
a secondary, disembodied category, thus conflicting with the Pythagorean understanding of harmony 
as a quality of the material elements of the world. 
48 Zhmud, Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans, p. 391. 
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early Pythagoreans considered the soul and the senses to be located in the heart49, 
which plays further into the notion of Murphy’s cardiac distress. There is also 
evidence for a strong link between the soul and movement in the context of 
Presocratic thinking as the soul was considered ‘the source of motion’50 by many 
Pythagorean philosophers. The soul, in turn, as the locus of an embodied form of 
affect, is touched by the senses – amongst others by the auditory sense and music – 
and its affectedness can thereby be generated by different musical forms. Zhmud thus 
summarises that ‘[i]n the late tradition, Pythagoras sometimes appears as the 
protagonist of stories which illustrate how music affects the soul by means of certain 
modes and metres’51. Thus, a strong link between music, the body and the concept of 
harmony is suggested; a relation that is transposed into Murphy and the question of 
harmonising the protagonist’s body and mind in a fashion analogous to a form of 
musical harmony. 
 In the Pythagorean sense, Murphy’s sense of a chasm between his body and 
mind as well as his irregular heart indicate the lack of a harmonisation between the 
different elements of his body. Not only is his body not in physiological equilibrium, 
but there is a striking imbalance between the world of the senses and the world of 
contemplation. To him, the mental realm and the physical world only seldom 
coincide. As described in the notorious sixth section of the novel,  
[t]he mental experience was cut off from the physical experience, its criteria were not those of 
the physical experience, the agreement of part of its content with physical fact did not confer 
worth on that part. It did not function and could not be disposed according to a principle of 
worth52. 
While in Murphy’s mind, there is a degree of correlation between mental and 
physical elements, this connection is neither desirable nor subjectively of any avail to 
him. 
The intersecting aspects of body and mind do not escape Murphy, but, 
echoing the philosophy of Arnold Geulincx53 – a follower of Descartes – he has no 
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understanding of how they might be related and prefers to keep them as separate as 
possible:  
Thus Murphy felt himself split in two, a body and a mind. They had intercourse apparently, 
otherwise he could not have known that they had anything in common. But he felt his mind 
to be bodytight and did not understand through what channel the intercourse was effected 
nor how the two experiences came to overlap. He was satisfied that neither followed from the 
other54. 
Due to this, Murphy’s mind can only free itself from the material world when his 
body is resting and silenced, a notion that translates into the punctuation of Beckett’s 
novel as commas and full stops are often used as rhythmically arranged moments of 
silence. Once Murphy has achieved this state of being, his mind is able to enter three 
zones representing successive states of disengagement from the physical world: light, 
half light and dark – a nod to Baruch Spinoza’s concept of the mind55. The first zone 
is a parallel world to the physical world and contains its elements, ready to be 
arranged differently; the second zone is filled with forms that cannot be found in the 
physical world; and the last zone is filled with forms in constant flux, constantly 
coming into being and disintegrating. In the course of the narrative, Murphy spends 
increasingly more time in the last realm as the novel chronicles his gradual journey 
into ‘darkness’ and ultimately his death, the complete termination of his physical 
existence. 
 Murphy’s self is not attuned to the world in the Heideggerian sense of 
Stimmung; it is not attuned to itself either. Matter and mind are conceived of as almost 
mutually exclusive, somewhat connected, but better kept separate. His body denies 
any kind of armonía, and an emulation of Neary’s harmonised physical constitution 
would be ‘fatal to a man of his temper’56 (my emphasis). This phrase, again, points 
towards the notion of temperament, both in a psychological and musical sense. 
Neary, in tune with his body, is ‘untempered’, tuned to a natural harmony, while it 
seems that Murphy’s constitution is altered, somewhat off key. In fact, he has never 
actually been in tune with the world, which is symbolised by his first cry as a 
newborn:  
His troubles had begun early. To go back no further than the vagitus, it had not been the 
proper A of international concert pitch, with 435 double vibrations per second, but the 
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double flat of this. How he winced, the honest obstetrician, a devout member of the old 
Dublin Orchestral Society and an amateur flautist of some merit. With what sorrow he 
recorded that of all the millions of little larynges cursing in unison at that particular moment, 
the infant Murphy’s alone was off the note57. 
This depiction parodies the idea that if it is Murphy alone who is not in tune with the 
rest of the world, then there must be a universal standard of harmony that everyone 
else conforms to, an issue Beckett would later further explore in Watt. Can it be so 
easy as to say that Murphy is different, that he is the only one who is ‘off key’? In a 
letter to his friend Thomas MacGreevy, Beckett expressed some concern about a 
tendency to see Murphy as an outsider of humanity: ‘There seemed to me […] 
always the risk of taking [Murphy] too seriously and separating him too sharply from 
the others’58 – the others presumably being Celia, Neary, Murphy’s former fiancée 
Ms Counihan, Mr Endon, and so forth. The polemic description of Murphy’s out-of-
tuneness, down to the exact rate of vibrations per second in his infant cry, indicates 
that while, on the surface, Murphy can be described as a radically dissonant element 
in an otherwise largely harmonious world, the actual implication looming behind 
Beckett’s irony is the absurdity of the idea of a universal harmony that keeps the 
world and human beings attuned to one another. 
 Far from being a coincidence, the cause of Murphy’s absurd death, a faulty 
gas connection elicited by someone flushing the toilet, further points towards an 
inability to establish harmony in the world that is not limited to the main character. 
When Murphy takes up his position at the M.M.M., his predecessor at the asylum, 
the pot poet Ticklepenny, installs a gas radiator and connects it to a jet in the W.C. 
on the floor below Murphy’s room, but the connection malfunctions due to an issue 
the pot poet is familiar with:  
The extremes [i.e. the gas radiator and the jet emitting gas] having thus been established, 
nothing remained but to make them meet. This was a difficulty whose fascinations were 
familiar to him from the days when as a pot poet he had laboured so long and so lovingly to 
join the ends of his pentameters59.  
Murphy’s demise is notably generated by a failure to bring together two extremes – 
as with his heart – the actual cause being a fault in the connection, in the 
Pythagorean sense, a fault in the harmony. This comically mundane form of 
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disharmony is related to poetic form, rhythm and sound, through reference to 
Ticklepenny’s poetic aspirations and his attempts to produce verse in pentameter. 
Again, Beckett presents us with a juxtaposition between metre and rhythm on the 
one hand and harmony and pitch on the other hand as timing is of a fundamental 
importance in the novel. 
As the treatment of harmony in Murphy suggests, these two fundamental 
elements of music, while seemingly distinct, are inherently related through the 
acoustic quality of pitch, which is, from the point of view of acoustics, constituted by 
rhythmic vibrations. If the problem of pitch is qualitatively a problem of rhythm – as 
it is indicated by Murphy’s infant cry being off the standard A with 435 double 
vibrations per second – harmony also becomes a problem of time and timing. The 
irregularity of Murphy’s heartbeat illustrates his inability to coincide temporally with 
the rest of the world; likewise, the flushing of the toilet that kills him occurs at an 
inconvenient, fateful time; the party in search of Murphy only arrives at the M.M.M. 
after his accidental death; the lovers’ entanglements are subject to a comically 
intertwined succession of encountering and missing each other. To Deleuze, this 
fundamental mode of discrepancy time becomes subject to, as it is declared in 
Hamlet’s statement that ‘[t]he time is out of joint’60, is a constitutive aspect of a new 
paradigm of time that emerges out of Kant’s philosophy, where time is defined as a 
‘discordant accord’61. The structure of temporal ‘out-of-jointness’, of missing each 
other and of unfortunate coincidences that governs the plot of Murphy, is thus 
testament to a pervasive underlying mode of discordance and dissonance. 
Through its reliance on the notions of rhythm, harmony and pitch, the 
composition of the novel is thus, to a certain degree, reminiscent of that of a piece of 
music. As Murphy realises that ‘M.M.M. stood suddenly for music, MUSIC, 
MUSIC’62, the trajectory of the novel becomes clear: it chronicles the search for 
harmony or an attunement, which is structurally expressed in the narrative of 
Murphy’s quest and in which dualist relations establish a dialectic that needs to be 
harmonised. Far from being answered in a definitive way, the question of the 
possibility of harmony remains open; however, the novel does not seem to offer any 
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stable forms of harmony and questions the very existence of its universality. The 
Pythagorean notion of harmony as an ontologically primary element that provides 
order between heterogeneous entities remains a central reference point to Murphy; 
however, since Pythagorean harmony is unfit for someone of Murphy’s temper, the 
world depicted in the novel features a more complicated and disturbed relationship 
between the objects and subjects in it, in which the question of harmony is rephrased 
as its former presuppositions erode. 
In conclusion, we can see that Pythagorean philosophy can thus fruitfully 
account for a number of the central themes of the novel: the question of harmony 
and attunement, the correlation between music and the self, motion and material 
presence and the relationship between the sensual body and the rational mind. 
However, the text does not seem to take these philosophical concepts at face value; 
instead they are playfully explored as potential, but not final answers or ways of 
framing Murphy’s intellectual – and far from unique – dilemma. As one of Beckett’s 
clear sources for his exploration of harmony, Pythagorean thought can be used to 
complement Heidegger’s notion of Stimmung in a way that opens up a closer 
relationship to musical acoustics and the human body. However, as it is stated, 
Neary was ‘at the time a Pythagorean’, but has clearly moved on after he reached the 
limitations of usefulness of Pythagorean philosophy, exasperated by a person whose 
physical constitution overthrows the Pythagorean ideal of a universal harmony 
between entities in the world and within the human self through a reductio ad absurdum, 
and by a world whose fundamental conditions are now based on discordance rather 
than accordance. 
The Pythagorean concept of harmony therefore ranks among a number of 
other philosophical influences and propositions the novel takes up and puts forward 
for the reader to test, consider and possibly dismiss:  
For if Beckett is, on the one hand, a novelist who employs philosophic ideas, he is also at 
times a grand debunker of philosophic notions. He is concerned, clearly, with metaphysics; 
he is also fond of philosophic puns and anecdotes; and the mixture of seriousness and levity is 
difficult to separate63.  
At this point in Beckett’s œuvre, the question of attunement is posed, approached 
through the Presocratic understanding of harmony, and yet not answered in a 
satisfactory way. Nevertheless, the themes that would mark his works to follow, in 
                                                            
63 Michael E. Mooney, ‘Presocratic Scepticism: Samuel Beckett’s Murphy Reconsidered’, p. 216. 
 106 
particular Watt, are put forward in an engaging, restless and urgent manner: the 
correlation between being and music, and the question of the possibility of an 
attunement in a seemingly hostile world. 
 
 
Tuning and Listening in Watt 
So I shall merely state, without enquiring how it came, or 
how it went, that in my opinion it was not an illusion, as 
long as it lasted, that presence of what did not exist, that 
presence without, that presence within, that presence 
between, though I'll be buggered if I can understand how 
it could have been anything else.64 
 
Written in occupied France during the early 1940s, while Beckett had gone into 
hiding from the Gestapo, but only published 15 years after Murphy, Watt, perhaps 
‘the oddest of all Beckett’s works’65, delves deeper into the realm of musical and 
ontological attunement. While Murphy’s semi-ironical treatment of Pythagorean 
harmony leaves the question of attunement open, Watt addresses the problem of 
Stimmung in a more direct manner. In four parts, Watt describes the journey of its 
eponymous hero to an unknown town, where he – without any explanation for this 
occurrence – takes up the position of being a servant to a Mr Knott. Upon his 
arrival, his predecessor Arsene introduces him to the household by means of a long-
winded monologue before leaving him to enter Mr Knott’s service alongside a senior 
servant called Erskine. When Erskine leaves, Watt becomes the senior servant and is 
joined by Arthur. During his confusing and alienating time in the Knott household, 
Watt gradually loses his ability to make sense of occurrences and develops a high 
degree of anxiety. In the third part of the novel, the narrator introduces himself as 
Sam and relates that Watt told him his story when they were spending time in an 
undefined institution at an unspecified moment in time, at which Watt also started to 
lose the ability to use language in the conventional sense. In the final part of the 
narrative, Watt departs from Mr Knott’s house and returns to the train station, 
where he eventually disappears. The chronology of the novel is disordered, and the 
narrative often oscillates between being over-precise and fastidious in, for instance, 
meticulously listing all possible combinations of people and entities in a given 
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context, while at the same time being uncertain, obscure and chaotic by leaving out 
essential information about the plot and characters. 
On the surface, Murphy and Watt may share a similar narrative structure in 
that a wandering individual finds work in an obscure place and at the end leaves it – 
dead or alive –, but aesthetically there are worlds between Murphy’s relatively 
conventional narrative composition and Watt’s unsettling indeterminacy. The novel 
thus marks a large step towards Beckett’s gradual movement towards a disintegration 
of the structure of the novel, which culminates in The Unnamable. I will show that this 
disintegration is accompanied by an implementation and exploration of the 
philosophical ideas the text engages with on a level that is more ostensibly aesthetic, 
as opposed to Murphy’s earlier predominantly intellectual and thematic treatment of 
philosophical concepts. Despite the noticeable shift in Beckett’s aesthetics after 
Murphy, Watt also represents a continuation of the philosophical enquiry initiated in 
its predecessor; according to P.J. Murphy, the focus here lies on Beckett’s 
understanding of Immanuel Kant’s dialectic of determinism and freedom, rendering 
Watt, in Murphy’s view, ‘a Kantian novel’66. 
Like Beckett’s Murphy, Watt is an alienated individual in an alienating world, 
on a quest that is very likely not of his own choosing. Once again, harmony is 
presented as an ideal state of being whose accomplishment is sought with a high 
degree of urgency, but which largely seems out of reach. Arsene’s monologue in the 
first part of the novel expresses a desire for finding harmony through a place where 
one belongs, and to the lonesome wanderer this place seems to be Mr Knott’s house: 
He is well pleased. For he knows he is in the right place, at last. And he knows he is the right 
man, at last. In another place he would be the wrong man still, and for another man, yes, for 
another man it would be the wrong place again. But he being what he has become, and the 
place being what it was made, the fit is perfect. And he knows this. No. Let us remain calm. 
He feels it. The sensations, the premonitions of harmony are irrefragable, of imminent 
harmony, when all outside him will be he, the flowers the flowers that he is among him, the 
sky the sky that he is above him, the earth trodden the earth treading, and all sound his echo. 
When in a word he will be in his midst at last, after so many tedious years spent clinging to 
the perimeter67. 
This vision of finding an existential mode of harmony in a place of belonging – in 
Heideggerian terms, a space of dwelling – proposes a coalescence between the self 
and its chosen space. As the self finally becomes one with the material world in this 
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image, it overcomes its sense of thrownness and thereby reaches a balance within 
itself, establishing a harmonious relationship with its surroundings and breaking the 
spell of its alienated subjectivity as it merges with the place it has found for itself. 
In the course of the novel, Watt seeks to find this sense of harmony, but his 
attempts are condemned to fail. The famous scene of the piano tuners’ visit at the 
beginning of Watt’s stay in the Knott household sets the scene for the question of 
musical tuning, which occupies a central position in Beckett’s œuvre. As they come to 
‘choon the piano’68, the Galls, a blind elderly father and his son, are the only people 
to enter the house during Watt’s first period of employment, in what is ‘perhaps the 
principal incident of Watt’s early days in Mr Knott’s house’69. As the younger Gall 
sets out to execute the task, it becomes clear that the piano has become as good as 
unusable:  
The mice have returned, [Mr Gall Junior] said.  
The elder said nothing. Watt wondered if he had heard.  
Nine dampers remain, said the younger, and an equal number of hammers.  
Not corresponding, I hope, said the elder.  
In one case, said the younger.  
The elder had nothing to say to this. 
The strings are in flitters, said the younger. 
The elder had nothing to say to this either. 
The piano is doomed, in my opinion, said the younger.  
The piano-tuner also, said the elder. 
The pianist also, said the younger70. 
The ‘doomed’ piano is a broken machine: the strings are worn out and have no 
tension, and as only nine hammers remain, only nine notes can be struck. Out of the 
remaining nine dampers, only one corresponds to a hammer, so that only one note 
can actually be played – the remaining notes can only fade out. Any attempt to tune 
the instrument seems senseless, and yet the Galls return to Knott’s house to do their 
work, although the piano has apparently been broken for a long time, as indicated by 
the younger Gall’s implication that the mice have been there before. The older Gall 
appears content with this state of affairs, even hoping that the hammers and dampers 
do not correspond. Hence, the tuning of the piano in itself has become an impossible 
act as the components of the piano are broken; an attunement is unattainable, and 
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the tuner himself wishes it to be that way. As a result of this, the pianist – or the artist 
– too is doomed to set out to do his work from a place of fundamental dissonance. 
Needless to say, the mere idea of tuning has been replaced by the phonetically 
skewed ‘chooning’, which constitutes yet another nail in the coffin of the concept of 
harmony. The older and the younger Gall, too, are out of tune with each other as 
Watt observes that ‘[t]here was no family likeness between the two’71, leading him to 
assume they might in fact merely be stepfather and stepson. In musical terms, the 
father-son relationship could be interpreted as representing the interval of an octave 
– with the older Gall being the starting note and the younger Gall being its 
equivalent at the higher end of the octave – but the lack of likeness between the two 
indicates that only a broken sense of correspondence is in place. The conversation 
between the two Galls and the way in which it is represented in isolated, verse-like 
lines evokes the notion of a rhythmic musical progression: ‘The piano is doomed, in 
my opinion, said the younger. / The piano-tuner also, said the elder. / The pianist 
also, said the younger’. However, the older man’s silences as well as their apparent 
physical unlikeness limit the possibility of an actual harmonic relationship, 
demonstrating that, similar to the piano itself, only fragments of harmony and 
correspondence remain. Thereby, the human piano keys, which the underground 
man previously described, step out of their imposed attunement; not of their own 
accord, but since the condition of attunement itself breaks away. 
In his outstanding article ‘Watt: Music, Tuning and Tonality’ (1983), Heath 
Lees provides the first comprehensive analysis of the role of musical imagery in the 
novel, identifying the concepts of tuning and harmony as a pivotal element of the 
text. He therein relates the idea that tuning is impossible within the novel, not only 
musically – as it is demonstrated in the piano-tuning scene – but also ontologically, in 
reference to the aforementioned issue of temperament and more specifically to the 
use of twelve-tone equal temperament. According to Lees, the imposition of this 
universal standard that tempers the natural sounds of the octave is the source of an 
inherent element of disharmony within music itself: 
Musical ‘order’ demands a continuous tinkering with natural sound to make the tonal system 
repeatable and therefore amenable to the form of series – the triumph of ratio over musical 
matter. Western music relies for its effect of discord resolving into concord not on musical 
truth but on musical compromise, the kind of compromise which is to be found in a pre-
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established, sleight-of-ear system that piano tuners, for example, are paid to create. Watt’s 
ear for music fails him not just because sensibility is overwhelmed by sense, but because the 
Western musical system of tonality is based on a distortion in order to achieve that system. It 
is, so to speak, a trick. In Wattian terms, Art is Con; tuner, piano and pianist are all 
doomed72. 
Lees argues that the inability to find a musical attunement in Beckett’s fiction is 
based on the modern system of tonality introduced by equal temperament, which 
limits and tempers natural sound in order to establish a universal standard. This 
claim is underlined by the ironic stance Murphy suggests regarding the notion of a 
universal harmony and norm – symbolised by the supposedly ubiquitous A of 
international concert pitch all infants but Murphy strike – that only the protagonist 
does not conform to. The piano in particular is symbolic of this method of tempering 
sound as equal temperament was specifically designed for instruments with 
immovable pitch like the organ and the piano, as opposed to string and wind 
instruments whose pitch is adjustable. This tuning method was popularised in France 
and Germany in the eighteenth century and in England in the nineteenth century, 
becoming a universal standard after 191773. 
According to Ross W. Duffin, the popularisation of equal temperament 
throughout the modern age is closely connected to the prevalence of capitalism and 
the progressive commercialisation of music, particular in the course of the twentieth 
century74. Standardised tuning methods facilitated the more affordable mass 
production of musical instruments and made musical performances more repeatable 
due to the reliance on a homogenised acoustic system. The connection between 
standardised attunement and capital becomes apparent in Beckett’s homeless, 
unemployed or vagrant characters, whose dysfunctional existence betrays their 
‘constitutive maladjustment to the world’75 and to a normative mode of Being-in-the-
modern-world. Celia is exasperated with Murphy’s resistance to finding work and 
adjusting to modern economy; his refusal to do so sounds like ‘difficult music’76 to 
her, out of tune with the universal ethos of his time. As we have previously seen, this 
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political dimension is also latent in Dostoevsky’s Petersburg texts, in which an 
attunement to the modern world is by definition shaped by financial interests. 
Duffin further argues that the introduction of a standard musical pitch has 
compromised the concept of harmony as, firstly, it has limited the variety of tuning 
methods that were previously in use and, secondly, the intervals constituting the 
octave in twelve-tone equal temperament are modulated, generating acoustical 
impurity in the structure of the octave77. In this sense, a fundamental aspect of 
disharmony is an integral part of this tuning method, a systemic issue of modern 
acoustics Beckett uncovers in both Murphy and Watt. To once again echo Hamlet, 
something is rotten in the universal structures that govern the modern world, which 
Beckett’s characters experience as there is a cacophony underlying the seemingly 
ordered and functional industriousness of modernity. 
The symbols present in Mr Knott’s music room, a bust of the Danish-
German Baroque composer Dieterich Buxtehude and a ravanastron, an ancient 
Indian string instrument, reinforce this notion of a forced concept of modern 
harmony. In this context, Buxtehude, who had a strong influence on Bach and his 
idea of the ‘well-tempered clavier’, represents the development of tuning methods 
that temper natural sound, particularly the practice of well-tempered tuning which 
emerged in the seventeenth century. The ravanastron, in turn, is a relic of a ‘much 
older non-Western musical tradition’78, epitomising – in line with the concept of 
Pythagorean tuning discussed earlier – an alternative to the established modern 
forms of tuning, and modes of existence, the novel critiques. The attempt at 
establishing equal temperament in the piano is thus symbolically countered by the 
ravanastron’s movable, less confined pitch. The discordance between equal 
temperament and Pythagorean tuning is further expressed in rhythmic terms as the 
Pythagorean comma, a term delineating the small intervals that constitute the 
differences in pitch between Pythagorean tuning and tempered tuning, appears as an 
image in Beckett’s manuscript for Watt, where this divisive element is then articulated 
in the punctuation and rhythmic use of commas in Beckett’s prose79. 
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What alternatives to the standardised notion of ‘equally tempered existence’ 
do Beckett’s works suggest? According to Daniel Albright, Watt also parodies Arnold 
Schoenberg’s twelve-tone method, debunking it as a too restrictive system of tonality:  
Twelve-tone procedures, as well as diatonic procedures, fail where there is no clear definition 
of pitch. A Beckett character, especially in the early novels, tends to be a creature of a 
continuous glissando of being, less appropriate to the music of Schoenberg than to the music 
that John Cage would be writing some years later80. 
The metaphor of a ‘glissando of being’ captures the vicissitudes of self that are 
displayed in Murphy to a certain degree and even more so in Watt. The latter in 
particular cannot be determined to any certain pitch, structure or form: the first view 
we get of Watt describes him as ‘a solitary figure’, which could be ‘a man or a 
woman’ or even just ‘a parcel, a carpet for example, or a roll of tarpaulin’81, and the 
only constant element of his self is his name, in itself a pun on the question of ‘what’ 
that may signify. Watt’s inharmonicity to the world, to language and to his fellow 
beings uncovers a larger structural problem of modernity, one that is reminiscent of 
Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s unearthing of the forms of oppression 
and violence inherent in the modern world in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944). 
 Some critics have suggested that the main difference between Murphy’s and 
Watt’s approach to this set of existential and political problems lies in the subjective 
space of the events related in the narratives: John Calder, for instance, proposes that 
‘[w]hereas Murphy is largely about the outer world of appearances, Watt is mainly 
concerned with an inner world’82. While I cannot fully agree with this proposition, 
Calder, quite aptly, foregrounds the significant degree of subjective experience Watt 
is concerned with. Murphy, a creature split between the inner and the outer world, 
can only perceive them as two largely separate spheres, where the inner sphere is 
preferred to the outer world, which becomes merely a necessary evil. In Watt, 
however, the boundaries of inner and outer world gradually break down, but as 
opposed to Arsene’s vision of a harmonic unity of inner and outer world, Watt’s 
sense of self and meaning are obliterated during his stay at Mr Knott’s house. 
To Watt, the significance of the piano-‘chooning’ incident lies in his inability 
to make sense of the occurrence as he repeats it in his mind over and over again until 
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it loses ‘in the nice processes of its light, its sound, its impacts and its rhythm, all 
meaning, even the most literal’83. By breaking down the elements of sensual 
experience into their basic material categories, Watt loses his grip on abstract 
thinking, a development that later culminates in his dissection of language into 
phonemes distinct from their semantics or pragmatics. He becomes a being of pure 
sensual experience without the ability to use the higher cognitive functions allowing 
him to perform abstractions, and as the semiotic dimension of language thus 
supplants its semantics in Watt’s mind, the realm of sensuousness, associated with the 
musical, comes to the fore. In Pythagorean terms, Watt loses any harmonising bond 
between unlimited and their limiters, finding himself in an unordered world he 
cannot comprehend. Successively, outer reality and inner processes become 
entangled to a degree where Watt can no longer ‘distinguish between what had 
happened and what did not happen, between what was and what was not, in Mr 
Knott’s house’84. Jonathan Boulter argues that Watt’s confusion about the meaning 
of this specific occurrence mirrors the hermeneutic act of reading, rendering Watt 
himself a confused reader and the Galls incident ‘the initiatory act of reading in Watt 
for Watt and the reader’85. Boulter’s point concerning Watt’s position as a recipient 
and interpreter rather than an active agent in his own narrative is very valuable; 
however, in my view the emphasis of Watt’s receptiveness should be placed on his 
function as a listener rather than a reader. 
 In the course of the novel, we find Watt listening to music, voices and sounds 
on countless occasions; each section features at least one significant listening incident. 
In section one, he first listens to a threne sung by a choir, lying in a ditch on his way 
to Knott’s house, and then to Arsene’s monologue for an extended period of time; in 
section two, we find him listening to the rhythmic croaking of three frogs; in section 
three, he listens to Arthur’s long-winded story in the garden and Mr Knott’s 
monotonous singing; and in section four, Watt listens to his successor Mr Micks, 
whose voice ‘was far from unmelodious’86, and upon reaching the train station and 
having been knocked out by a door in the waiting room, becomes a receptacle of the 
conversation and events around him rather than an active agent. 
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The novel invites the reader to join Watt in his listening experience, 
providing, for instance, the musical notation of the threne; however, the notation is 
incomplete as only the length of the notes without their pitch, key, tempo or definite 
rhythm is given. A footnote in this scene poses the question: ‘What, it may be 
enquired, was the music of this threne? What at least, it may be demanded, did the 
soprano sing?’87. The Addenda at the end of the novel, a number of sections not 
incorporated into the novel due to ‘[o]nly fatigue and disgust’88, provides the 
complete notation for the soprano voice, but the notation for the remaining voices is 
absent, thus obscuring the harmonic relationship between the voices. To Watt, they 
are ambiguously ‘indifferent in quality’89; he can either not distinguish them 
qualitatively, or he has no interest in or understanding of their harmonic 
relationship. The novel withholds the song’s harmonicity, and the locus of harmony, 
or rather of its lack, becomes Watt: as the focaliser of the narrative and the person 
who related the incident to the narrator Sam, he would have to fill in the gap, but he 
is unable to do so as the voices seem ‘indifferent’ to him. Rather than asking ‘What 
[…] was the music of this threne?’, we thus discover that ‘Watt was the [inharmonic, 
incomplete] music of this threne’.  
In Beckett’s handwritten draft of Watt it says of the threne that ‘Watt heard 
the music in D-flat minor but it was probably in C-sharp minor for Watt was inclined 
to hear a with a flat’90. Watt’s inclination is to hear the note a – again, this A of 
international concert pitch – as a flat renders his attunement to sound somewhat off 
the established norm, a tendency that becomes progressively more pronounced in his 
acts of listening and understanding in the course of the novel. Lees, then, interprets 
the Galls incident as a symbolic occurrence representing Watt’s attempted and failed 
endeavour to attune to the meaning of what is happening around him: 
The tuners represent the ability to impose an acoustic system upon natural sound, yet the 
state of the piano renders this impossible, and the incident itself throws out an insuperable 
challenge to Watt’s systematically-grounded powers of reasoning. Watt is as defeated in 
trying to tune the Galls into his concept of meaning as the Galls themselves are in trying to 
tune the piano into the tempered acoustic system91. 
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The breakdown in interpreting sound and meaning due to the lack of a solid system 
of signification – since the established systems of signification have been uncovered as 
a form of tempering the materiality of sound – goes hand in hand with a breakdown 
of the limits of Watt’s subjectivity and the outer world. In the scene of the threne, it is 
suggested that the voices of the choir might be inside Watt’s mind before he asserts 
that ‘really [the music] seemed from without’92 (my emphasis). A similar tendency is 
expressed in Arsene’s monologue in the first section of the novel, which describes a 
slip, a shift in perception affecting his inner and outer world in equal measures: 
It was a slip that I felt, that Tuesday afternoon, millions of little things moving all together 
out of their old place, into a new one nearby, and furtively, as though it were forbidden. And 
I have little doubt that I was the only person living to discover them. To conclude from this 
that the incident was internal would, I think, be rash. For my – how shall I say? – my 
personal system was so distended at the period of which I speak that the distinction between 
what was inside it and what was outside it was not at all easy to draw. Everything that 
happened happened inside it, and at the same time everything that happened happened 
outside it93. 
The self thus finds itself in a process of distension which seems to obliterate the 
barrier between subject and world and which enables a free circulation of affect and 
moods. Stimmung, as a fundamentally spatial phenomenon, dwells in a space that 
transcends subjectivity and the material world, a concept Arsene finds a perfect 
expression for:  
So I shall merely state, without enquiring how it came, or how it went, that in my opinion it 
was not an illusion, as long as it lasted, that presence of what did not exist, that presence 
without, that presence within, that presence between, though I’ll be buggered if I can 
understand how it could have been anything else94.  
Watt thus executes an important shift in Beckett’s narrative fiction by reframing the 
question of harmony away from the strict dualism portrayed in Murphy and into a 
world in which the subject becomes a permeable locus of experience; in other words, 
from a theoretical exploration of philosophical attunement to an affective, 
experiential account of Stimmung, which then becomes the point of departure in the 
trilogy. Watt’s feeling of anxiety, which grows over the course of the narrative, opens 
a door to what I will describe as Molloy’s ‘anxious disposition’ in relation to Being-in-
the-world in the next chapter. 
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 In Watt, the unsuccessful search for harmony initiated in Murphy thus leads to 
a subversion of harmony based on the modern practice of musical temperament, 
which the novel exposes as a corrupted form of harmony. There is a fundamental 
disharmony underlying Beckett’s modernity, which translates into his characters’ 
imprecision, fluidity and thrownness into the world. Lees quite aptly summarises the 
stages of deconstructing the Western musical system in the course of the novel: 
Throughout Watt’s music, the quest begun in Murphy for Apmonia or Attunement is 
thwarted. The notion of true pitch is thrown into confusion; the coherence of an underlying 
key-system is denied and the patterns of scales themselves are revealed as a manipulation of 
acoustic fact – a mere expedience wrought at the hands and ears of Western musicians in 
league with the tuners95. 
In Watt, even the tuners, the blind elder and his son, have given up on establishing 
harmony and only leave rudimentary, incomplete aspects of attunement behind. 
Beckett’s critique of aesthetic modernity can be viewed as an important part of a 
larger discourse on a sense of discontent about the modern world, which also 
includes Horkheimer and Adorno’s analysis of the modern culture industry. 
While Murphy preserves a largely traditional narrative structure, Watt opens 
up the cracks of narration and trapdoors of cohesion that would mark Beckett’s later 
narrative works, thus mirroring the loss of Pythagorean harmony as a ‘natural’ 
system of reference and meaning in their aesthetic composition. At the same time, 
the acoustic quality of the text becomes ever more prominent, featuring sound 
experiments like the incorporation of rhythm through the song of the frogs and 
musical notation. These rhythmic elements are, again, connected the question of 
pitch through the notion of the Pythagorean comma, which manifests itself in a 
peculiar rhythmic prose. Just as Watt becomes a listener in his own narrative, so the 
reader, too, is made to listen to the voices, sounds and music of a novel that is 
perhaps as anti-mimetic as most pieces of instrumental music in its foregrounding of 
the material and semiotic dimension of its own language. As Mary Bryden points 
out, the musicality of these works thereby invites the reader to hear rather than read 
them: ‘When we read or hear Beckett’s texts, we are being drawn into their 
musicality, exhibiting as they do an extraordinarily acute attunement to sound’96. 
The alienating experience of reading Watt, with all its vagueness and chaos, and the 
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act of listening to the material rawness of its sound and rhythm thus approximates 
the ontological struggle the novel portrays, throwing readers into a pandemonium of 
acoustic discordance and thwarted meaning, leaving them flapping to attune, 
somehow, to the sound of Beckett’s out-of-tune writing. 
 
 
 
III. ‘All I am is feeling’: The Textual Dynamics of Molloy 
The work lives its own life within me; in a certain sense, 
it thinks itself, and even gives itself meaning within me.97 
 
 
Readers, Narrators and Authors 
After the intellectual exploration of attunement in Murphy and a turn towards its 
aestheticisation in Watt, Molloy – Beckett’s first novel originally published in French – 
places ontological forms of mood at the centre of its study of the human condition. 
Unfolding against the backdrop of an existential notion of anxiety that draws on 
Heidegger’s notion of Angst as a unique form of Stimmung enabling ontological self-
awareness, Molloy develops some of the major themes Beckett introduced in the 
previous novels further: a profound sense of alienation from the world, a 
‘thrownness’ that defines human existence, an undermining of paradigms of 
representation and, concurrently, a foregrounding of the questions of materiality, 
sound and subjectivity entailing a search for musical, and existential, attunement. At 
the same time, Molloy foreshadows the radical deconstruction of narrative 
conventions executed in the two later parts of the trilogy, Malone Dies and The 
Unnamable. 
The transition from the third-person narration used in Murphy to the first-
person narrative of Molloy marks Beckett’s farewell to the idea of an omniscient 
narrator, which is already questioned and parodied in his first published novel and 
then successively dismantled in Watt. In a transitional state between homodiegetic 
and heterodiegetic narration98, Watt presents its narrative voice Sam as 
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predominantly a third-person narrator, who is, however, to some degree involved in 
the plot of the novel, relating his personal encounter and experiences with Watt, who 
has, in turn, narrated his experiences in the Knott household to Sam. In the 
chronology of Beckett’s works, Molloy is the first title character to represent a 
radically subjective account of his story within the novel genre, a tendency that 
makes the trilogy ‘microscopically concerned with the hermeneutics of the individual 
subject’99. Along with this turn towards a more subjective approach to narrative 
comes a reorientation towards a more nuanced engagement with affect and emotion. 
Of all of Beckett’s novels, Molloy is certainly the most openly melancholic as the 
lonesome wanderings of Molloy and Moran, ostensibly his mirror image and alter 
ego, through the desolate landscape of the fictional county of Ballybaba are 
permeated by an elegiac atmosphere of isolation and an underlying sense of grief. 
This tangible ‘moodiness’ of the novel, and of the trilogy in general, can be 
extrapolated through reference to Beckett’s self-reflexive comments on his decreasing 
engagement with philosophical thought. 
In a frequently cited interview with Gabriel D’Aubarède, Beckett purports 
that he has little interest in the philosophy of his contemporaries, explaining that his 
writing from Molloy onwards is more closely related to feeling rather than 
philosophical thought: 
‘Have contemporary philosophers had any influence on your thought?’ 
‘I never read philosophers.’ 
‘Why not?’ 
‘I never understand anything they write.’ 
‘All the same, people have wondered if the existentialists’ problem of being may afford a key 
to your works.’ 
‘There’s no key or problem. I wouldn’t have had any reason to write my novels if I could 
have expressed their subject in philosophic terms.’ 
‘What was your reason then?’ 
‘I haven’t the slightest idea. I’m no intellectual. All I am is feeling. “Molloy” and the others 
came to me the day I became aware of my own folly. Only then did I begin to write the 
things I feel’100. 
Although in this statement Beckett significantly downplays his engagement with 
philosophy – whose biographical and aesthetic influence has been well 
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documented101 – the shift alluded to in his aesthetic approach to the novel makes 
itself felt in Molloy’s affectively charged narrative, in which subjectivism and feeling 
take the place formerly occupied by a more distanced, ironic and philosophically 
charged tone. As Fifield notes, ‘[a]cross the range of Beckett’s corpus, philosophical 
reference appears to become increasingly subtle’102. Beckett insinuates that his ‘folly’ 
in the earlier works may have been the exclusion of feeling, but the trilogy marks the 
beginning of a turn towards such forms of affect that may have been largely missing 
in the early novels and where life is equated with feeling: as Molloy phrases it, ‘[i]t is 
in the tranquillity of decomposition that I remember the long confused emotion 
which was my life’103. In line with this notion, my analysis of the trilogy will focus on 
the aesthetic evocation of Stimmung as a central aspect of this affective reconfiguration 
in Beckett’s works, and the way it complements the critical insights gained from the 
interpretation of attunement in Murphy and Watt. 
Molloy, an heir of Murphy’s and Watt’s alienation and lack of belonging, 
narrates his story from his mother’s room. We learn that he is supposed to write his 
story down, for whom or for what purpose we do not know. The majority of his 
narrative depicts a journey he took with his bicycle through Ballybaba – which may 
or may not be based on Beckett’s native Ireland – during which he had a number of 
random and bizarre encounters, while his physical constitution gradually decayed. 
The second part of the novel is narrated by Moran, a detective who is instructed to 
find Molloy. Taking his son Jacques on his quest, Moran’s health, too, deteriorates in 
the course of his journey. After his son leaves him behind, Moran murders a stranger 
and eventually finds his way home, where he begins to write down his report on the 
journey. 
In the opening scene of the novel, the eponymous anti-hero observes an 
encounter between two unknown men on a country road, their approach describing 
an attempted form of attunement: ‘At first a wide space lay between them’, but as 
they walk towards each other, the distance is gradually diminished until they are 
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standing ‘breast to breast’104 in a trough. Molloy speculates that the two men, who 
‘[look] alike, but no more than others do’105, may know each other as they departed 
from the same town, but he believes that now ‘they will know each other, greet each 
other, even in the depths of the town’106 when they meet again. After looking at the 
nearby sea and exchanging a few words, the two men – whom Molloy calls A and C 
– continue to walk their separate ways. The allegorical nature of this encounter as a 
form of approach or attunement foreshadows the novel’s preoccupation with 
questioning whether a state of attunement between two subjects is possible at all, and 
if so, how it can be achieved. This peculiar scene intimates that an exchange has 
taken place and that the two men will henceforth ‘know’ each other, but to what 
extent this ‘knowledge’ indicates a shared state of mind, is unclear, though the scene 
suggests that attunement is a form of encounter with a certain epistemological value. 
As they part, Molloy imagines the inner life of C, who continues to move 
away from the town: 
The treacherous hills where fearfully he ventured were no doubt only known to him from 
afar, seen perhaps from his bedroom window or from the summit of a monument which, one 
black day, having nothing in particular to do and turning to height for solace, he had paid his 
few coppers to climb, slower and slower, up the winding stones. From there he must have 
seen it all, the plain, the sea, and then these selfsame hills that some call mountains, indigo in 
places in the evening light, their serried ranges crowding to the skyline, cloven with hidden 
valleys that the eye divines from sudden shifts of colour and then from other signs for which 
there are no words, nor even thoughts. But all are not divined, even from that height, and 
often where only one escarpment is discerned, and one crest, in reality there are two, two 
escarpments, two crests, riven by a valley. But now he knows these hills, that is to say he 
knows them better, and if ever again he sees them from afar it will be I think with other eyes, 
and not only that but the within, all that inner space one never sees, the brain and heart and 
other caverns where thought and feeling dance their sabbath, all that too quite differently 
disposed107. (my emphasis) 
This lyrical depiction of a landscape reminiscent of Romantic and Gothic imagery 
sets the tone for a narrative that explores the connection between outer landscapes 
and ‘that inner space’, a relationship that is shown to be subject to a constant 
exchange of mood, moods that are changeable, fleeting, and – in their changeability 
– constitutive for the forms of fractured subjectivity that the novel sketches. 
Representing the shift in tone and focus from the theoretical considerations of 
attunement that dominates the early novels to the affective exploration of 
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subjectivity, or even intersubjectivity, the passage describes a subject, Molloy, 
imagining the subject position and feelings of another, the man he calls C. Molloy’s 
empathetic interpretation of the situation is predicated upon the notion that 
experiencing the landscape of the ‘treacherous hills’ enables him to enter a state of 
mind he and C have in common, a mood, generated by the atmosphere of this 
specific space. From the opening of the novel, Stimmung thus appears as, first, by 
definition spatially determined and, second, a potential door into the (imagined) 
subjectivity of another. 
Due to the mirror structure of the two narratives constituting Molloy, critics 
have suggested that Moran and Molloy may actually represent the same ‘character’ 
and that the chronology of their stories has been inverted108. According to this 
interpretation, Moran is the earlier version of their self, which leaves home and 
descends into mental and physical decay in his search for ‘Molloy’ (who might be 
himself, or another whose name he may have adopted), while Molloy is the later 
vagrant version of the character, who writes his account anticipating his impending 
death. If Molloy and Moran are to be considered the same character, the novel 
obliterates the concept of self-identity, presenting its characters as unstable entities 
that elude any linguistic coherence: Moran, whose son goes by the same name as 
himself, as well as ‘Molloy, or Mollose’109 are unstable signifiers, mirroring their 
bearers’ instability of being. Moran describes ‘[t]he fact was there were three, no, 
four Molloys’. He then elaborates that these Molloys are constituted by ‘[h]e that 
inhabited me, my caricature of same, Gaber’s and the man of flesh and blood 
somewhere awaiting me’110. In his analysis of ‘dispossessed’ subjectivity in Molloy, 
Thomas Trezise foregrounds the relationship between temporality and self-identity 
in Beckett’s novel:  
‘I am in my mother’s room’ – the inaugural sentence of Molloy and thus of the trilogy as a 
whole – describes an anonymous subject who is no longer Molloy and not yet his mother, 
and whose very anonymity testifies both to the temporal non-self identity and to the 
fundamental intersubjectivity of the Beckettian subject111. 
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The fragmented selves of Beckett’s novel lack a sense of coherent subjectivity and 
self-sufficiency and are, as such, dependent on temporality and on other subjects. In 
the following, I will demonstrate that it is this intersubjective nature and temporal 
mutability of Beckett’s characters that gives Stimmung a central position in his texts as 
the fragmented self becomes contingent on a circulation of mood between subjects 
and within time and space that becomes constitutive for the existential structure of 
the self. 
At the same time, the passage imagining C’s thoughts and feelings illustrates 
the basic plot of both parts of the novel in a nutshell: both Molloy and Moran set out 
into the landscape of Ballybaba in search of another person, in Molloy’s case this 
person being his mother, in Moran’s case it being Molloy; both of them travel 
through the ‘treacherous’ and lonely hills and encounter them first-hand, even 
become one with them, and then return to civilisation with a changed perspective 
that does not only affect the exterior world but also their disposition. Although both 
parts reference the genre of the quest narrative, the quest structure is deconstructed 
in the course of the novel112 as the story becomes ‘a circling and recircling of quests, 
of attempts to identify oneself through identification with another’113. While the quest 
genre is commonly associated with the idea that the hero acquires a form of – mostly 
immaterial – gain from his or her journey (experience, self-knowledge, etc.), both 
Molloy and Moran become destitute in the course of their quests. The quest for 
meaning or identity through finding another or one’s own alienated self results 
instead here in a loss of meaning and self-identity as well as in physical decay. Both 
characters are ‘quite differently disposed’ at the end of their quests, but their 
experiences bereave them of the fragments of coherence and identity they previously 
still possessed.  
Julie Campbell’s article ‘Bunyan and Beckett: The Legacy of Pilgrim’s Progress 
in Mercier and Camier’ (2010) sheds more light on the use of the quest narrative in 
Beckett’s fiction. Campbell suggests that the quest structure in Beckett’s Mercier and 
Camier (1970), the novel whose writing immediately preceded that of the trilogy, 
undermines the traditional format of the spiritual quest as it leads to a form of 
physical and metaphysical impoverishment, thus establishing a notion of spiritual 
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regress that is opposed to the idea of making ‘progress’ through a quest in Bunyan’s 
allegorical text114. Campbell points out that 
it is important to stress that although [Beckett’s] version of a quest undermines the validity of 
the quest in the contemporary world, it is simultaneously a quest in its own right: a journey 
through the maze of conflicting pressures, apathies, escape routes, and blind alleys of 
contemporary thought115. 
As the quest genre has lost its transcendental meaning in the modern world, Beckett’s 
anti-quests locate themselves within a discourse of modernity that discloses the 
absurdity and futility of a quest for meaning, identity or belonging and is present in 
texts by other central figures of modern literature, amongst others, Kafka – and 
Thomas Bernhard, whose works will be discussed in the following chapter. 
Furthermore, on a self-reflexive level, Molloy’s depiction of C’s journey is 
evocative of the reading process: the reader first sees the landscape, inner and outer, 
from afar, ‘perhaps from [her] bedroom window’, as it is described in the section 
cited above. From this private locus of the reading experience she is unable to 
discern all of its details and abysses. She then ventures into the narrative and gets to 
know it intimately, realising that like the escarpment, the novel might initially appear 
to be one but then it turns out that ‘in reality there are two, two escarpments, two 
crests, riven by a valley’: Molloy’s story and Moran’s narrative. When she resumes 
the detached point of view from which she departed, the journey, in other words, the 
act of reading, will not only have changed her view of the novel but it will also have 
transformed her inner self. Molloy thus continues the hermeneutic project of 
approximating the content and structure of the narrative to the reading experience of 
the text that is set in motion in Watt.  
As Boulter puts it,  
[a]s readers move through Beckett’s corpus they finds [sic.] themselves in increasingly close 
relation to the experience of the characters in the novel: their hermeneutic bafflement 
mirrors or is mirrored by the character’s own; their experience of what Heidegger calls 
‘thrownness’ is identical to that of the character116. 
Boulter here draws on Iser’s reader-response theory and the notion that the reader of 
any kind of fiction is complicit in the realisation of the text, which was explored in 
the introductory chapter of this study. As explained above, the literary work thus 
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comes into being through a process of ‘convergence of text and reader’117, which 
takes the form of a dynamic process between the two. Iser thereby sketches a 
‘phenomenology of reading’ that defines the act of reading as interactive rather than 
a one-way street where meaning is transmitted from the text to the reader. In Iser’s 
words, 
participation means that the reader is not simply called upon to ‘internalize’ the positions 
given in the text, but he is induced to make them act upon and so transform each other, as a 
result of which the aesthetic object begins to emerge118. 
The degree to which the reader is involved in the production of textual meaning is 
dependent on the level of determinacy the individual text provides. Following Iser’s 
concept of reader-text interaction, Boulter goes on to argue that in Molloy, the reader 
is inscribed in the text in the character of Moran: the character Molloy thereby 
becomes the ‘text’ Moran is reading and attempting to comprehend, rendering 
Moran the ‘reader-as-detective’119. Due to the fragmented concept of subjectivity 
that the novel revolves around, Molloy thus becomes both the subject and the object 
of his narrative, both ‘I/you, narrator/narrated’120. Molloy, the ‘author’ of the first 
part of the novel, is, then, ‘narrated by someone else, […] dispossessed of his own 
story’121. As Molloy/Moran becomes both his own author and reader, attempting to 
make sense of a voice telling him things throughout the course of the narrative, the 
reader is made to become an active part of the mechanics of the narrative. 
 In his book Re-Forming the Narrative: Towards a Mechanics of Modernist Fiction 
(1987), David Hayman categorises Beckett’s texts as a type of modernist fiction he 
defines as ‘self-generating’122, meaning that the absence of authorial authority allows 
the text to come into being ‘out of its own matter’ as a form of ‘verbal perpetual 
motion’123. In a mode reminiscent of Iser’s reader-response model, Hayman argues 
that in Beckett’s narrative fiction, particularly in the trilogy, the reader is thus made a 
crucial part of the process of textual genesis, placing Beckett’s fiction at the higher 
end of the reader-participation spectrum where the authorial position is virtually 
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obliterated. Although Hayman’s reading of Molloy does not elaborate on the reader’s 
constitutive role in the novel, closer inspection of the passage quoted above reveals 
the significance of readerly interaction in the text as the man called C, a place holder 
for the reader figure, is observed by the narrator Molloy, not the other way around. 
The narrator thereby becomes an observer, a surrogate for the reader, and the 
reader briefly becomes the subject of the surface narrative. Molloy reports that C is 
walking ‘on by ways he seemed hardly to know, or not at all, for he went with 
uncertain step and often stopped to look about him, like someone trying to fix 
landmarks in his mind’124. As C portrays the Beckettian reader, in search of clues for 
some form of ‘fixed,’ stable meaning in the alienating text that is Molloy, the reader 
finds herself narrated by the text, that is by Molloy/Molloy (as both character/text). 
The passage hints at the dimension of embodied, imaginative space generated 
by the fictional text, a space that exists only ‘in [the reader’s] mind’ but takes the 
shape of a physical territory where ‘landmarks’ may indicate the possibility of 
determining stable signification. Molloy, however, does not consider himself a 
suitable landmark: ‘But a man, a fortiori myself, isn’t exactly a landmark’, he muses, 
but an ‘unstable fugitive thing’125. Molloy’s existence is a fortiori, only by inference – 
and not of its own right – probable, throwing the reader into ‘an oscillating zone of 
indecision’126. The inverted reader-narrated character constellation introduced in 
this section is then, however, relativised as it seems that C and Molloy share a 
number of distinguishing features: like Molloy, C ‘looks old’ and is a ‘sorry sight’ on 
his solitary journey; like Molloy, he walks with a stick ‘to thrust himself onward’127. 
To a certain degree, this description suggests, the reader, Molloy and Moran are the 
same being: they share the same role in the hermeneutic design of the text that 
renders them all authors, fragmented readers and narrated objects of the novel at the 
same time. However, due to the fragmented and unstable model of subjectivity 
underlying the novel, Boulter suggests that reading the text leads to a negation of the 
reader’s subject position: ‘if […] the reader assumes the role of specular reader, his 
readerly subject position becomes tenuous as it too is decomposed’128. The aesthetic 
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process of Molloy thus subjects the reader to the fragmentation of subjectivity 
depicted in the character(s) of Molloy and Moran, A and C, making her, too, an 
existential ‘vagrant’ in the reading experience. 
The novel thereby introduces a central theme of self-reflexion that runs 
through the entire trilogy in the form of the perspective and experience of the reader, 
which is successively approximated to that of the narrator and – to some degree – 
even equated with and mirrored in it. Introducing a counter-concept to Erich 
Auerbach’s notion of mimesis, the mechanics of Beckett’s fiction thereby establish an 
alternative concept of literary ‘realism’. While Auerbach acknowledges that 
modernist realism requires a high degree of reader-text interaction, he still finds that 
the modernism of Woolf and Joyce is ‘a mirror’ of their times129. As we have seen in 
Murphy, Beckett’s anti-realism is far from attempting to simulate reality, but – 
through the individual reader – the texts of the trilogy actively absorb significant 
elements of reality into their aesthetic realisation, which turns literature from a fixed 
representative entity into a real changeable process. As opposed to the widespread 
concept of readerly engagement based on the idea that literature detaches the reader 
from reality130, Beckett’s narrative fiction engages the reader in the reality of her own 
subjectivity. As the narrator’s and the reader’s subjectivity are thus made to converge 
in the process of reading Molloy, the question of Stimmung, or disposition, arises. Iser 
points out that the realisation of the fictional text through the reader is by definition 
not fixed or determined and ‘by no means independent of the individual disposition 
of the reader’131. Molloy then suggests that the reader’s disposition will be subject to 
change in the course of reading the novel, that at the end of it she, too, will be ‘quite 
differently disposed’. Arguing that this change of disposition, of temper and mood, is 
the focal point of Molloy, I will, in the following, demonstrate the way in which a 
dynamic process of Stimmung between reader and text is constitutive for a reading of 
the trilogy. 
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Molloy’s Anxious Disposition 
In line with the reorientation towards a more visceral focus in Beckett’s œuvre from 
the trilogy onwards as discussed above, both Jonathan Boulter and Russell Smith132 
have called for a new way of interpreting the trilogy, and in particular Molloy, 
through the lens of affect or feeling, specifically in view of its impact on readers. 
Likewise, in her article ‘Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable: The Novel Reshaped’ 
(2015), Angela Moorjani provides an overview of the dominant theoretical 
frameworks critics have used to interpret the trilogy, noting that most recently studies 
on affect and the body have taken centre stage in the critical discourse133. At the 
heart of Molloy’s affective core lies Heidegger’s Grundstimmung anxiety. As Molloy 
watches A and C approach and then turn away from each other from a distance, an 
anxiety emerges that is situated in the space between him, the observer, and the 
observed: ‘I watched him recede, overtaken (myself) by his anxiety, at least by an 
anxiety which was not necessarily his, but of which as it were he partook. Who knows 
if it wasn’t my own anxiety overtaking him’134. Both C – the specular reader – and 
Molloy are thus overcome by an anxiety that might originate from either of them 
and has been transferred onto the other. Is it C, the reader, who infuses the narrator 
with his own anxiety, or is it the other way around? Does the text create a mood that 
is then transmitted to the reader or does the reader’s disposition colour the text with 
its forms of affect? The novel’s ambiguous answer to these questions anticipates a 
crucial problem of Beckett’s writing: is meaning created by the reader or by the text? 
Or does it, instead, emerge in the production of Stimmung through the negotiation 
between reader and text? The textual dynamics of anxiety in Molloy allow for a more 
careful consideration of these issues. 
As pointed out above, the novel’s plot unfolds against the backdrop of an 
existential form of anxiety closely related to Heidegger’s concept of anxiety as a 
unique form of Stimmung enabling ontological self-awareness. In the introductory 
chapter of this study, I have specified that Heidegger’s analysis of this fundamental 
mood draws on Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety, where anxiety is defined as ‘a 
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fear of “nothing”’135, a notion Heidegger takes up in his ontology as he distinguishes 
between fear [Furcht] of a concrete thing within the world [innerweltlich Seiendes] and 
anxiety [Angst] of nothing and nowhere in particular136. An entry in Beckett’s 
German notebook from August 1936 reveals that he engaged with a very similar 
train of thought, stating that it is ‘better to be afraid of something than of nothing’137. 
To further outline a notion mentioned in my previous discussion of Heidegger’s 
philosophy, the ‘nothingness’ of this anxiety is caused by a loss of identity and 
meaning as provided by the world: ‘Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the 
possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in the terms of the “world” and the way 
things have been publicly interpreted’138. Adopting this notion, Jean-Paul Sartre finds 
that anguish – his preferred term for anxiety – emerges in the face of realising one’s 
individual freedom from the framework of meaning provided by Heidegger’s Man 
[‘They’]139. Béatrice Han-Pile summarises this position: 
What anxiety discloses is not the burden of existing but human freedom. When I am anxious, 
I become aware of two things: (a) that nothing in the world can determine my choices 
because I am radically separated from the in-itself by my nihilating activity (therefore nothing 
can act as a ‘cause’ on me unless I construe it as such, thematically or non thematically); and 
(b) that nothing in myself can determine my choices either. Anxiety forces me to adopt the 
standpoint of pure reflection and thus to abandon bad faith in order to realize that what I see 
as myself (the ego) is a construct to which I can’t be identified140.  
Anxiety thus leads to a disintegration of the subject’s self-identity as it realises that the 
latter is a mere construct provided by the world. Molloy’s – and/or C’s – anxiety 
testifies to this loss of self-identity, which reveals the dissolution of self into an 
intersubjective notion of mood that then dissolves the division between reader and 
text. However, Beckett’s self-erasing anxiety goes beyond Sartre’s notion of the 
subject, which still considerably relies on the idea of a stable self. C’s anxiety is not 
part and parcel of his individual freedom and subjective affect – it is not even his 
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anxiety ‘but [one] of which as it were he partook’. Molloy’s anxiety thus evidences 
the self’s ultimate dependence on an intersubjective notion of affective selfhood141. 
Later in the novel, Molloy’s Doppelgänger Moran only perceives his own 
anxiety after noticing a change in his surroundings when his superior Gaber sends 
him after Molloy, thereby – in a fashion reminiscent of Watt – breaking down the 
barrier between internal and external atmospheres: ‘The colour and weight of the 
world were changing already, soon I would have to admit I was anxious’142. Moran’s 
anxiety is self-aware to the extent that he knows of the effect it has on the outside 
world, changing both its colour – his way of perceiving it – as well as its ‘weight’ – 
the impact it has on him. As an all-encompassing form of affect, this anxiety impacts 
not only the way Moran perceives the world around him; it also changes his 
relationship to it, which Moran is acutely aware of. In Heidegger’s words, ‘Dasein’s 
openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-
mind’143; Moran’s openness to the world is thus altered and transformed by the 
anxiety shaping this scene. 
It is remarkable that Moran’s realisation of his anxiety originates from his 
‘outer’ perception rather than his ‘internal’ self-awareness. Once again, as seen in 
Watt above, ‘the distinction between what was inside it and what was outside it was 
not at all easy to draw’144. Drawing on Sianne Ngai’s analysis in Ugly Feelings (2007), 
Russell Smith underlines this ontological shift generated by Beckett’s concept of 
anxiety as it blurs the lines between subject and object145. The conventional idea of a 
separation between an internal and external world collapses in this depiction of 
Stimmung as Beckett engages with the Heideggerian notion that Stimmung is not merely 
an internal phenomenon but rather a form of affect that emerges through an 
interaction and a negotiation between the self and the world. As pointed out in the 
introduction to this study, Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as contingent on its Being-
in-the-world can be extended through Deleuze’s notion of the subject, according to 
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which ‘[t]here’s no subject, but a production of subjectivity’146. We can now observe 
that Beckett’s anxiously dissolved subjects, in turn, suggest that there is no fixed or 
individual subject, only a production of intersubjectivity. 
Conversely, however, as Beckett’s characters are not in tune with the world 
and the fellow beings surrounding them, incapable of achieving a sense of Stimmung, 
their anxiety singles them out. Molloy suffers from a successive isolation and 
dissociation from the world, as demonstrated in the following pastoral scene, which 
depicts his encounter with a shepherd and his flock of sheep: 
I heard the shepherd whistle, and I saw him flourishing his crook, and the dog bustling about 
the flock, which but for him would no doubt have fallen into the canal. All that through a 
glittering dust, and soon through that mist too which rises in me every day and veils the world 
from me and veils me from myself. The bleating grew faint, because the sheep were less anxious, or 
because they were further away, or because my hearing was worse than a moment before, 
which would surprise me, for my hearing is still very good, scarcely blunted coming up to 
dawn, and if I sometimes hear nothing for hours on end it is for reasons of which I know 
nothing, or because about me all goes really silent, from time to time, whereas for the righteous the 
tumult of the world never stops147 (my emphases). 
Alluding to T.S. Eliot’s concept of the ‘dissociation of sensibility’, according to which 
in seventeenth-century literature a separation of intellect and feeling developed that 
has dominated literature ever since148, Molloy describes himself as being dissociated 
from the world of experience of this pastoral sequence. Molloy’s dissociation from 
the narrative world and the ‘glittering dust’ veiling both the world and himself from 
Molloy further illustrate the unique ontological function Heidegger assigns to 
anxiety: ‘In anxiety what is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, in 
general, do entities within-the-world. The “world” can offer nothing more, and 
neither can the Dasein-with others’149. Generating a hiatus between the world and 
Dasein, anxiety – as a mode of dissociated contemplation – separates and isolates the 
individual from other beings, a notion reflected in Beckett’s solipsistic characters. It 
thereby creates a form of ontological detachment that, according to Heidegger, 
reveals the most authentic forms of being: ‘Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that 
which it is anxious about – its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety 
individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that 
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understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities’150. As the ‘tumult of the 
world never stops’, ontological self-understanding is only possible in this detached 
state of mind, one we encounter in Beckett’s writing in the form of ‘silence’.  
The idea of silence, which is a central motif in the trilogy and culminates in 
the play of voices and silence in The Unnamable, reappears in the second half of the 
novel in Moran’s narrative: ‘Yet only then can you detect, beyond the fatuous 
clamour, the silence of which the universe is made’151. Beckett’s existentialist notion 
of a profound stillness and silence beneath the frenzy of the world permeates the 
trilogy as well as his later short story Company (1979). It opens up an ontological 
enquiry into language and its relationship to being as well as the notion of a voice 
speaking through the void of existence, which is reminiscent of Blaise Pascal’s often 
quoted observation from Pensées about the silence beyond birth and death as a 
fundamental source of anxiety: ‘The eternal silence of these infinite spaces frightens 
me’152. This silence, which I will explore further in the following section, is beyond 
the search for Stimmung: it admits a defeat and renouncement of the possibility of 
achieving an attunement, a sense of harmony, the idea of connectedness.  
Two conflicting views on the existential condition thus take centre stage in 
Molloy: the first is constituted on a plot level, through the Heideggerian – and by 
extension, Sartrean – notion of a singularising form of anxiety that allows for 
ontological self-understanding and an authentic kind of being removed from the 
notions of identity and meaning provided by the world. The promise of authenticity 
which Heidegger’s concept of anxiety harbours is, however, shown to fail since the 
anxious Molloy and Moran undergo a disintegration of self rather than a realisation 
thereof. The second plane is located on the reader-response level and generated by a 
gradual dissolution of self-identity into an intersubjective circulation of affect, which 
is subject to temporal change and is set in motion through the reading process. As 
noted above, the dissolution of selfhood in the fragmented, non-identical ‘characters’ 
of Molloy/Moran showcases the self’s relationality to other beings and to other 
versions of the non-identical self as it/they evolve over time (whether to speak of a 
singular or plural of selfhood here becomes truly unclear). The hermeneutic process 
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of Molloy renders the reader an integral part, both subject and object, of this 
dispossession, of the ‘insurmountable deferral of any ultimate subject position’153. A 
closer look at the textual economy of Stimmung provides a way of resolving the conflict 
between these two existential models. 
As Iser points out, the literary text requires its reader to distance herself from 
her own subjectivity to embark on the narrative process154. This self-effacing process 
– reminiscent of Eliot’s proposition that the poet must erase her subjectivity in the act 
of writing as it is developed in ‘Traditional and the Individual Talent’155 – influences 
the circulation of mood: the Stimmung the reader may initially ‘bring’ to the text needs 
to be curbed, in line with their subjectivity partly effaced, to allow for textual 
engagement. This subdued form of Stimmung is, however, still present or – in view 
that this analysis is built upon a notion of mood as a continuous process of 
attunement – rather continues to evolve throughout the reading process. Molloy is, 
naturally, not only a text about anxiety, but in itself highly anxiety-inducing. 
Norman N. Holland’s method of conceptualising affect in the reading process 
in The Dynamics of Literary Response, which is largely based on Freud’s psychoanalysis, 
relates forms of textual affect to two fundamental aspects: the anxiety-arousing and 
the drive-gratifying element of reader engagement156. If the narrative manages the 
anxiety-arousing elements and at the same time provides satisfaction to the 
stimulated drive, the reading process results in a gratifying affective resolution. 
Looking at Beckett’s narrative texts, a low or even negative degree of ‘traditional’ 
reader-gratification can be assumed: notorious aspects such as failed quests, the lack 
of narrative resolutions, anti-heroes, infinite circularity, the withholding of stable and 
defined meaning and linguistic oddities are more likely to frustrate readers than to 
gratify them. The novel displays an ironic meta-awareness of its refusal for such 
gratification as Moran comments after he kills a wayfaring stranger: ‘I am sorry I 
cannot indicate more clearly how this result was obtained, it would have been 
something worth reading. But it is not at this late stage of my relation that I intend to 
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give way to literature’157. In addition to the refusal of conventional forms of reader-
gratification, the dissolution of readerly subjectivity Molloy performs acts not just on 
the implicit level Iser postulates for any type of fictional text, but on a more 
aggressive, more alienating scale through the inversion and merging of the reader, 
narrator and author positions. 
 Naturally, a general statement such as ‘Beckett’s novels induce anxiety in 
their readers’ would be questionable as many readers seek out and enjoy his 
trademark disintegration of traditional literary structures158. However, the textual 
(de)composition of the novels constituting the trilogy generate a hermeneutic 
structure that can evoke anxiety if readers embark on the existential anti-quests of 
these novels. But, if it is realised, what would be the locus of this anxiety? Molloy’s 
refusal to provide mimetic character models prevents one from describing Molloy or 
Moran as ‘anxious characters’ in themselves. They cannot be anxious because they 
are not (in the sense of existing in a narrative universe). Likewise, we cannot claim 
that the potential for anxiety structurally inherent in the novel realises itself in the 
reader and only within the reader since the self-effacing mechanism of the reading 
process suspends her subjectivity in the act of reading. 
The convergence of readerly and textual affect can only lie within the 
reader’s being in the textual world. As I have outlined in Chapter 1, by ‘world’, I refer 
to a system of meaning and signification rather than a physical space; in this sense, 
the textual world fulfils similar ontological functions as that which Heidegger 
designates by the term world. In his approach to a phenomenology of reading The 
Unnamable, Paul Stewart locates the experience of the reader both in and outside the 
text as he states that ‘the reader’s consciousness, which is both inside and outside the 
text, is caught between the felt reality of his or her mundane world and the quasi-felt, 
quasi-judgemental world created through living in the text’159. The act of reading 
thus places the reader in a space outside her individual subjectivity but not within the 
common, public world; it forces her into the continuous negotiation of an 
intersubjectivity that relies partly on aspects of her subject position – which, as part of 
this process, is dissolved through its attunement to the text – and partly on the 
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dynamics of textual affect. As observed earlier in Murphy and Watt, the possibility of a 
harmonic attunement of this kind has been obliterated in Beckett’s branch of fiction; 
hence, a structural dissonance between the readerly subject and the text becomes the 
constitutive element of such intersubjectivity. A new, discordant system of 
signification – or ‘world’ – thus takes shape. 
As Molloy and Moran become the readers of their own stories, they are cast 
into an affective attunement with their own past selves. Upon writing his report, 
Moran, for instance, relives his anxiety while recounting the events depicting his 
departure to Ballybaba with his son: 
Since in this way I shirked the issue, have I to appologize [sic.] for saying so? I let fall this 
suggestion for what it is worth. And perfunctorily. For in describing this day I am once more 
he who suffered it, who crammed it full of futile anxious life, with no other purpose than his 
own stultification and the means of not doing what he had to do. And as then my thoughts 
would have none of Molloy, so tonight my pen. This confession has been preying on my 
mind for some time past. To have made it gives me no relief160. 
The crippling anxiety Moran suffers estranges him from ‘doing what he had to do’, 
that is, from finding Molloy. And while the act of confession offers no relief to him, 
the act of narration subjects him to his past mood, rendering him not only the teller 
but simultaneously a recipient and reader of his own story who converges with the 
Stimmung of his past self. Molloy’s specular reader, in all his indeterminacy, allows even 
Molloy only conjectures about his textual experience:  
From there he must have seen it all, the plain, the sea, and then these selfsame hills that some 
call mountains, indigo in places in the evening light, their serried ranges crowding to the 
skyline, cloven with hidden valleys that the eye divines from sudden shifts of colour and then 
from other signs for which there are no words, nor even thoughts161. 
As we have seen through a reading of the hermeneutics of Molloy, the aesthetic 
process between text and reader is a continuous negotiation of affect which is subject 
to changes in attunement that are beyond the grasp of intellectual consideration; all 
they are is feeling. 
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IV. Decomposed Selves, Voices in the Dark 
Finality without End: Malone Dies, The Unnamable 
The mood that characterises not only Molloy but most of Beckett’s œuvre – an anxious 
exploration of the void underlying the ‘fatuous clamour’ of being in the world – is 
captured succinctly in Moran’s realisation that ‘it was only by transferring it to this 
atmosphere, how shall I say, of finality without end, why not, that I could venture to 
consider the work I had on hand’162 (my emphasis). The paradoxical idea of a 
‘finality without end’ echoes Heidegger’s notion of Being-towards-death, according 
to which Dasein is always oriented towards its own end but can never actually 
experience it. In this sense, Beckett’s characters are always anxiously and 
asymptotically leaning towards their own finality, nothingness and silence without 
ever being able to actually reach it. The anxiety underlying these texts generates a 
structural mood of anxiety that always in itself contains a sense of insufficiency.  
While it seems that to Beckett human existence itself bars the possibility of 
ever being that nothingness, his fictional ‘characters’, including Vladimir and 
Estragon in Waiting for Godot (1953), Hamm and Clov in Endgame (1957), the nameless 
narrator of How It Is (1961), Molloy and Moran, are, through their own fictional 
being, forever trapped inside this state of a ‘finality without end’. At the end of his 
report, Moran walks past a graveyard and ironically states that ‘[i]t is a great thing to 
own a plot in perpetuity, a very great thing indeed’163, a metafictional comment 
showcasing the fate Beckett’s weary characters suffer in the fictional ‘existence’ they 
are trapped in. His narrators are not in control of their stories, but are rather the 
victims of their own narratives, which trap them in a state of an anxious anticipation 
of the impending void. The most overt articulation of such finality, of perpetual 
dying, can be found in the second novel of the trilogy. 
Malone Dies, originally published the same year as Molloy, takes the main 
themes of its predecessor further, depicting more radically the successive 
disintegration of the self and the act of narration I have previously discussed. In the 
same vein as Tolstoy’s novella The Death of Ivan Ilyich («Смерть Ивана Ильича», 
1886), this short novel thematises the process of dying; but as opposed to Tolstoy’s 
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psychological depiction of this experience, Malone Dies tests the existential concept of 
always already living towards death. Malone exclusively exists in the human 
condition of being trapped in a ‘finality without end’, in the perpetual process of 
dying, embodying Augustine’s notion of the state of dying portrayed in The City of 
God. Augustine therein finds that one can never be dying, or ‘in death’, as one is 
always either before or after death164. There is no duration between those two, as 
there is no duration between past and future. However, he suggests that there is a 
hypothetical mode of eternal dying as a mode of punishment: 
For the death that is effected, not by the separation of soul and body, but rather by the union 
of both for eternal punishment is more serious and the worst of all evils. There, conversely, 
men will not be in a state before death or after death but always in death, and for this reason 
never living, never dead, but endlessly dying. Indeed, man will never be worse off in death 
than where death itself will be deathless165. 
Where Augustine proposes the state of dying, of a ‘deathless’ death, as a hypothetical 
idea, Heidegger integrates it into his ontology as an integral part of human existence 
through the concept of Being-towards-death. He suggests that the projection towards 
death, towards one’s own finality, defines one’s understanding of self and allows for a 
realisation of one’s ownmost authentic being166. Lance St John Butler finds that 
‘Malone’s entire narrative […] illustrates Being-towards-death’167, a structure of 
existence defined by finality and oriented towards it. 
While Molloy and Moran are, or become, ill and handicapped, but are still 
capable of interacting with the world to a certain extent, Malone is confined to his 
death bed in a body that he describes himself as ‘impotent’. He further laments that 
‘[t]here is virtually nothing it can do’168. While awaiting his death, his only pastime is 
storytelling, and although he might initially appear to be a posterior ‘version’ of 
Molloy, he later intimates that he could instead be the ‘creator’ of Molloy’s narratives 
and the others:  
But let us leave these morbid matters and get on with that of my demise, in two or three days 
if I remember rightly. Then it will be all over with the Murphys, Merciers, Molloys, Morans 
and Malones, unless it goes beyond the grave169. 
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Once again, the narrative voice thus becomes an unstable entity as the boundaries 
between Malone and his characters, as well as himself as his own character, are 
blurred170, leading to a fragmentation of the writing self that is even more intense 
than in Molloy: ‘Of all of Beckett’s works, the one that is most illustrative of this 
process of splintering and self-estrangement of the writing subject is probably Malone 
Dies’171. As the self disintegrates, it becomes apparent that this Being-towards-death is 
far removed from Heidegger’s optimistic concept of self-realisation through death. 
Instead, Malone’s state of Augustinian ‘endlessly dying’ leaves him forever deathless 
and forever entangled in a state of being that is not marked by ‘authentic’ selfhood 
but by its contingency on the world: ‘The search for myself is ended. I am buried in 
the world’172. 
The disintegration of the body and the narrating voice finds its climax in The 
Unnamable, a text narrated by a nameless and motionless entity. Boulter rightly points 
out that ‘[i]n The Unnamable […] the subject is in radical crisis, unable to fix himself as 
a subject’173. All the eponymous creature really consists of is a voice, and like 
Malone, this voice is a teller of stories. Again, it is suggested that this narrator is the 
one who created the other narrators in the trilogy and thus assumes the position of 
an absent implied author:  
All these Murphys, Molloys and Malones do not fool me. They have made me waste my 
time, suffer for nothing, speak of them when, in order to stop speaking, I should have spoken 
of me and of me alone. […] Let them be gone now, them and all the others, those I have 
used and those I have not used, give me back the pains I lent them and vanish, from my life, 
my memory, my terrors and shames. There, now there is no one here but me, no one wheels 
about me, no one comes towards me, no one has ever met anyone before my eyes, these 
creatures have never been, only I and this black void have ever been. And the sounds? No, all 
is silent174. 
As the Unnamable discloses that his – or, perhaps more aptly, its – predecessors are 
mere figments of his imagination, his ‘puppets’175, he declares that the only one who 
is there, wherever his ‘here’ is, is himself. Without their voices, he finds himself in 
complete silence and a black void. There is no encounter with the world in The 
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Unnamable as there is no tangible ‘world’ in the nothingness where the narrator – who 
is not anthropomorphic, who not only has no name but cannot be named – resides. 
The use of the deictic ‘here’ implies a presence without an identifiable space as the 
speaker provides no answers to the initial questions of ‘Where now? Who now? 
When now?’; hence it must be the presence of the narrative itself he is speaking of. 
Beckett’s later short story Company is reminiscent of the narrative setup of The 
Unnamable as it is opened by the words ‘A voice comes to one in the dark. 
Imagine’176. The text thus posits a narrative structure in which the solitude of the 
reader is a presupposition for an aesthetic encounter, and then explores whether that 
solitude is, at all, possible. As I will outline in the following, the Unnamable is both 
the voice coming to the reader in the dark and a listener of such a voice himself, in a 
black space of nothingness, a mere presence. This presence is Heidegger’s Dasein 
stripped to its basic semantics: as a mere ‘being there’177 with no actual mode of 
being or definition of the ‘there’. 
The novel’s emphasis on the idea of the voice, of hearing and listening, 
foregrounds the auditory dimension of the narrative as I have previously observed in 
Watt. The only identifiable trait of the Unnamable is his voice, a voice that 
establishes a subject position through its narrative discourse alone. As the 
Unnamable observes at one point in the novel, ‘it’s entirely a matter of voices’178. 
Like Moran, the Unnamable becomes a recipient, a listener of his own narrative as 
suggested in Jacques Derrida’s concept of s’entendre-parler, of hearing oneself speak179. 
Returning to Deleuze’s definition of the self from the introductory chapter of this 
study, the Unnamable instantiates his selfhood by means of the successive 
modulation of his voice over the course of the novel as ‘the Self is not an object, but 
that to which all objects are related as to the continuous variation of its own 
successive states, and to the infinite modulation of its degrees at each instant’180. 
However, although his position as a self is established through the presence of his 
voice and as a supposed author figure – the creator of Murphy, Molloy and Malone 
– the Unnamable himself does not appear to be the one in charge of his own 
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 139 
narrative when he indicates that he is ‘obliged to speak’181. At the same time, he is at 
times taken over by the voices of his own creations, in this example of a character he 
first calls Basil and then renames Mahood:  
It was he told me stories about me, lived in my stead, issued forth from me, came back to me, 
entered back into me, heaped stories on my head. I don’t know how it was done. I always 
liked not knowing, but Mahood said it wasn’t right. He didn’t know either, but it worried 
him. It is his voice which has often, always, mingled with mine, and sometimes drowned it 
completely182. 
Taken over by the voices of others, the Unnamable is the one who is being spoken 
through. As opposed to Malone, who suggests that he impersonates others, the 
Unnamable is impersonated by his creations and other voices, whose stories he 
listens to, rendering him both ‘the teller and the told’183 of the novel. It is against the 
backdrop of Malone and Moran’s ‘finality without end’ that the Unnamable 
famously realises that he is forever trapped within his own narrative:  
perhaps it’s done already, […] perhaps they have carried me to the threshold of my story, 
before the door that opens on my own story, that would surprise me, if it opens, it will be I, it 
will be the silence, where I am, I don’t know, I’ll never know, in the silence you don’t know, 
you must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on184. 
His narrative is therefore both his product and his own origin: Hayman suggests that 
‘[i]t follows that the details of these narrative accounts, aborted fragments though 
they may be, are overtly self-generated’. And, further, ‘[t]he speaker itself is 
transparently the creature of its prose, generated as much as generating’185. In this 
loss of the stable subject-object relation lies the foundation of the Unnamable’s 
radical intersubjectivity: only by abandoning the concept of self-contained 
subjectivity can he enter the realm of speech; ‘in order to speak at all, he must speak 
as if he were an other, one of the community that shares language and reason’186. 
The contingency of speech on a sense of community and on a form of company – 
constituted by the reader – propels the Unnamable’s being into a form of 
intersubjectivity that becomes the precondition for any kind of speaking. 
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Conclusion: The Modern Self in Search of Company 
In Beckett’s texts, which ‘are marked not so much by harmony as by disjunction, 
dissonance and fragmentation’187, Stimmung is a quest for attunement, at first a 
thematic exploration and then an aesthetic reflection of whether a sense of harmony 
can be achieved or not. Therein, the question of attunement is found to be 
inextricably tied up with that of the subject. Theodor Adorno’s discussion of the 
individual in Endgame reveals the complexity behind this concept in Beckett’s works 
and its dialectic relationship to Heidegger’s ontology: 
The individual himself is revealed to be a historical category, both the outcome of the 
capitalist process of alienation and a defiant protest against it, something transient himself. 
The individualistic position constitutes the opposite pole to the ontological approach of every 
kind of existentialism, including that of Being and Time, and as such belongs with it. Beckett’s 
drama abandons that position like an outmoded bunker. If individual experience in its 
narrowness and contingency has interpreted itself as a figure of Being, it has received the 
authority to do so only by asserting itself to be the fundamental characteristic of Being. But 
that is precisely what is false. The immediacy of individuation was deceptive; the carrier of 
individual experience is mediated, conditioned. Endgame assumes that the individual’s claim 
to autonomy and being has lost its credibility. But although the prison of individuation is seen 
to be both prison and illusion – the stage set is the imago of this kind of insight – art cannot 
break the spell of a detached subjectivity; it can only give concrete form to solipsism188. 
As Adorno observes, the existential, or non-existential, condition of Beckett’s 
characters defeats the ontological structures proposed by Heidegger as the self is 
found to be, by definition, historically determined and transient rather than 
transcendental. Further, Adorno suggests that individuation and solipsism are at the 
core of this understanding of the modern condition, but that the aesthetic process 
can never actually achieve this individuation itself. A closer analysis of integral 
structures of reader response in the trilogy has shown that the artistic process is, in 
itself, predicated upon an intersubjective notion of community, or company. 
Beckett’s late short story Company elucidates this principle and becomes a 
locus of such intersubjectivity. As it revisits the idea of a bodiless voice in the dark, it 
is intimated that the ‘Unnamable’ is not a speaker but a hearer of the narrative: ‘Let 
the hearer be named H. […] Then let him not be named H. Let him be again as he 
was. The Hearer. Unnamable. You’189. In the same mode we have observed in 
Molloy, if the reader is the Unnamable, she becomes the narrator and the listener of 
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the text, both the speaker and the one who is being spoken to. The text then 
intimates that this relationship between the narrative and the reader as a narrator-
narratee is negotiated through a form of musical, acoustic attunement:  
But for the other say for some time past some improvement. Same flat tone as initially 
imagined and same repetitiousness. No improving those. But less mobility. Less variety of 
faintness. As if seeking optimum position. From which to discharge with greatest effect. The 
ideal amplitude for effortless audition. Neither offending the ear with loudness nor through 
converse excess constraining it to strain. How far more companionable such an organ than it 
initially in haste imagined. How far more likely to achieve its object. To have the hearer have 
a past and acknowledge it190. 
This section revisits the question of musical attunement and pitch proposed in 
Murphy and Watt and extends it by describing the narrative process as a form of 
musical performance, thus effectively bringing together the questions of musical 
attunement and of the interaction between reader (or hearer) and text (or voice). 
‘[F]lat tone’ and ‘repetitiousness’ are recurrent components in Beckett’s narrative 
inventory, but Company now looks for the ideal setup to achieve ‘greatest effect’, a 
milder form of the anxiety-inducing aesthetics of previous texts that attempts to not 
‘[offend] the ear’ or to constrain it. Although the voice becomes its own audience, 
Beckett’s texts are never in themselves sufficient without their readers and the 
company they provide: ‘The voice alone is company but not enough. Its effect on the 
hearer is a necessary complement’191. The second person narrative of the story 
utterly abandons the mimetic paradigm of fiction as the text denies any form of 
representation and reverts its focus on the dynamics of the reader-text interaction. 
Company thus provokes a Stimmung, one that acknowledges the negotiating character 
of such attunement in that the reader’s subjectivity as a temporal category is 
integrated: rather than abandoning her subjective experience in favour of not only a 
‘suspense of disbelief’ but also of self, the story urges its recipient ‘to have a past and 
acknowledge it’. 
 A dialectical structure hence arises out of an all-encompassing sense of 
solipsism that is, however, relativised by the urgent, self-effacing need for company. 
The closing paragraph of the text mirrors the different levels of narrative framing 
and re-framing and the contradictory condition of being alone in the company they 
create:  
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You now on your back in the dark shall not rise again […]. But with face upturned for good 
labour in vain at your fable. Till finally you hear how words are coming to an end. With 
every inane word a little nearer to the last. And how the fable too. The fable of one with you 
in the dark. The fable of one fabling of one with you in the dark. And how better in the end 
labour lost and silence. And you as you always were.  
Alone192. 
Silence is the end of attunement. And yet, paradoxically, as long as Beckett’s 
narrators speak to their readers, there is a search for attunement, a process of an 
attempted harmonisation. Their incompleteness of self invites the reader into the 
aesthetic experience of this existential condition, making her their company. 
 The modern condition in in Beckett’s fiction is marked by an underlying 
sense of a being and ‘making aware’ of the situatedness and attunement I have 
previously described. In Beckett’s earlier novels we have observed that the Stimmung 
of the modern is a quest for attunement, a thematical exploration and aesthetic 
reflection of whether a sense of harmony can be achieved or not – harmony between 
characters and their worlds, characters amongst each other, and finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, between the reader and the text, through texts that speak to their 
readers in search for an attunement that may counteract the silence underlying 
Beckett’s dissolved modern subjects. The relationship between Beckett’s take on 
human existence and Heideggerian ontology has been found to be based on a 
number of common themes and concerns; however, as Barfield rightly points out, 
Beckett’s aesthetics go beyond Heidegger’s framework, which relies on a notion of 
consistent self-identity. Beckett’s focus on ‘presence’ as a stripped-down version of 
Dasein lacks any and all coherence, identity and authenticity; it has by definition no 
real existential condition in the Heideggerian sense:  
whereas Heidegger can affirm that temporality as the being of Dasein should replace Kant’s 
‘pure reason’, Beckett cannot make such an essentially straightforward declaration. His 
fictional world is at least one stage removed from an existential situation; therefore, Beckett 
must seek the language which could mediate this distantiation between would-be self and 
would-be world193. 
At the core of Beckett’s treatment of the self lies a profound discomfort with 
modernity and with the idea of self-contained art that Adorno here encapsulates: 
For Beckett, culture swarms and crawls, the way the intestinal convolutions of Jugendstil 
ornamentation swarmed and crawled for the avant-garde before him: modernism as what is 
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obsolete in modernity. Language, regressing, demolishes that obsolete material. In Beckett, 
this kind of objectivity annihilates the meaning that culture once was, along with its 
rudiments. And so culture begins to fluoresce. In this Beckett is carrying to its conclusion a 
tendency present in the modern novel. Reflection, which the cultural criterion of aesthetic 
immanence proscribed as abstract, is juxtaposed with pure presentation; the Flaubertian 
principle of a completely self-contained subject matter is undermined. The less events can be 
presumed to be inherently meaningful, the more the idea of aesthetic substance as the unity 
of what appears and what was intended becomes an illusion. Beckett rids himself of this 
illusion by coupling the two moments in their disparity194. 
Aesthetic and existential substance dissolve into mutable, unstable and always 
contingent possibilities, leading Beckett’s characters – and readers – to find an 
insufficiency in the proposed models of human existence such as Heideggerian 
ontology and other modern concepts of human existence. Richard Begam has 
therefore proposed that Beckett’s works are part and parcel of what he coins the ‘end 
of modernity’195: a dissolved intersubjective self located between the fatuous clamour 
of the world and the eternal silence of nothingness. As we will see when turning to 
Bernhard in the following chapter, this dissolution of subjectivity would encounter a 
new mode of intensity in the modern construction of aesthetic and existential 
Stimmung. 
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Chapter 4 
‘Das ist, glaube ich, eine Stimmungssache’: 
Thomas Bernhard’s ‘Trilogy of the Arts’ 
I. Introduction: Dostoevsky, Beckett and the Scandal Maker 
In the previous sections of this study, two pivotal configurations of aesthetic mood in 
modern fiction have emerged: in Dostoevsky, the intensity of highly spatialised forms 
of collective affect, and in Beckett, an enquiry into the existential and musical 
dimension of Stimmung. We have seen that, as a consequence of these modes of 
interrogating affect within the modern condition, the works of both authors combine 
the levels of textual attunement outlined at the outset of this study: Dostoevsky’s 
analysis of Stimmung begins with a depiction of modes of existence in the modern city, 
his native Saint Petersburg, thus merging a perceived epochal Grundstimmung with 
representations of solitary characters who seem fundamentally out-of-tune with their 
times and through that very dissonance become all the more emblematic of the 
modern. The Idiot, then, marks a step towards an aesthetic practice that foregrounds 
the reading experience and the attunement at work within it. Beckett’s narrative 
fiction first resorts to a philosophical exploration of the human condition and 
successively delves deeper into an exploration of the aesthetics of intersubjective 
Stimmung in the reading process via the notion of musical attunement and the 
dissolution of self. 
In the following, I will study the prose works of Austrian writer Thomas 
Bernhard (1931-89) as a means to synthesise these two manifestations of Stimmung 
and its aesthetic philosophy in the fiction of modernity. Combining the affective 
immediacy of Dostoevsky’s works with the philosophical exploration of human 
existence and notions of musical harmony which marks Beckett’s novels, Bernhard’s 
works self-reflexively investigate the nature of art and scrutinise even more openly 
how mood informs and shapes the reader’s experience in the aesthetic process. 
Bernhard, who was considered the enfant terrible of Austrian post-war fiction for much 
 145 
of his career, has now become ‘a thoroughly canonic figure in modern literature’1 
and his works have frequently been compared to those of his Irish contemporary2, to 
such an extent that the German news magazine Der Spiegel called the Austrian writer 
an ‘Alpen-Beckett’3, an Alpine version of Beckett, in 1972. 
The affinities between the works of the two authors, who were both prolific 
writers of drama, prose and poetry and passed away in the same year, are manifold. 
Both Beckett and Bernhard are pessimistic commentators on the human condition, 
both have a propensity for absurd and black humour in the face of existential 
despair, and both display a fascination with language, music and the human voice 
which informs their notion of literature. The position of the solitary, alienated 
individual dominates their œuvres time and again, as Martin Esslin describes it: 
Bernhard’s world, like much of Beckett’s, whether in his poetry, prose or drama, is an 
essentially monologic universe, a universe of characters caught up in the prison house of their 
own consciousness, compulsive solipsistic talkers, experiencing their own selves, or rather, the 
hopeless quest for their true identities, as an endless stream of language erupting from their 
brains in the form of stories, stories made up of voices4. 
Although I consider an understanding of Beckett’s works as being purely monologic 
to be questionable since – as discussed in the previous chapter – they always imply a 
search and desire for company, one that is fulfilled by the reader, Esslin raises a valid 
point about the solipsistic nature and narrative programme of both Beckett’s and 
Bernhard’s characters: as well as their signature self-scrutiny, Bernhard’s narrators 
are marked by a tendency for monomania5 and, even more so than Beckett’s 
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storytellers, by the obsessive, repetitive circling of pivotal questions they lack a final 
answer to. 
 Dostoevsky, on the other hand, constitutes a crucial influence and reference 
point for Bernhard’s writing6. In his autobiographical text Die Kälte: Eine Isolation 
(1981), Bernhard describes how he discovered the novel Demons («Бесы», 1871-2) 
while afflicted with pulmonary disease during the early post-war period: 
Ich vertiefte mich in Verlaine und Trakl, und ich las Die Dämonen von Dostojewski, ein Buch 
von dieser Unersättlichkeit und Radikalität und überhaupt ein so dickes Buch hatte ich 
vorher in meinem Leben nie gelesen, ich betäubte mich, ich löste mich für einige Zeit in den 
Dämonen auf. […] Ich war von einer wilden und großen Dichtung getroffen, um selbst als ein 
Held daraus hervorzugehen. Nicht oft in meinem späteren Leben hat Dichtung eine so 
ungeheure Wirkung gehabt7. 
[I immersed myself in Verlaine and Trakl, and I also read Dostoyevsky’s novel The Demons. 
Never in my whole life have I read a more engrossing and elemental work, and at the time I 
had never read such a long one. It had the effect of a powerful drug, and for a time I was 
totally absorbed by it. […] I had felt the impact of a work that was both wild and great, and I 
emerged from the experience like a hero. Seldom has literature produced such an 
overwhelming effect on me8.] 
Bernhard’s account of his influential, perhaps even life-changing, reading experience 
of Dostoevsky at a young age underlines the intense affective nature and 
‘overwhelming’ immersive potential of the Russian novelist’s works, which I have 
discussed in Chapter 2 of this study. Both aspects – intensity and immersion – would 
shape Bernhard’s own writing considerably insofar as many of his works create a 
similar degree of affective intensity in the aesthetic process. In the following, I will 
outline the ways in which Bernhard’s ferocious poetics of immediacy juxtapose 
Beckettian musical attunement with the concept of Stimmung as affectively laden 
atmosphere, as a matter of space and presence – such as we find it in Dostoevsky’s 
novels – engendering an aesthetics of Stimmung that places the reading process front 
and centre. ‘Bernhard ist nicht einer von jenen, die man «mit Abstand» liest’9, Erika 
Tunner finds: Bernhard is not an author one reads from a distance. Quite the 
opposite is the case. The intense, intimate quality of his narrative fiction will 
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constitute my point of departure for a reconsideration of the relationship between 
mood and the reading process in the context of modern aesthetics. 
 
 
 
From Erzählung to Erregung 
If grumpiness were an art form, Thomas Bernhard would be its uncontested master. 
His works are notorious for the highly idiosyncratic style of his narrators, who are an 
epitome of spite, hatred and disgust, as well as for the many public scandals 
surrounding their publication10. As Wendelin Schmidt-Dengler points out:  
Um fast jedes Werk – wie auch fast um jeden Auftritt Bernhards – rankt sich eine 
Blumenkette von Skandalen, die den Blick auf das Werk oder auf den jeweils in Rede 
stehenden Anlaß der Aktion auf sich und weg vom Text zieht11.  
[Every work of art – as well as almost all of Bernhard’s public appearances – is tendriled with 
a girdle of flowers formed by scandals, which draw attention to themselves and away from 
the text or the respective occasion of his campaigns (my translation).] 
Bernhard’s novel Holzfällen: Eine Erregung (1984; translated into English by Ewald 
Osers as Cutting Timber: An Irritation in 1985 and by David McLintock as Woodcutters in 
1987) is a prime example of this phenomenon as its German subtitle Eine Erregung – a 
commotion, irritation or uproar – is both programmatic for the content of the novel 
and for its reception. 
One of Bernhard’s former friends, the composer Gerhard Lampersberg, filed 
a libel suit since he recognised himself in the unfavourable portrait of the composer 
Auersberger. Consequently, all copies of the novel were temporarily confiscated in 
Bernhard’s native Austria12. Lampersberg later abandoned the lawsuit, but the 
public scandal promoted the novel’s publication considerably and initially almost 
overshadowed its status as a work of art. By the time the novel was published, 
Bernhard had already caused a number of public scandals, for instance through an 
opprobrious speech offering a damning assessment of his home country when being 
                                                            
10 For a more detailed discussion of Bernhard’s public scandals, see Christine Kiebuzinska, ‘The 
Scandal Maker: Thomas Bernhard and the Reception of Heldenplatz’, Modern Drama, Vol. 38, Nr. 3 
(1995), 378-88, and Matthias Konzett, ‘Publikumsbeschimpfung: Thomas Bernhard’s Provocations of 
the Austrian Public’, The German Quarterly, Vol. 68, No. 3 (1995), pp. 251-70. 
11 Schmidt-Dengler, Der Übertreibungskünstler, p. 94.  
12 Cf. Mittermayer, Eine Biografie, pp. 120f.; 373f. For a detailed chronology of the public scandal and 
legal procedures resulting from it, see Eva Schindlecker, ‘Thomas Bernhard: Holzfällen. Eine Erregung. 
Dokumentation eines österreichischen Literaturskandals’, in Statt Bernhard: Über Misanthropie im Werk 
Thomas Bernhards, ed. by Wendelin Schmidt-Dengler and Martin Huber (Vienna: Verlag der 
Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1987), pp. 13-39. 
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awarded the Austrian State Prize for Literature in 196813. In this sense, the notion of 
Erregung can be interpreted as a self-reflexive comment on Bernhard’s own artistic 
reputation as well as a provocative prediction of how Holzfällen would be received in 
the public eye. 
In addition to causing eine Erregung, the novel introduced a new literary ‘genre’ 
of the same name that is emblematic of many of Bernhard’s works14. The novel, I 
will demonstrate, comments on the role of genre as a meaning-producing aspect of 
works of art which in many ways hinges on mood, thus exemplifying the third 
manner of articulating Stimmung in literature outlined in Chapter 1: that of how 
literary forms are shaped by forms of mood as modes of meaning-production. 
Bernhard shows in his works that, whether we pity or ridicule a character, whether 
we laugh or cry at the same narrative event, depends largely on the mood given to a 
text, which shapes our understanding by making us apply the schemata of comedy, 
tragedy, satire, romance and so forth in the course of the reading process 15. In this 
sense, genres are interdependent with moods defining the tone of works of art; one 
could even go so far as to say that, on an aesthetic level, genres are moods and modes 
of reading, watching and listening. 
It is an important research desideratum to identify and describe the moods 
that shape specific genres, but as this task goes well beyond the scope of this project, I 
will confine my analysis to the use of the dramatic genres of comedy and tragedy in 
Bernhard’s writing as well as the literary form of the Erregung which he created to 
circumvent and expose these preconfigured frames of understanding. The term 
‘Erregung’ is evocative of the narrative genre of the ‘Erzählung’ in German-speaking 
literature, which is comparable with the narrative forms of story, novella and tale, 
and simultaneously underlines Bernhard’s concern with mood as a driving force of 
writing: while the emphasis of Erzählung – which, in the literal sense, translates as 
narrative or story – lies in the mode of storytelling, the Erregung is more overtly 
concerned with stirring up emotions and exciting its readers, hence foregrounding 
                                                            
13 Ibid., pp. 184-8. 
14 Cf. Hans Höller, Thomas Bernhard (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1993), p. 131. 
15 John Frow’s Genre (London and New York: Routledge, 2015) provides a concise introduction to the 
concept of genre as related to schemata (pp. 90-94) and frames (pp. 112-9). Moreover, in her book 
Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), Monika Fludernik further 
comments on the relationship between cognitive frames of understanding and genre classifications (pp. 
312f.). 
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the active transmission of forms of affect, which we will further explore in this 
chapter. 
 Bernhard scholarship has commonly subsumed Holzfällen and two other 
novels under the umbrella term of the ‘trilogy of the arts’16, which comprises Der 
Untergeher (The Loser, 1983), Holzfällen and Alte Meister (Old Masters, 1985), published 
within three years during the writer’s late artistic phase. The three texts constitute a 
thematic and aesthetic unity as each of them explores a different art form from a 
similar aesthetic angle. Der Untergeher deals with the sphere of music in depicting the 
fictional relationship between three musicians: a nameless narrator, the world-
famous Canadian pianist Glenn Gould and their friend Wertheimer. In Holzfällen, a 
disgruntled author muses about the performing arts, especially theatre and dance, 
while attending an ‘artistic dinner’ in the Vienna of the 1980s. In Alte Meister, the 
narrator Atzbacher describes his meeting with the aging art critic Reger at the 
Viennese Museum of Art History, during which they converse about the fine arts, the 
state of philosophy and art as well as the impossibility of artistic perfection. 
Through consistent reference to an example from the respective artistic 
tradition, the novels not only engage with those art forms on a thematic but also on a 
structural level, which reflects in narratives which are considerably influenced by the 
three intertexts they revolve around: in Der Untergeher, Glenn Gould’s performance of 
Johann Sebastian Bach’s Goldberg Variations (1741); in Holzfällen, Henrik Ibsen’s play 
The Wild Duck (1884); and in Alte Meister, Tintoretto’s Portrait of a White-Bearded Man (c. 
1570). Gregor Hens proposes that these intermedial references do not merely play 
out in the theme and narrative of the texts, but are instead constitutive for their 
narrative structure: ‘Es geht im Kern bei diesen Arbeiten darum, in erzählerischer 
Form die Strukturen der Musik, des Dramas und der bildenden Kunst zu 
verarbeiten’17 [‘At the core of these works lies the narrative configuration of the 
structures of music, drama and visual art’ (my translation).]. These narrative 
actualisations of other art forms in the trilogy display Bernhard’s intense 
preoccupation with art and artifice, the dichotomy between art and nature and, 
finally, with the relationship between affect and art as the process of aesthetic 
experience is examined in minute detail. 
                                                            
16 Cf. Gregor Hens, Thomas Bernhards Trilogie der Künste: Der Untergeher, Holzfällen, Alte Meister 
(Woodbridge and Rochester, NY: Camden House, 1999), p. 15. 
17 Ibid. p. 18. 
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Although they are all themselves creative minds, the narrators of the three 
novels – only one of whom, Atzbacher in Alte Meister, is actually named – do not, 
primarily, act as the artistic creators in their narratives, but predominantly take on 
the positions of observers, listeners and spectators of the music, theatre and 
portraiture which the respective protagonists of the novels produce, thus mirroring 
Molloy’s and Watt’s position as readers or listeners in their own stories. Moreover, all 
novels of the trilogy feature similar monomaniac homodiegetic narrators who analyse 
the world and people around them with an extraordinary degree of ruthlessness and 
spite and who consider the potential and the limits of creativity and representation 
through various art forms as they are acting as the recipients of their respective 
artistic objects: Gould’s piano playing, the spectacle and theatre constituted by the 
‘artistic dinner’ and the portrait of an old man that Reger represents for Atzbacher, 
in the same way as the White-Bearded Man is, in turn, to Reger. The trilogy thus 
investigates the arts first and foremost from the point of view of aesthetic reception 
and experience, a position which gives the moods emerging in aesthetic reception 
and the process of affective attunement a prominent position and crucial role. As will 
become evident in the individual readings of the three novels, the trilogy acts as a 
means to summarise Bernhard’s reflections on aesthetics and focus on the role of the 
listener and spectator in the encounter with works of art, a process in which forms of 
attunement take centre stage. In this context, the reader or spectator becomes the 
locus of a relationship established with the work of art which is marked by conflicting 
forms of affect generated by artistic form and experimentations with literary 
conventions and boundaries. 
In the novels of the trilogy, as well as in his other works, Bernhard challenges 
and undermines genre conventions, blurring the boundaries between comedy and 
tragedy in particular. As are most of his works, all three novels of the trilogy are 
strongly concerned with death: the plot of Der Untergeher revolves around Glenn 
Gould’s death and the suicide of his fictional friend and competitor Wertheimer. In 
Holzfällen, the ‘artistic dinner’ depicted by the narrator is overshadowed by the 
suicide and funeral of his friend Joana. Despite its subtitle being A Comedy, Alte Meister 
broaches the issue of how to deal with a loved one’s death in describing Reger’s 
struggle to live on after the death of his wife, a motif which has been connected to 
Bernhard’s loss of his ‘Lebensmensch’, his life-long companion, and patron Hedwig 
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Stavianicek in 198418. And yet, all three novels – Holzfällen and Alte Meister in 
particular – are marked by a sense of humour which is generated through the use of 
incessant hyperboles and bizarre details and character traits in the people who are 
portrayed.  
In this sense, the title of Bernhard’s ambiguous short story ‘Ist es eine 
Komödie? Ist es eine Tragödie?’ (‘Is it a comedy? Is it a tragedy?’, 1967) is 
programmatic for the trilogy of the arts as well as for Bernhard’s other prose works 
and their indebtedness to theatrical conventions19. Therein, a medical student who is 
attempting to write a theatre study, meets an odd stranger outside a theatre, who 
urges the student to accompany him on a walk in the park. The stranger, dressed in 
women’s clothes, behaves in a curious and threatening manner, persistently asking 
whether the play being performed in the theatre that evening is a comedy or a 
tragedy, but keeping the student from answering. Ultimately, he claims to have killed 
the woman whose clothes he is wearing and tells the student that the play which is 
under way as they are speaking is ‘[t]atsächlich eine Komödie’20 [‘actually a comedy’ 
(my translation)]. 
 In The Dark Comedy: The Development of Modern Comic Tragedy, J.L. Styan suggests 
that modern theatre is marked by an ambiguity of affect that calls the traditional 
distinction of comedy and tragedy into question, creating a brand of comic tragedy 
which becomes emblematic of the age of modernity21. Bernhard transfers this 
phenomenon into his prose, thus continuing the line of aesthetic undecidedness and 
uncertainty that, as we have seen in Chapter 1, has marked the aesthetics of modern 
fiction since Dickens and Dostoevsky. In Bernhard’s novels and plays, events that are 
essentially tragic in nature are thus perpetually depicted in a light which renders 
them comic and vice versa. Wendelin Schmidt-Dengler therefore argues that in 
                                                            
18 Cf. Mittermayer, Eine Biografie, p. 380. 
19 Cf. Mark M. Anderson, ‘Fragments of a Deluge: The Theater of Thomas Bernhard’s Prose’, in A 
Companion to the Works, ed. by Konzett, pp. 119-35 (p. 130); Andrew Webber, ‘Costume Drama: 
Performance and Identity in Bernhard’s Works’, in A Companion to the Works, ed. by Konzett, pp. 149-
65 (p. 152). 
20 Bernhard, ‘Ist es eine Komödie? Ist es eine Tragödie?’, in Prosa by Bernhard (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1967), pp. 38-48 (p. 48). 
21 Cf. J.L. Styan, The Dark Comedy: The Development of Modern Comic Tragedy, 2nd edn (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 296f. Styan also dedicates a chapter of his study to an 
aesthetic form he describes as the ‘play of mood’, a type of drama which imprints a specific 
atmosphere on its audience (pp. 106-12), thus outlining the central role Stimmung plays not only in 
narrative fiction but also, importantly, in drama. Since Bernhard’s prose was very much influenced by 
his background in theatre, this aspect constitutes a significant reference point for the way in which 
Bernhard’s narrative fiction engenders aesthetic moods. 
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Bernhard’s writing ‘[c]omedies and tragedies are posited as identical’22. By wreaking 
comic effects from tragic events and tragic undertones from comic situations, 
Bernhard’s style blurs the boundaries between the two traditionally dramatic genres, 
thus eliminating the tragic-comic dichotomy in favour of a mode of writing which 
destabilises generically preconfigured, ‘safe’ forms of affect and enables ambiguity 
and more nuanced forms of affectedness. The prominent conjunction of death and 
humour in this writing is grounded in Bernhard’s dictum ‘es ist alles lächerlich, wenn 
man an den Tod denkt’23, ‘everything is ridiculous when one thinks about death’, 
from his speech at the award ceremony for the Austrian state prize. Indeed, the 
notion of ‘ridiculousness’ [Lächerlichkeit] is crucial for an understanding of the poetics 
of affect in Bernhard’s works as it represents the in-between of the tragic and the 
comic mode: the ridiculous is associated with tragic failure and a comic 
understanding and representation thereof; with the gravity of existential distress and 
the simultaneous levity of comic relief. 
This philosophical outlook on life significantly informs the genre conventions 
present in Bernhard’s aesthetics. According to Matthias Löwe, the constant presence 
of death in Bernhard’s œuvre is at the same time the source of its often humorous tone:  
Wer dem ‘memento mori’ eine Dauerpräsenz im eigenen Denken einräumt, für den gibt es 
keinen Normalzustand, für den gibt es kein routiniertes Rollenhandeln, denn wer das Leben 
nur von seinem tödlichen Ende her denkt, der kann nichts ernst nehmen, weil alles abstirbt24. 
[For someone who grants the ‘memento mori’ a permanent presence in his thinking, there is 
no normal state, there is no routine in playing one’s role, because someone who can only 
think about life from its fatal end cannot take anything seriously because everything dies off 
(my translation).] 
Bernhard’s comedy, which is intertwined with a constant awareness of an ontological 
Being-towards-death, is thus reminiscent of Beckett’s laughter in the face of existential 
despair: ‘Both Beckett and Bernhard look at the world and at themselves in a mood 
of savage black humor, gallows humor in the true sense of the word’25. This brand of 
laughter is the last resort against what Josef König describes as ‘die allgemeine 
                                                            
22 Wendelin Schmidt-Dengler, ‘Thomas Bernhard’s Poetics of Comedy’, in A Companion to the Works, 
ed. by Konzett, pp. 105-15 (p. 113). 
23 Bernhard, ‘Verehrter Herr Minister, verehrte Anwesende’, in Thomas Bernhard – Der Wahrheit auf der 
Spur: Die öffentlichen Auftritte, ed. by Wolfram Bayer, Raimund Fellinger and Martin Huber (Berlin: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 2011), pp. 69-70 (p. 69). 
24 Matthias Löwe, ‘Erregtes Ich und dezisionistische Ästhetik: Die Auseinandersetzung mit der offenen 
Gesellschaft im Werk Thomas Bernhards’, in Thomas Bernhard: Gesellschaftliche und politische Bedeutung der 
Literatur, ed. by Johann Georg Lughofer (Cologne and Weimar: Böhlau, 2012), pp. 55-68 (p. 60). 
25 Esslin, ‘Beckett and Bernhard’, p. 76. 
 153 
Krisensituation des modernen Geistes’26 [‘the general mode of crisis of the modern 
spirit’ (my translation)], though like any form of affect in his works, I consider 
Bernhard’s laughter and tendency for hyperbole as more bold and aggressive than 
Beckett’s fatalistic humour of existential hopelessness. 
In Bernhard’s texts, laughter takes on the role of an intersubjective gesture: as 
Henri Bergson outlines in his famous study of the comic, laughter is a social 
phenomenon which always presupposes the presence of another, ‘[o]ur laughter is 
always the laughter of a group’27. The supposed solipsism of Bernhard’s characters is 
called into question by this comic programme, which includes the reader in a 
circulation of transsubjective affect. For Schmidt-Dengler, then, in Bernhard’s works  
[t]he opposites of comedy and tragedy exist alongside rather than in mutually exclusive 
terms. Bernhard’s virtuosity reveals itself in that he gives the reader the opportunity to re-
enact this constant crossing of borders between the two genres28. 
 He goes on to observe that  
[Bernhard’s] brand of poetics is determined by the dynamic change between tragedy and 
comedy. Both occupy the same territory and the difference between them only becomes 
glaringly evident at the moment when it is negated29. 
 As Bernhard’s texts circumvent genre conventions, readers are invited into the 
characters’ tragicomic existential conditions, and the very mode of attunement 
between reader and text becomes constitutive for poetic meaning. Through this open 
generic structure, the reader’s own affectedness by the text is creatively integrated in 
the aesthetic process. The genres of Bernhard’s works are hence not inscribed in the 
texts as fixed entities; instead, constituting a central aspect of my reading of Stimmung 
in modern literature, they become subject to an act of negotiation, an attunement, 
between text and reader. 
 What is more, much of Bernhard’s understanding of art, narrative and life 
depends on Stimmung. The following exchange in an interview with Peter Hamm 
from 1977 suggests, in typical nonchalant Bernhard-fashion, the importance of these 
modes of affect in Bernhard’s self-understanding and views on art: 
P.H. Warum unterhalten Sie sich eigentlich mit mir? 
                                                            
26 Josef König, ‘Nichts als ein Totenmaskenball.’ Studien zum Verständnis der ästhetischen Intentionen im Werk 
Thomas Bernhards (Frankfurt am Main et al.: Peter Lang, 1983), p. 195; cf. also p. 201. 
27 Henri Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, trans. by Cloudesley Brereton and Fred 
Rothwell (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications), p. 3.  
28 Schmidt-Dengler, ‘Thomas Bernhard’s Poetics of Comedy’, p. 107. 
29 Ibid, p. 113. 
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T.B. Das ist, glaube ich, eine Stimmungssache, spielt vielerlei mit, glaube ich. Erstens eine – 
das fällt alles in das Hauptwort »Stimmung« – Sentimentalität, weil das halt Sie sind und weil 
ich Sie jetzt, wie direkt oder indirekt auch immer, fast zwanzig Jahre lang kenne. Und dann, 
weil mir auch völlig egal ist, was ich sage, nicht? Ich kontrollier das ja auch gar nicht. Hat gar 
keinen Sinn. Mehr kann ich nicht sagen30. 
[P.H. Why are you even talking to me? 
T.B. I think it’s a mood thing, it plays into many things, I think. First off, due to a sense of – 
and all of this falls into the noun ‘mood’ – sentimentality, just because it’s you and because 
I’ve known you, whether directly or indirectly, for almost twenty years now. And also, 
because I really don’t care what I say, do I? I don’t even control it in any case. There’s no 
point. I can’t say any more (my translation).] 
To Bernhard, his interview with Hamm is in itself ‘a mood thing’, motivated by a 
sentimentality associated with his long acquaintance with the interviewer. But more 
importantly, as Bernhard provocatively states that it does not actually matter to him 
what he says, the extent of this ‘mood thing’ becomes apparent: in the interview, as 
well as in Bernhard’s works, what is said is often less important than how an 
exchange between two parties unfolds and how forms of affect and attunement play 
into these kinds of interactions.  
This notion extends to Bernhard’s view on literature: in the same interview, 
Bernhard claims that as a reader, here more specifically of Dostoevsky, form and 
technique are immeasurably more important to him than content: 
T.B. […] Wie es gemacht ist, hat mich immer am meisten interessiert und komischerweise 
kaum, was gesagt wird.  
P.H. Und wenn Sie etwa Dostojewskijs »Idiot« oder »Die Brüder Karamasow« gelesen 
haben, dann hat Sie wirklich nur das Gemachte daran interessiert? 
T.B. Ja, das hat mich fasziniert, das Gemachte.31 
[T.B. […] I’ve always been the most interested in how it is made, and funnily enough, hardly 
in what is being said. 
P.H. And when you, for instance, read Dostoevky’s The Idiot or The Brothers Karamasov, you 
were really only interested in the way it was made into art? 
T.B. Yes, that’s what fascinated me, the way it was made into art (my translation).] 
Hamm’s phrase ‘das Gemachte’ [‘that which is made’ or ‘fabricated’], which 
Bernhard then takes up, connects art to the notion of artifice and the Greek poiēsis 
[ποίησις], which conceptualises literature as something that is fashioned from reality. 
What Bernhard thus values in works of art is not the semantic or referential level of 
                                                            
30 Bernhard and Peter Hamm, »Sind Sie gerne böse?« Ein Nachtgespräch zwischen Thomas Bernhard und Peter 
Hamm im Hause Bernhard in Ohlsdorf 1977 (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2011), p. 61. 
31 Ibid., p. 44. 
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meaning, but their ‘fabricatedness’ and the aesthetic techniques underlying them. 
Bernhard, famously, declared himself to be a Geschichtenzerstörer, a destroyer of stories:  
Andererseits bin ich natürlich auch kein heiterer Autor, kein Geschichtenerzähler, 
Geschichten hasse ich im Grund. Ich bin ein Geschichtenzerstörer, ich bin der typische 
Geschichtenzerstörer. In meiner Arbeit, wenn sich irgendwo Anzeichen einer Geschichte bilden, 
oder wenn ich nur in der Ferne irgendwo hinter einem Prosahügel die Andeutung einer 
Geschichte auftauchen sehe, schieße ich sie ab32. 
[On the other hand I am, of course, not a cheerful author, no storyteller, I essentially hate 
stories. I am a destroyer of stories, I am a typical destroyer of stories. Whenever a hint of a story 
emerges in my work, or when I can, somewhere from afar, even see an inkling of a story 
beyond a prose hill, I shoot it down (my translation).] 
Bernhard’s polemic refusal to provide stories in his works corroborates his claim to 
have no interest in what is narrated [mimesis] as opposed to how it is narrated [poiēsis]. 
Once again, the semantics of modern literature are supplanted by its semiotics, 
rendering the semiotic dimension its new semantic subject matter. However, 
although Bernhard describes himself as an anti-storyteller, his works are decidedly 
not anti-narrative: on the contrary, as Rüdiger Görner points out, ‘[t]he art of 
narration was Bernhard’s connection with the world in a decidedly existential 
meaning of the word’33. The act of narration thus comes to the fore as the subject of 
narration is discarded – through a crucial development engendered by Bernhard’s 
works, the narrative process, the attunement between reader and text and the 
techniques underlying it, become the crucial driving force behind this prose. 
 As my reading of Dostoevsky’s and Beckett’s texts has already indicated, an 
important move away from representation and towards the modes and moods 
thereof within the medium of fiction can be observed in the narrative works of these 
influential modern writers, constituting part and parcel of their inquiry into the 
existential conditions of the post-Enlightenment subject. The works examined 
showcase a dialectical structure between moods which are represented in them and 
the modes of Stimmung generated by the interactive process between text and reader. 
As the aesthetic process itself increasingly becomes the subject of the literary text, the 
question of the attunement between text and reader is put forward and is always, as it 
were, related to the ontological structure of the modern individual and its own 
                                                            
32 Bernhard qtd. in Barbara Diederichs, ‘Musik als Generationsprinzip von Literatur. Eine Analyse 
am Beispiel von Thomas Bernhards Untergeher’ (doctoral thesis, Justus Liebig University Gießen, 1998), 
p. 19. 
33 Rüdiger Görner, ‘The Broken Window Handle: Thomas Bernhard’s Notion of Weltbezug’, in A 
Companion to the Works of Thomas Bernhard, ed. by Konzett, pp. 89-103 (p. 94). 
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subject position. As a transsubjective form of affect, Stimmung reaches beyond the 
singular being and creates a space for an aesthetic encounter that destabilises the 
demarcations between subject and other. Within this context, Bernhard’s works will 
represent a brand of fiction which, through a number of textual and paratextual 
elements, fictionalises its own attunement and thereby engages the reader in an 
intense and inescapable process of Stimmung. 
In the following section, I will closely look at the role of mood and 
attunement in the three novels constituting the trilogy of arts in order to trace 
Bernhard’s inquiry into the transmission of aesthetic affect. Of all of Bernhard’s 
manifold, moody narrative, dramatic and poetic works, the trilogy stands out as the 
author’s most explicit self-referential commentary on aesthetics and, at the same 
time, the most open exploration of aesthetic Stimmung. This is not a coincidence: the 
two, as will become more transparent in the analysis of the three texts, are absolutely 
inseparable to him. Art, in other words, becomes ‘a mood thing’ which is deeply 
embedded in Bernhard’s critique of modernity and his post-war aesthetics. 
 
 
 
II. Music and Artistic Ideal in Der Untergeher 
The ‘Musicality’ of Bernhard’s Prose 
Bernhard’s entire œuvre is shaped by the author’s affinity to the musical arts and his 
understanding of literature as an art form that is, inherently, musical in nature. 
Bernhard even goes so far as to describe the literary text itself as a multi-layered 
musical score: 
[I]ch sehe die Prosastücke wie die Stücke als Partituren. Die Kritiker aber sehen nur die 
Singstimme oder den Klavierauszug, und dadurch geht bei ihnen immer alles daneben, weil 
sie das Ganze nicht sehen. Sie sehen nur den Auszug und die Oberstimme. Und das ist für 
mich immer der Ruin […]. Der Literaturkritiker müẞte eigentlich auch um drei Jahre in die 
Musikhochschule gehen, finde ich. Literatur hat ja sehr viel damit zu tun34. 
 [I consider the prose works as well as the plays as scores. However, the critics only see the 
descant or the piano reduction, and that is the reason why they always get everything wrong, 
because they do not see the whole thing. They only see the reduction and the descant. And to 
me that is always their downfall […]. Any literary critic should in fact attend a conservatoire 
for three years, in my opinion. Literature has a lot to do with that (my translation).] 
                                                            
34 Bernhard qtd. in Bernhard and Hamm, Nachtgespräch, pp. 34f. 
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Applying musical metaphors to the elements of fiction, Bernhard suggests an affinity 
between literature and music which is reminiscent of Beckett’s musical references 
and emphasis on the voice as an instrument of narrative. The failure in literary 
criticism’s ability to understand his works, Bernhard opines, lies in the fact that critics 
– whom Bernhard was chronically wary of, as for example his spat with the feminist 
critic Ria Endres indicated35 – have read his texts in a too one-dimensional way, 
often conflating the voices of his narrators with his own and focusing on the 
scandalous and vicious elements observable on the surface-level of the works. 
Although Bernhard had previously experimented with musical elements and 
literary form – for instance in his play Die Macht der Gewohnheit (1974), which revolves 
around Franz Schubert’s Trout Quintet, and in the 1982 novel Beton, whose narrator is 
attempting to write a piece on the composer Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy – the first 
novel in the trilogy of the arts, Der Untergeher, is his most far-reaching experiment in 
combining musical and literary elements in the medium of narrative fiction. It is the 
closest Bernhard’s writing would come to engendering the notion of a ‘musical score’ 
in the medium of narrative prose, which the author references in his remarks about 
his aesthetic self-understanding. 
The novel describes the relationship between three friends and piano players: 
a fictional version of the Canadian pianist Glenn Gould, the eponymous 
‘Untergeher’ Wertheimer and the nameless narrator, who meet during their training 
with the distinguished master pianist Vladimir Horowitz at the Mozarteum in 
Salzburg in the 1950s. With the narrative being set 28 years after their first 
encounter, shortly after Gould’s death from a stroke and Wertheimer’s subsequent 
suicide, the narrator is the only surviving member of the group and reminisces about 
their relationship during their studies and its impact on their individual lives. While 
Gould, a natural prodigy, rises to international fame through his famous recording of 
Bach’s Goldberg Variations, both the narrator and Wertheimer end their careers as 
professional pianists – as the narrator suggests, because the experience of Gould’s 
unachievable genius rendered their ambitions void. 
                                                            
35 Cf. Ria Endres, ‘Das Dunkel ist nicht finster genug’, in Bernhard: Annäherungen, ed. by Jurgensen, pp. 
9-14. Following the publication of Endres’s doctoral thesis Am Ende angekommen: Dargestellt am wahnhaften 
Dunkel des Männerportraits des Thomas Bernhard (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1980), Bernhard showed 
himself dismissive about her – very justified – feminist critique of patriarchal dominance in his works. 
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While the narrator dedicates himself to philosophy instead and moves to 
Madrid, Wertheimer takes up a position in the humanities and begins to live in a 
quasi-incestuous relationship with his sister. They maintain their friendship with 
Gould, who lives an increasingly secluded life and eventually retires from giving 
public performances. After Gould dies of a stroke while playing the piano and 
Wertheimer’s sister, having married a rich entrepreneur, moves to Switzerland, 
Wertheimer follows her and hangs himself outside her house as a form of ‘revenge’. 
The narrator, too, travels to Switzerland to attend Wertheimer’s funeral and 
consequently returns to Austria to visit Wertheimer’s house. While reflecting on 
Wertheimer’s reasons for committing suicide, the narrator’s thoughts revolve around 
their encounter with Gould, concluding that it was the fateful experience of seeing a 
perfection that Wertheimer never could have achieved in Gould: ‘Wenn wir dem 
Ersten begegnen, müssen wir aufgeben’36 [‘When we meet the very best, we have to 
give up’37]. 
Even though Bernhard references some biographical aspects, the historical 
figures appearing in the novel only bear partial resemblance to the actual Gould and 
Horowitz, and the Gould portrayed in the novel in particular in many ways ‘has 
much more to do with the real-life Thomas Bernhard than with the real-life 
Gould’38. Indeed, Bernhard himself studied singing and later theatre at the 
Mozarteum in the 1950s39 (an experience that considerably influenced the writing of 
Der Untergeher), and he continued to consider music a vital part of his life40. He further 
equipped his version of Gould with properties which clearly indicate the fictional 
nature of the character, as for instance the Gould in the novel dies aged 51, while the 
real-life Gould famously died shortly after his fiftieth birthday. Autobiography, 
biographical elements from Gould’s career and fiction thus merge into a piece of 
writing which, in interrogating the relationship between between reality and fiction, 
addresses the production of attunement through the tension between the two. 
                                                            
36 Bernhard, Der Untergeher, 16th edn (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2014), p. 15. 
37 Bernhard, The Loser, trans. by Jack Dawson (London: Faber and Faber, 2013), p. 9. 
38 Jason Blake, ‘A Canadian Icon in a “Cretinous Provincial Dump”: Glenn Gould and Thomas 
Bernhard’s Novel The Loser’, British Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, 71-87 (p. 77). Cf. also 
Mittermayer, p. 361. 
39 Mittmeyer, pp. 109f.; 361. 
40 Cf. Andrea Reiter, ‘Thomas Bernhard’s “Musical Prose”’, in Literature on the Threshold: The German 
Novel in the 1980s, ed. by Arthur Williams, Stuart Parkes and Roland Smith (New York et al.: Berg 
Publishers, 1990), pp. 187-207 (pp. 187-9). 
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The ‘musicality’ of Bernhard’s prose is one of the most commonly studied 
phenomena in recent criticism on his works and has been addressed by numerous 
critics41. That Bernhard’s literary texts possess a musical quality has now become 
critical consensus, though scholars have disagreed about, firstly, the specific ways in 
which this impression is generated and, secondly, to what degree the prose works 
actually engender musical structures or merely use them as reference points. Andreas 
Herzog and Liesbeth Bloemsaat-Voerknecht represent the widespread position that 
while Bernhard’s writing is partly inspired by musical structures, attempts to 
substantiate one-to-one analogies between, for instance, the form of the sonata or 
rondo and Bernhard’s prose texts42, or more specifically, between Der Untergeher and 
the Goldberg Variations43, are too far fetched. Instead, they consider his writing style as 
one that is informed by musical elements, but creates an artistic form in its own right. 
Herzog, in reference to Arnold Schoenberg’s notion of musical prose44, describes this 
form as ‘prosaic music’45. He further argues that the employment of musical concepts 
in Bernhard’s writing is fundamentally connected to a search for harmony in the 
author’s life: ‘Die im Werk immer wiederkehrende Thematisierung von Musik, 
Musizieren bzw. Musikvirtuosität […] offenbart, über sich selbst hinausweisend, eine 
Sehnsucht nach Harmonie und rettendem Aufgehobensein, deren Erfüllung dem 
Autor versagt blieben’46 [‘Beyond self-referentiality, the recurring form of addressing 
music, making music or musical virtuosity, respectively, discloses a yearning for 
harmony and for feeling safe and sheltered, whose fulfilment the author was denied’ 
(my translation)]. 
                                                            
41 The most extensive studies of musicality in Bernhard’s works can be found in Manfred Jurgensen, 
‘Die Sprachpartituren Thomas Bernhards’, in Bernhard: Annäherungen, ed. by Jurgensen, pp. 99-122; 
Reiter, ‘Musical Prose’; Andreas Herzog, ‘Thomas Bernhards Poetik der prosaischen Musik’, Zeitschrift 
für Germanistik, Neue Folge, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1994), 35-44;  Beate Sorg, ‘Alle Sätze sind Partituren: 
«Musikalisches» Erzählen bei Thomas Bernhard’, Neue Zeitschrift für Musik, Vol. 157, No. 2, Literatur 
und Musik (1996), 18-22, and Liesbeth Bloemsaat-Voerknecht, Thomas Bernhard und die Musik: 
Themenkomplex mit drei Fallstudien und einem musikthematischen Register (Würzburg: Königshausen & 
Neumann, 2006). More specific analyses of musicality in Der Untergeher can be found in Hens, Thomas 
Bernhards Trilogie der Künste, pp. 27-82; Diederichs, ‘Musik als Generationsprinzip’, and Michael P. 
Olson, ‘Thomas Bernhard, Glenn Gould, and the Art of the Fugue: Contrapuntal Variations in Der 
Untergeher’, Modern Austrian Literature, Vol. 24, No. 3/4, Special Issue: Form and Style in Contemporary Austrian 
Literature (1991), 73-83. 
42 Herzog, ‘Poetik der prosaischen Musik’, p. 35. 
43 Bloemsaat-Voerknecht, Bernhard und die Musik, p. 226. 
44 Cf. Bryan R. Simms, The Atonal Music of Arnold Schoenberg 1908-1923 (Oxford et al.: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 49. 
45 Herzog, ‘Poetik der prosaischen Musik’, p. 35. 
46 Ibid., p. 36. 
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Through this description an elementary connection between ontology, 
attunement and harmony – in the musical sense – is established. Herzog interprets 
Bernhard’s own sense of alienation and ‘thrownness’ as the origin of a desire for 
harmony, which is conceptualised as a mode of belonging and feeling at home in the 
world. The pursuit of musical harmony thus becomes a countermeasure for a failed 
ontological attunement. Although biographical interpretations of these aesthetic 
structures can be problematic, I consider Herzog’s point as a valid one insofar as the 
ubiquitous sense of alienation and sickness in Bernhard’s works points towards a 
fundamentally disturbed existential condition, one that, if not connected to 
Bernhard’s own life, manifests unease about the modern human condition.  
According to Robert Menasse, Bernhard’s works, as well as those of his fellow 
countryman and contemporary Peter Handke, respond to a sense of ‘forced’ 
harmonisation which pervaded the Austrian political climate in the post-war era and 
in particular from the 1970s onwards47. After the height of crisis that European 
modernity would encounter through the Second World War, Menasse’s account 
portrays harmony as an even more pressing aspiration – in the same vein as Riegl’s 
position which was described in Chapter 1. However, this harmony was enforced 
through a politically charged climate that manifests itself in the anti-harmonic 
literature of that time. Like Beckett, Bernhard turns to music to determine the 
aesthetic conditions of harmony and to establish whether an attunement of self and 
world is achievable, and in doing this, he further extends Beckett’s perspective. In the 
following, a closer look at the musical elements and notion of harmony in Der 
Untergeher will be used as the first step towards outlining the workings of the aesthetic 
process as a form of attunement in Bernhard’s œuvre. 
 
 
 
Musical Structures and the Defiance of Attunement 
Since critics have pointed out that one-to-one applications of musical structures to 
Bernhard’s prose are often not only a futile exercise but may also occlude the 
idiosyncrasies of his narrative texts, my interpretation of harmonic relationships in 
Der Untergeher will draw on musical patterns while at the same time emphasising the 
creative liberties with which the texts metaphorically engender a sense of ‘musicality’ 
                                                            
47 Cf. Robert Menasse, Überbau und Unterground: Die sozialpartnerschaftliche Ästhetik. Essays zum 
österreichischen Geist (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1997), pp. 58f., 84f. 
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in the medium of literary fiction. In the following, I will provide an overview of the 
musical or quasi-musical structures the text displays and will subsequently discuss the 
implications these forms have for the concept of existential and aesthetic attunement 
in Bernhard’s works. 
The mark-up in the following extract from an extended section on 
Wertheimer’s view on his own aphorisms, as summarised by the narrator, provides 
an example of the notion of literature as a musical score described by Bernhard and 
of the highly ‘musicalised’ forms of narration Der Untergeher creates: 
Da ich zum Philosophen nicht geboren bin, habe ich mich, nicht ganz unbewußt, muß ich 
sagen, zum Aphoristiker gemacht, zu einem dieser widerwärtigen 
Philosophiepartizipanten, die es zu Tausenden gibt, sagte er, dachte ich. Mit ganz kleinen 
Einfällen auf die ganz große Wirkung abzielen und die Menschheit betrügen, sagte er, dachte 
ich. Im Grunde bin ich nichts anderes, als einer dieser gemeingefährlichen Aphoristiker, die 
sich mit ihrer grenzenlosen Skrupellosigkeit und mit ihrer heillosen Frechheit unter die 
Philosophen mischen wie die Hirschkäfer unter die Hirsche, sagte er, dachte ich. Wenn wir 
nichts mehr trinken, verdursten wir, wenn wir nichts mehr essen, verhungern wir, sagte 
er, auf diese Weisheiten laufen alle diese Aphorismen hinaus, es sei denn, sie sind von 
Novalis, aber auch Novalis hat viel Unsinn geredet, so er, dachte ich. In der Wüste lechzen 
wir nach Wasser, so etwa lautet die Pascalsche Maxime, so er, dachte ich. Wenn wir es genau 
nehmen, bleibt uns von den größten philosophischen Entwürfen nur ein erbärmlicher 
aphoristischer Nachgeschmack, sagte er, gleich um was für eine Philosophie, gleich um 
welchen Philosophen es sich handelt, alles zerbröselt, wenn wir mit allen unseren 
Fähigkeiten und das heißt mit allen unseren Geistesinstrumenten daran gehen, sagte er, 
dachte ich48 (my emphases). 
[Since I wasn’t born to be a philosopher I turned myself into an aphorist, not entirely 
unconsciously I must say, turned myself into one of those disgusting tagalongs of philosophy 
who exist by the thousands, he said, I thought. To produce a huge effect with tiny ideas and 
deceive mankind, he said, I thought. In reality I’m nothing other than one of those 
aphorizing public menaces who, in their boundless unscrupulousness and impudence, tag 
along behind a horse, he said, I thought. If we stop drinking we die of thirst, if we stop 
eating we starve to death, he said, such pearls of wisdom are what all these aphorisms 
amount to in the end, that is unless they’re by Novalis, but even Novalis talked a lot of 
nonsense, so Wertheimer, I thought. In the desert we thirst for water, that’s about what 
Pascal’s maxim says, he said, I thought. If we look at things squarely the only thing left from 
the greatest philosophical enterprises is a pitiful aphoristic aftertaste, he said, no matter 
what the philosophy, no matter what the philosopher, everything falls to bits when we set 
to work with all our faculties and that means with all our mental instruments, he said, I 
thought.49 (my emphases).] 
 
 
This dense section contains a number of signature elements of Bernhard’s prose, and 
the translation by Dawson demonstrates the difficulty in doing his style justice in 
                                                            
48 Bernhard, Untergeher, pp. 94f. 
49 Bernhard, Loser, p. 65.  
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English50 as many of Bernhard’s techniques depend on grammatical structures, 
morphemes and compound words that inhere in the German language. The notion 
of ‘musicality’ in Bernhard thus largely depends on an approach to language which 
conceptualises it from its material and acoustic dimension. Bernhard’s language 
upends semantics in favour of the semiotic level of signification; to use the terms 
introduced by Viktor Shklovsky and Roman Jakobson, everyday language is 
defamiliarised as Bernhard commits a form of ‘organized violence’51 upon it in a 
quasi-poetic fashion. The most prominent elements of this style are the (underlined) 
frequent, rhythmic repetitions of the inquit-phrase ‘sagte er, dachte ich’ [‘he said, I 
thought’], which demarcate rhythmic units and thereby aid in structuring the 
reading flow of a text almost entirely free of chapters and paragraphs52. Once the 
motivic structure has been established through several repetitions, variations of the 
phrase – ‘sagte er’ and ‘so er, dachte ich’ – appear, only to then return to the original 
format, thus mimicking the musical structures of canon and fugue. 
 The theme of the section is constituted by the initially opposing phrases 
‘Philosoph’ and ‘Aphoristiker’ (highlighted by different font) as Wertheimer contrasts 
the two as being antithetical at the outset of the section. In the following, they 
undergo several grammatical variations – ‘Philosophiepartizipanten’, ‘philosophisch’ 
and ‘Philosophie’ and ‘Aphorismen’ and ‘aphoristisch’, respectively – while another 
motif, the semantic cluster constituted by ‘essen’, ‘hungern’, ‘trinken’ and ‘dursten’ 
[‘eat’, ‘starve’, ‘drink’ and ‘thirst’] is introduced. Furthermore, another theme is 
developed through the repetition of the morpheme ‘-los-’ (highlighted in bold), which 
translates as ‘-less’ or ‘free from’ and is first associated with the term ‘Aphoristiker’, 
but then initiates a semantic inversion as the three letters ‘los’ are, it is insinuated, 
contained in the antithetical term ‘Philosoph’. Wertheimer thus unwittingly 
synthesises the two elements as he shows that both philosophers and aphorists are 
lacking in effectiveness and permanent significance. Throughout the section, the 
antithetical relationship of the two terms is thus inverted as the resolution of the 
                                                            
50 For a more extensive discussion on the problems involved in translating Bernhard into English, see 
Gitta Honegger, ‘Language Speaks. Anglo-Bernhard: Thomas Bernhard in Translation’, in A 
Companion to the Works, ed. by Konzett, pp. 169-85. 
51 Roman Jakobson qtd. in Peter Steiner, Russian Formalism: A Metapoetics (London and Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 231. 
52 Cf. Hens, Thomas Bernhards Trilogie der Künste, p. 15. 
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section shows that they eventually fall prey to the same fate: that of being destroyed 
by the workings of the ‘instrument’ that is the human mind. 
As it becomes observable in this example, Bernhard’s signature repetitions – 
of single words, phrases, sentences, ideas, syntactical structures and so forth – are one 
of the main components generating a sense of ‘musicality’ in his prose. Andrea Reiter 
suggests that the frequent repetitions of individual words or phrases in these works 
resemble the development of motifs, in musicological terms the ‘shortest intelligible 
and self‐existent melodic or rhythmic figure[s]’53, in classical music: ‘Thomas 
Bernhard’s prose works can be broken down into individual motifs, which are 
developed in a musical sense, logically put together and “quoted” later in the work’54. 
Through the prominent use of neologisms in Der Untergeher, such as the typically 
Bernhardian compound words ‘Klavierradikalismus’55, ‘Geistesmensch’56 or 
‘Weltverblüffung’57 or the leitmotif58 of the ‘Untergeher’59, these ‘prose motifs’ gain 
recognisability and mnemonic value, thus mimicking the function of musical motifs 
and allowing for the narrator to reference them throughout the novel. 
 In addition to the musically inspired elements on the micro-level, Hens 
identifies a number of musical elements affecting the macro-structure of the novel, 
most importantly contrapuntal elements engendered by the character constellation of 
Gould, Wertheimer and the narrator. According to Hens, the three characters 
constitute three individual voices – leading voice, middle voice or melodic 
counterpart and bass – wherein Gould represents the leading voice by setting the 
theme, Wertheimer the middle voice following the theme and the narrator the bass60. 
Hens thereby corroborates an observation by Manfred Jurgensen, which draws 
attention to the use of the voice as a musical instrument in Bernhard’s œuvre: 
                                                            
53 Kennedy and Bourne Kennedy, ‘motif’, in The Oxford Dictionary of Music, ed. by Tim Rutherford-
Johnson (Oxford University Press, 2012), <http://0-www.oxfordreference.com.pugwash.lib. 
warwick.ac.uk/view/10.1093/acref/9780199578108.001.0001/acref-9780199578108-e-6246> 
[accessed 24 March 2017]. 
54 Reiter, ‘Musical Prose’, p. 93. 
55 Bernhard, Untergeher, p. 10; translated as ‘piano radicalism’ in Bernhard, Loser, p. 5. 
56 Bernhard, Untergeher, p. 27; translated as ‘thinking person’ in Bernhard, Loser, p. 17, this term 
constitutes a recurrent theme in Bernhard’s writing, in which the ‘Geistesmensch’, a ‘mind person’, is 
frequently contrasted with material reality and nature. 
57 Bernhard, Untergeher, p. 83; translated as ‘world flabbergaster’ in Bernhard, Loser, p. 57. 
58 For a detailed discussion of the recurrent leitmotifs pervading Bernhard’s earlier works, such as 
landscape, forest, darkness, the body and the notion of the native country, see Manfred Jurgensen, 
Thomas Bernhard: Der Kegel im Wald oder die Geometrie der Verneinung (Frankfurt am Main et al.: Peter Lang, 
1981), pp. 91-138. 
59 Bernhard, Untergeher, p. 26. 
60 Hens, Thomas Bernhards Trilogie der Künste, p. 53. 
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‘Bernhard begreift die menschliche Stimme als Instrument. Er spielt es in seiner 
Prosa, indem er sich eines konsequenten Zitationsstils bedient. Nicht Bernhard 
spricht, sondern er spielt mit dem Geist auf menschlichen Stimmeninstrumenten’61 
[‘Bernhard conceives of the human voice as an instrument. In his prose, he plays it 
by using a consistent style of citation. It is not Bernhard who is speaking; in his mind 
he plays on human vocal instruments’ (my translation).] The voices of Gould, 
Wertheimer and the narrator are thus combined into a polyphonic narrative which is 
very likely inspired by classical musical structures and uses the voice in ways that are 
reminiscent of such patterns. 
Counterpoint, which is marked by the use of different, harmonically 
interdependent voices, is a cornerstone of musical polyphony and plays a major role 
in Bach’s compositions, for instance in the Well-Tempered Clavier and the Art of the 
Fugue, two pieces the narrator of Der Untergeher overtly references alongside the 
Goldberg Variations in discussing the relationship between the three protagonists 
towards the end of the novel: 
Wenn ich meine Beschreibung von Glenn Gould wirklich nocheinmal versuche, dachte ich, 
dann werde ich in dieser auch seine Beschreibung Wertheimers vorzunehmen haben und es 
ist fraglich, wer der Mittelpunkt dieser Beschreibung sein wird, Glenn Gould oder 
Wertheimer, dachte ich. Von Glenn Gould werde ich ausgehen, von den Goldbergvariationen 
und vom Wohltemperierten Klavier, aber Wertheimer wird in dieser Beschreibung eine 
entscheidende Rolle spielen, was mich betrifft, denn für mich war Glenn Gould immer mit 
Wertheimer verbunden gewesen, gleich in was für einer Beziehung und umgekehrt 
Wertheimer mit Glenn Gould und vielleicht alles in allem spielt doch Glenn Gould in 
Beziehung auf Wertheimer die größere Rolle, als umgekehrt. […] Wertheimers Bösendorfer 
gegen Glenn Goulds Steinway, dachte ich, Glenn Goulds Goldbergvariationen gegen Wertheimers 
Kunst der Fuge, dachte ich62. 
[If I really have another go at my description of Glenn Gould, I thought, I will have to 
incorporate his description of Wertheimer in it and it’s questionable who will be the focus of 
this account, Glenn Gould or Wertheimer, I thought, I’ll start with Glenn Gould, with the 
Goldberg Variations and with the Well-Tempered Clavier, but Wertheimer will play a crucial role in 
this account as far as I’m concerned, since from my point of view Glenn Gould was always 
linked to Wertheimer, no matter in what respect, and vice versa Wertheimer with Glenn 
Gould and perhaps all in all Glenn Gould does play a greater role in Wertheimer’s life than 
the other way around. […] Wertheimer’s Bösendorfer against Glenn Gould’s Steinway, I 
thought, Glenn Gould’s Goldberg Variations against Wertheimer’s Art of the Fugue, I thought63.] 
As this self-reflexive section, which summarises the entire trajectory of the novel, 
indicates, the relationship between the three characters – at least in the narrator’s 
                                                            
61 Jurgensen, ‘Sprachpartituren’, p. 102. 
62 Bernhard, Untergeher, p. 220f. 
63 Bernhard, Loser, pp. 154f. 
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view – is marked by mutual dependence and a concept of self which is designed in 
relation to the other two, particularly on Wertheimer’s and the narrator’s end. 
Without Gould, they may not have given up their careers as pianists, which shows 
that through the encounter with the Canadian, their self-understanding was 
fundamentally changed. Gould is the uncompromising genius who, in a quasi-
contrapuntal fashion, renders – and names – Wertheimer the Untergeher, the ‘loser’, 
‘perisher’ or ‘sinker’ to his simultaneous artistic rise, and as such, the narrator’s 
conception of Wertheimer’s role in the constellation is derived from Gould’s 
description of the former. The narrator’s view on this artistic triangle reinforces the 
notion of harmonic interdependence and of Gould’s dominant position that is 
evoked by the character constellation: 
Indem ich über den einen (Glenn Gould) schreibe, werde ich mir über den anderen 
(Wertheimer) Klarheit verschaffen, dachte ich, indem ich die Goldbergvariationen (und die Kunst 
der Fuge) des einen (Glenn) immer wieder höre, um dann über sie schreiben zu können, werde 
ich über die Kunst (oder Nichtkunst!) des Andern (Wertheimer) immer mehr wissen und 
auch aufschreiben können, dachte ich64. 
[By writing about the one (Glenn Gould), I will order my thoughts on the other 
(Wertheimer), I thought, by listening again and again to the Goldberg Variations (and the Art of 
the Fugue) of the one (Glenn), in order to write about them, I will know more and more about 
the art (or the nonart!) of the other (Wertheimer) and be able to write it down, I thought65.] 
Gould’s voice, the narrator finds, provides the key for understanding Wertheimer’s 
part in the novel as Gould, so to say, sets the theme of the text, thus establishing a 
quasi-contrapuntal pattern which Bernhard transposes into the realm of narrative 
fiction.  
 However, Hens’s reference to the fugue structure, which he considers the 
musical model the novel’s polyphony builds on66, is not entirely conclusive as the 
polyphonic voices of a fugue usually act as equals, without the fixed hierarchical 
structure of a homophonic composition that Hens seems to draw on in describing 
Gould as the leading voice and the narrator as the ‘bass’ voice of the text. In my 
view, the imposition of such specific musical structures limits an understanding of the 
creative liberty with which Bernhard chose to generate musical effects in the medium 
of literary fiction, and ultimately threatens to distract from their aesthetic effects. 
More important than specific structures are the overarching musical concepts the 
                                                            
64 Bernhard, Untergeher, p. 225. 
65 Bernhard, Loser, p. 157. 
66 Hens, Thomas Bernhards Trilogie der Künste, p. 44. 
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novel adopts and uses towards an inquiry into the existential constitution of the 
modern individual, a central one of which is the question of harmony. 
Beyond the question of which – if any – specific musical structures are 
engendered in the novel, the notion of attunement in a musical and philosophical 
sense lies at the core of the existential crisis depicted in it. Wertheimer, the tragic 
centre of the narrative, has a fundamentally disturbed relationship with the world, 
one that can be found in many of Bernhard’s works:  
Er habe nicht damit fertig werden können, in eine Welt hineingeboren worden zu sein, die 
ihm im Grunde in allem und jedem immer nur widerwärtig war von allem Anfang an. […] 
Existieren heißt doch nichts anderes, als: wir verzweifeln, so er. Stehe ich auf, denke ich mit 
Abscheu an mich und es graust mir vor allem, das mir bevorsteht67. 
[He could never come to terms with being born into a world that basically repulsed him in 
every detail from the very beginning. […] To exist means nothing other than we despair, he 
said. When I get up I’m revolted by myself and everything I have to do.68] 
Wertheimer’s existential crisis is shown to be his primary mode of experiencing the 
world and himself, displaying a type repulsion with existence which is reminiscent of 
Emil Cioran’s pessimistic philosophy69 as well as Sartre’s notion of nausea that 
Raskolnikov finds himself afflicted by. It is therefore not surprising that Dostoevsky is 
in fact named as one of Wertheimer’s favourite authors: 
Er hat immer Bücher gelesen, in welchen von Selbstmördern die Rede ist, in welchen von 
Krankheiten und Todesfällen die Rede ist, dachte ich, im Gastzimmer stehend, in welchen 
das Menschenelend beschrieben ist, die Ausweglosigkeit, die Sinnlosigkeit, die Nutzlosigkeit, 
in welchen alles immer wieder verheerend und tödlich ist. Deshalb liebte er Dostojevskj und 
alle seine Nachfolger über alles, überhaupt die russische Literatur, weil sie die tatsächlich 
tödlichste ist, aber auch die deprimierenden französischen Philosophen70. 
[He always read books that were obsessed with suicide, with disease and death, I thought 
while standing in the inn, books that described human misery, the hopeless, meaningless, 
senseless world in which everything is always devastating and deadly. That’s why he 
especially loved Dostoevsky and all his disciples, Russian literature in general, because it 
actually is a deadly literature, but also the depressing French philosophers71.] 
The existential despair of Dostoevsky’s texts and the French existentialists resonates 
with Wertheimer, whom the overarching motifs of sickness and alienation in the 
modern world drive into an early grave. 
                                                            
67 Bernhard, Untergeher, p. 69. 
68 Bernhard, Loser, p. 47. 
69 Cf. E.M. Cioran, On the Heights of Despair, trans. by Ilinca Zarifopol-Johnston (London and Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 8f., 55f. 
70 Bernhard, Untergeher, p. 91. 
71 Bernhard, Loser, p. 62. 
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Ultimately, Wertheimer’s perceived sense of ‘thrownness’ into the world, 
which does not seem to offer him any sense of belonging, reflects in his failure to 
achieve the musical greatness he aspired to:  
Kein Musiktalent! hat er ausgerufen, kein Existenztalent! Wir sind so hochmütig, daß wir 
glauben, Musikstudieren sei es, während wir nicht einmal fähig sind, zu leben, nicht einmal 
zu existieren im Stande sind, denn wir existieren ja nicht, es existiert uns!72 
[No musical ability! he cried out, no life ability! We’re so arrogant that we think we’re studying 
music whereas we’re not even capable of living, not even capable of existing, for we don’t 
exist, we get existed73.] 
Wertheimer’s self-understanding equates musical talent with ‘existential’ talent; his 
inability to become a virtuoso pianist conceptually coincides with his inability to live. 
Perceiving his existence as being too fundamentally flawed, disturbed and out of his 
control, he concludes that he essentially lacks the ability to achieve perfection in the 
realm of music. Existential Stimmung and musical Stimmung thus become synonymous 
to Wertheimer as an originary line of dissonance permeates his life. 
  The achievement of aesthetic attunement and harmony, in this sense, equals 
ontological attunement and finding a home and a purposeful mode of existence in 
the world. Since he lacks all of these, Wertheimer’s sense of subjectivity and agency is 
obliterated as he considers himself not as living but as ‘lived’. As outlined in the 
introductory section of this study, according to Heidegger, existential Stimmung is 
constitutive for Dasein’s subject position within the world. A relationship to the world 
which is marked by a universal sense of Verstimmung intercepts the establishment of 
such a subject position, and yet – as we have seen through the works of Dostoevsky 
and Beckett – Verstimmung emerges as the new fundamental mode of existence out of 
the modern condition. Wertheimer, however, in a Wertherian fashion eventually 
defies his gloom by taking his own life, and as the narrator suggests, ‘das 
Wohltemperierte Klavier ist die Ursache’74 [‘the Well-Tempered Clavier is the cause’75] for the 
existential ‘catastrophe’ that was his life. The knowledge that a ‘well-tempered’ 
harmonious relationship between musical elements is possible, the awareness of such 
a perceived perfect Stimmung within the musical sphere constitutes an antipole to 
Wertheimer’s existential failure and becomes – at least as the narrator believes – the 
                                                            
72 Bernhard, Untergeher, p. 70. 
73 Bernhard, Loser, p. 47. 
74 Bernhard, Untergeher, p. 217. 
75 Bernhard, Loser, p. 152. 
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reason for his suicide as it becomes the benchmark for Wertheimer’s understanding 
of life. 
Revisiting the notion of musical temperament from my earlier reading of 
Watt shows that the practice of tempering sound to achieve standard tuning methods 
such as equal temperament was particularly popular in the Baroque age76. In Der 
Untergeher, the Well-Tempered Clavier, the Goldberg Variations and the figure of Gould 
become metaphors for an aesthetic ideal Wertheimer finds to be unparalleled in his 
lived experience. It is the Well-Tempered Clavier, the narrator opines, which ‘kills’ 
Wertheimer as the proof it provides of the possibility of harmony in the realm of 
music antithetically defines Wertheimer’s lack thereof. Shortly before his death, 
Wertheimer attempts to defy this oppressive harmony by buying an old piano that is 
perversely out of tune, as described by his woodsman Franz: 
Wie die Zettel alle verbrannt waren, […] habe er, Wertheimer, nach Salzburg telefoniert 
und das Klavier bestellt und der Franz erinnerte sich noch genau, daß sein Herr während 
dieses Telefonats immer wieder betont habe, man solle ihm einen völlig wertlosen, einen entsetzlich 
verstimmten Flügel nach Traich schicken. Ein völlig wertloses Instrument, ein entsetzlich verstimmtes 
Instrument, soll Wertheimer immer wieder am Telefon gesagt haben, so der Franz. […] Die 
Klavierbringer waren noch nicht weggewesen, so der Franz, habe sich Wertheimer an das 
Klavier gesetzt und habe zu spielen angefangen. Es sei entsetzlich gewesen, so Franz. Da 
habe er, Franz, den Eindruck gehabt, sein Herr sei wahnsinnig geworden77. 
[When the notes were all burned, […] he, Wertheimer, called up Salzburg and ordered the 
piano and Franz distinctly recalled that during this telephone call his master kept insisting 
that they send a completely worthless, a horribly untuned grand piano to Traich. A completely worthless 
instrument, a horribly untuned instrument, Wertheimer is supposed to have repeated over and over 
on the phone, said Franz. […] The deliverymen weren’t out the door, said Franz, before 
Wertheimer sat down at the piano and began playing. It was awful, said Franz. He, Franz, 
had thought his master had lost his mind78.] 
By insisting on buying an instrument which is horribly out of tune79 out of defiance 
for the notion of aesthetic harmony and attunement, Wertheimer expresses his 
Weltanschauung and self-understanding as the piano represents an antithesis to the idea 
                                                            
76 Most musicologists had previously assumed that Bach’s Well-Tempered Clavier was written for equal 
temperament, but a recent debate in musicology has uncovered contrary evidence, which has been 
subject to a critical debate that has resulted in various theories regarding which temperament was 
originally used by Bach. Cf. Bradley Lehman, ‘Bach’s Extraordinary Temperament: Our Rosetta 
Stone: 1’, Early Music, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2005), 3-23; Lehman, ‘Bach’s Extraordinary Temperament: 
Our Rosetta Stone: 2’, Early Music, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2005), 211-31; John O’Donnell, ‘Bach’s 
Temperament, Occam’s Razor, and the Neidhardt Factor’, Early Music, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2006), 625-33. 
77 Bernhard, Untergeher, pp. 242f. 
78 Bernhard, Loser, p. 170. 
79 The word ‘verstimmt’ translates more accurately as ‘out of tune’ rather than the ‘untuned’ used by 
Dawson as the German translation of the latter would be ‘ungestimmt’. ‘Verstimmt’ implies that the 
instrument is either wrongly tuned or used to be tuned correctly but is now out of tune, whereas 
‘ungestimmt’ implies that the instrument has not been tuned at all. 
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of a well-tempered, attuned existence. Where all harmony and musical consonance 
have become impossible, Wertheimer embraces a radical dissonance and Verstimmtheit 
– from his woodman’s point of view a sign of madness – and a narrative symbol of 
the Untergeher eventually embracing Gould’s prediction: his Untergang, his demise and 
ruin. In this context, the Well-Tempered Clavier represents an aesthetic notion of 
perfection which is, however, fabricated and therefore, at heart, tempered. 
Wertheimer’s tragedy lies in his inability to detect the artifice underlying art and the 
fundamentally tempered conditions of harmony. His death fulfills the musical pattern 
of counterpoint in ‘echoing’ Gould’s passing but follows an intrinsically flawed one-
to-one application of art to life. Hans Höller fittingly summarises Bernhard’s 
aesthetic programme in defiance of harmony: ‘An die Stelle der klassischen 
bürgerlichen Utopie der organischen Ganzheit und Harmonie des Menschen und 
seiner Welt setzt Thomas Bernhard deren Auflösung, Zerstörung und 
unwiderrufliche Todesverfallenheit’80 [‘Bernhard replaces the classic bourgeois 
utopia of the organic wholeness and harmony of the human being and its world with 
its disintegration, destruction and irrevocable ‘fallenness’ to death’ (my translation)]. 
Where European post-war society enforces a notion of ‘total harmony’81 – as Adorno 
and Horkheimer phrase it in their critique of the culture industry, an idea Menasse’s 
study of the literature of 1970s and 1980s Austria further corroborates – which 
becomes a standard for ways of living and notions of art, Bernhard radically 
undermines a constructed universal concept of Stimmung. Wertheimer’s imitation of 
art in life within the medium of art represents the folly and indeed the ‘deadliness’ of 
such an imposition. 
 
 
 
Listening to Bernhard 
As we have observed, the ‘musical’ elements of Der Untergeher affect the 
microstructure as well as the narrative macrostructure of the text, creating a sense of 
musicality by using language as acoustic material which emulates elements of 
melodic development and counterpoint. On a symbolic level, the exploration of the 
lives of three musicians depicts an ontological struggle not limited to the realm of the 
                                                            
80 Hans Höller, ‘«Es darf nichts Ganzes geben», und «In meinen Büchern ist alles künstlich»: Eine 
Rekonstruktion des Gesellschaftsbilds von Thomas Bernhard aus der Form seiner Sprache’, in 
Bernhard: Annäherungen, ed. by Jurgensen, pp. 45-63 (p. 49). 
81 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 106. 
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musical: Wertheimer represents an existential dissonance in the group that stands in 
sharp contrast to Gould’s virtuosity, which Wertheimer, however, continues to aspire 
to. Gould, in turn, is not so much a fully-fledged character as he is a symbol of 
artistic perfection – which is underlined by the stark differences between the fictional 
and the historical Gould – and his virtuosity comes at the cost of self-renunciation: 
the narrator describes Gould’s desire to become one with his instrument and with the 
music he is playing, once again conjuring up Dostoevsky’s image of man as a ‘piano 
key’. The fictional version of Gould in Bernhard’s novel therefore symbolically dies 
while playing the Goldberg Variations on the piano as, to the artistic world, his name 
has become synonymous with ‘Goldberg’, which thus fully absorbs him into art and 
causes his physical death. Through explicit reference to Bach’s works, of which the 
Art of the Fugue in particular relies on the notion of counterpoint, the theme of musical 
harmony is intertwined with the notion of existential attunement and brought to the 
fore of the text. 
 In conclusion, the aforementioned insights into the ‘compositional structure’ 
of Der Untergeher shall be used to shift the focus of my analysis to the novel’s aesthetic 
impact in the reading process. Bernhard’s awareness of the acoustic dimension of 
language gains a pivotal role as the semantic level of the text, the author’s remarks 
suggest, takes on a subordinate position in relation to semiotics and aesthetic form – 
a technique reminiscent of James Joyce’s overriding of meaning through semiotics in 
Finnegans Wake, which also considerably influenced Beckett. In view of this, 
Bernhard’s prose is one that actively attunes the reader to the text in a very literal, 
musical sense as its rhythmic patterns and punctuation govern the reading flow while 
the use of motifs, recurrent themes and variations thereof direct the reader’s 
attention and create semantic fields of meaning which the reader learns to navigate 
through. The semiotics of the text thus govern and drive its semantics; in other 
words, the semiotics become the semantics in Bernhard’s prose. In doing so, the prose 
utilises musical structures and the predictability of musical progressions but at the 
same time retains the variability and creativity of classical pieces through the guiding 
principle of variation, an overarching structure borrowed from Bach’s Goldberg 
Variations. 
Throughout the process of reading the novel, its reader thus becomes a 
listener of the ‘score’ constituted by the text, just as the narrator of Der Untergeher turns 
into the listener of Gould’s playing, Wertheimer’s demise and the innkeeper’s and 
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woodman’s narratives. The inverted structure of reader/listener has already been 
observed in Beckett’s Watt and Molloy and can be viewed as a continuation of 
Bernhard’s discourse on hearing initiated in the early novel Das Kalkwerk (1970, 
translated into English as The Lime Works), in which the protagonist Konrad tortures 
his paralysed wife as part of an experiment on the nature of hearing. And yet, 
Bernhard’s inquiry into modes of listening gains a new dimension in Der Untergeher as 
the entire novel is modelled around the concept of listening to music, polyphonic 
voices, harmonies and dissonances, and fittingly ends as the narrator once more 
listens to Gould’s famous recording of the Goldberg Variations. However – as with 
Beckett’s narrative fiction – the paradox of the text is that, technically, it is an affair 
completely free of material sound: unlike a theatre play, it is not written to be 
performed and thus consists of mere words on a page. To create the sense of a 
musical piece, the reader needs to actualise the text’s latent musicality, its rhythm, 
pitch, melody, harmony and dissonances. This puts the reader and her attunement 
into the most crucial position we have seen in this study as yet: without the 
attunement between text and reader, the essential semiotic level of meaning loses its 
impact. 
 Der Untergeher thus needs to attune the reader through the rhythm of its prose, 
its semantic leitmotifs and formulaic expressions of perceived truths – as evidenced 
by the recurrent phrase ‘das ist die Wahrheit’ [‘that is the truth’] – but cracks in the 
quasi-musical harmony open up, most importantly the repressed political subtext of 
the novel, which relates to Austria’s Nazi history82. It is no coincidence that Gould, 
Wertheimer and the narrator end up renting the former villa of a Nazi sculptor 
during their studies, and neither is the fact that Wertheimer was Jewish, an aspect 
only mentioned in passing when the narrator discusses Wertheimer’s funeral with the 
innkeeper. The narrator’s concept of pure art, which is designed in opposition to 
‘nature’ and material reality, is shown to be insufficient in uncovering the truth of the 
events, despite his repeated, insistent affirmations of the opposite. Der Untergeher 
therefore represents an aesthetic ideal doomed to fail; Manfred Jurgensen, likewise, 
views Bernhard’s musical form of narration as a way of communicating that which 
no longer exists or is always, by definition, incomplete83. In the following, I will 
                                                            
82 Cf. Mark M. Anderson, ‘Afterword’, in The Loser by Bernhard, pp. 171-90 (pp. 178f.). 
83 Jurgensen, ‘Sprachpartituren’, pp. 114f. 
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discuss the modes of aesthetic Stimmung in the second novel of the trilogy to further 
outline the aesthetic effects of Bernhard’s works in relation to their philosophical and 
historical background and their motivation through a fundamental scepticism 
towards modernity. 
 
 
 
III. Holzfällen: Irritation and the Creative Process  
The Life of the Party  
Closely following the publication of Der Untergeher, Holzfällen shifts the focus from the 
realm of music to that of theatre in depicting a state of irritation for the nameless 
narrator, an Austrian writer and intellectual in his sixties. He describes an artistic 
dinner, a term put in ironic italics throughout the novel, hosted by his former friends, 
the Auersbergers, in the Viennese Gentzgasse in the 1980s. Although he used to be 
one of their close friends and protégés, he now detests them as he felt exploited by 
them and consequently left their circle twenty years ago. The day he finds out that 
their mutual friend Joana, a choreographer, committed suicide, the narrator by 
chance meets the Auerbergers on the Graben boulevard in Vienna and is invited to 
the soirée they are hosting for an actor of the Austrian National Theatre, the 
Burgtheatre, which is scheduled to take place on the same day as Joana’s funeral. 
Despite his inner resentment and hatred of the couple, the narrator accepts their 
invitation. At the dinner party he sits down at a distance, on his favourite wing chair, 
and begins to scrutinise and dissect the other attendees in the most relentless way 
possible. As he gets more and more agitated, he especially considers the Auersberger 
couple and the writer Jeannie Billroth – another attendee of the soirée as well as a 
self-declared Austrian Virginia Woolf and evidently the narrator’s former lover – as 
pretentious, ridiculous and tasteless as he relates the years of their friendship as well 
as his acquaintance with Joana. 
 As with all three novels in the trilogy, the temporal structure of the text 
oscillates between the consonance and dissonance of events, timelines and rhythms. 
First, the narrator and the Auersbergers’ paths intersect, a meeting that also 
coincides with Joana’s death. Then, the funeral falls on the same days as the artistic 
dinner. Consequently, though, the famous actor keeps the entire party waiting, 
sending the narrator down a spiral of irritation and disgruntlement that results from 
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this temporal discrepancy. As in Murphy as well as in the works of Woolf – which are 
referenced through the character of Jeannie Billroth – timing thus takes on a 
significant role in the plot development, one that orchestrates modes of harmony as 
well as the narrator’s eponymous irritation, which constitutes the affective fundament 
of the text. 
When the famous actor, who keeps the company waiting until very late, 
finally arrives, the second part of the novel unfolds. The dinner and the actor’s 
monologue about his theatre career and the play he is currently starring in, Ibsen’s 
The Wild Duck, are related from the narrator’s point of view. Although he first depicts 
the actor with the same spite which he previously directed at the Auersberger couple, 
the narrator’s perception of him changes when the actor, already drunk, openly 
attacks the company and Jeannie in particular. In a soliloquy filled with theatrical 
pathos, the actor declares that life in Vienna is just as fake and unnatural as the 
artistic dinner, and that real life quality lies in being one with nature, in ‘Wald, 
Hochwald, Holzfällen’84, ‘[t]he forest, the virgin forest, the life of a woodcutter’85. As the dinner 
party ends, the narrator runs towards the city centre of Vienna, out of a desire to 
escape from the despised company of his acquaintances and overcome by an urge to 
write about the dinner party. 
 Due to its belligerent tone, Heinz Kuehn considers Holzfällen as an epitome of 
Bernhard’s deeply pessimistic interpretation of modernity:  
 Here is the real Bernhard, the outraged moralist at his most open and self-revealing, the man 
who uses all the tricks of the trade—irony, sarcasm, spite, cynicism, malediction, 
confrontation—to lay bare his utter, hopeless despair over the moral disintegration of 
modernity and the ruinous state of his city, his country, his world, the Western world86. 
As I have outlined above with reference to Der Untergeher, the view on art and 
modernity that is expressed in Holzfällen and the other novels of the trilogy is marked 
by a profound sense of dissonance between the self and the world, which is – as 
Kuehn further insinuates – also extended to the reader. 
 The narrator of Holzfällen thus relates the events due to and out of a state of 
irritation and the narrative portrays his growing agitation during the soirée. 
Throughout his spiteful rant, during which he does not shy away from dissecting 
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himself as harshly as the other party guests, he makes frequent use of one of 
Bernhard’s most prominent stylistic devices, the hyperbole. In the following section, 
for instance, his anger is directed at the interior design of the Auersberger flat in 
what may be described with a misplaced and exaggerated sense of revulsion: 
 Wie ich an diesem Abend und in dieser Nacht von dieser ganzen, wie mir auch jetzt wieder 
schien, perversen Gentzgassenwohnung abgestoßen gewesen war. Diese überall einem gar zu 
aufdringlich in die Augen springende Perfektion ist ja auch nichts als abstoßend, habe ich 
gedacht, wie überhaupt Wohnungen, in welchen, wie gesagt wird, alles stimmt, nichts und rein 
gar nichts aus dem Rahmen fällt und auch niemals aus dem Rahmen fallen darf, 
widerwärtige Wohnungen sind87. 
[How sickened I was by this whole apartment in the Gentzgasse, which once more struck me 
as perversely ostentatious! Such perfection, which hits you in the eye and crowds in upon you 
from all sides, is simply repellent, I thought, just as all apartments are repellent in which 
everything is just so, as they say, in which nothing is ever out of place or ever permitted to be 
out of place88.] 
The tirades of Bernhard’s narrators are marked by such hyperbolic statements, 
which distort the people and events he depicts in such a deeply grotesque way that 
they can often only have a comic effect. According to Josef König, these hyperbolic 
tirades are closely related to the creating of aesthetic Stimmung:  
[S]ie sind Zitate aus und auf einem düsteren Hintergrund, die in dem Zusammenhang, in 
welchem sie stehen, zwar den Leser in der vorher vorbereiteten Stimmung gefangen halten, ihn zuletzt 
aber doch erkennen lassen müssen, wenn er sich zur notwendigen Distanz durchgearbeitet 
hat, daß es sich um künstlich aufgebaute Übertreibungen handeln muss89 (my emphasis). 
[They are quotes from and against a gloomy backdrop, which in their context captivate the 
reader in the previously prepared mood, but eventually, once he has reached the necessary distance, 
they must make him realise that they are artificially constructed hyperboles (my translation 
and emphasis).] 
Although the reader eventually realises that Bernhard’s narrator only presents a 
grotesque, distorted image of reality, these obsessive, venomous rants intend to 
captivate her in the mood generated by the narrative. At the same time, however, the 
reader herself gradually enters a state of irritation90 about the narrative voice as the 
plot of the novel is likely to frustrate her expectations. Although the narrator 
complains about the artistic dinner throughout the novel, his behaviour at the party 
does not live up to his fierce critique. Instead of confronting the Auerbergers with 
                                                            
87 Bernhard, Holzfällen, pp. 244f. 
88 Bernhard, Woodcutters, p. 139. 
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90 Cf. Willi Huntemann, Artistik und Rollenspiel: Das System Thomas Bernhards (Würzburg: Könighausen & 
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their hypocrisy, he eventually thanks his hosts profusely when he leaves the party and 
thus frustrates any hopes the reader may have built up for a final cathartic scene. 
Hence there is a dialectic at work between the narrator and the reader and between 
two of the levels of textual Stimmung I have previously outlined: on the one hand, the 
narrator urges the reader to enter in and share his mood of irritation, but on the 
other hand, the narrator himself becomes a source of irritation for the reader, which 
establishes two parallel temporalities and trajectories of textual affect. This second, 
self-reflexive level of narrative affect is also indicative of Bernhard’s affinity with 
elements of late twentieth-century meta-fiction that we have previously seen in 
Beckett. Since the novel is thus not only concerned with a specific mood – irritation – 
on a content level but also addresses the general phenomenon on an aesthetic level, I 
will show that Stimmung is the both the main theme and governing principle of 
Holzfällen. 
 
 
 
Irritating the Reader 
Holzfällen thus employs conflicting modes of Stimmung as its main plot-developing 
device. The initial act of accepting the Auersbergers’ invitation to the artistic dinner 
results from the mood that follows the news of Joana’s suicide:  
 In meinem schwarzen, viel zu eng gewordenen sogenannten Begräbnisanzug […] saß ich da 
und dachte, daß ich wieder einmal im Begriff bin, mich gegen meine Überzeugung gemein 
und niederträchtig zu machen, indem ich die auersbergerische Einladung zu ihrem 
Nachtmahl angenommen und nicht abgelehnt habe, indem ich auf dem Graben für einen 
Moment weich und schwach geworden bin und alles in mir verleugnet habe, daß ich an 
diesem Abend und in dieser Nacht nicht allein meinen Charakter, sondern gleich alles in mir 
auf den Kopf gestellt habe. Nur in Anbetracht des Selbstmordes der Joana hat es zu diesem 
für mich verheerenden Kurzschluß kommen können, selbstverständlich hätte ich die 
Einladung der Auersberger abgelehnt, wäre ich nicht durch den Selbstmord der Joana auf 
geradezu vernichtende Weise konsterniert gewesen91. 
[I was wearing my so-called funeral suit […]. As I sat there I reflected that once more, contrary 
to my better judgment, I was making myself cheap and contemptible, having accepted the 
Auersbergers’ supper invitation instead of declining it. That day in the Graben I had 
momentarily become soft and weak and so acted contrary to my nature, and tonight I was 
standing not only my character, but my whole nature, on its head. Only Joana’s suicide could 
have prompted such an irrational reaction. Had I not been so devastated by her suicide, I 
would naturally have declined the invitation92.] 
                                                            
91 Bernhard, Holzfällen, pp. 31f. 
92 Bernhard, Woodcutters, pp. 17f. 
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If he had not found out about Joanna’s suicide that morning, the narrator claims, he 
would not have accepted the Auersbergers’ invitation, but the news left him in a 
mood of consternation and ‘weakness’. The plot of the novel is thus initiated by an 
originary sense of being ‘aus dem Gleichgewicht’93 – of being off balance – and it is 
another notion of disharmony – the narrator’s profound irritation – which then 
facilitates the acts of writing and narrating. If the narrator had not been so 
tremendously irritated by the artistic dinner, there would be nothing to write about, 
there would be no work of art. The origin of writing is, then, a sense of Verstimmung, 
of being out of tune. 
 It is noteworthy that like Dostoevsky’s The Idiot, which was extensively 
discussed in Chapter 2, Holzfällen thematises Stimmung in the context of a party, that 
is, in a microcosm of society. Such social gatherings make forms of mood collude by 
bringing together the private and the public, the solitary and the social. The 
attunement taking place between the individual and her social surroundings becomes 
pressing in such situations, and in both novels it leads to notions of profound 
dissonance. However, whereas the Stimmung of the party scene in The Idiot is 
intersubjective and contagious within the narrative world, the irritation felt by the 
narrator of Holzfällen is subject to his pondering isolation94, limiting the circulation of 
affect to the interaction between reader and narrator. I have previously discussed the 
inverted structure of Stimmung I am proposing on a philosophical level: I define 
Stimmung as the attunement between individual and world that brings these two 
categories into being in the first place. The party trope demonstrates that by defining 
itself and others in opposition to one other, the subject postulates itself through 
Stimmung and cannot exist or define itself without the structure of attunement. 
Transferring this idea to the context of the dinner party in The Idiot and 
Holzfällen, we observe that the protagonists of these novels are defined through their 
dissonant and strained relationships with the world that surrounds them. As much as 
the nameless narrator of Holzfällen detests the Auersbergers, Jeannie and the famous 
actor, he still needs them to be able to postulate his subject position as the focaliser 
and narrator of the novel. In this sense then there is no subject without the 
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postulation of that position in relation to the world. Without this constitutive 
Stimmung, there is no subject, and in the case of the novel, no subject of enunciation. 
 In Der Übertreibungskünstler: Studien zu Thomas Bernhard, Wendelin Schmidt-
Dengler importantly observes that the notion of dissonance created by the mood of 
irritation in Bernhard’s works is not merely an act of negation but at the same time 
one of creation: ‘Wenn (prätendierte) Harmonie durch Irritation […] aufgehoben 
wird, so geht diese Irritation auf Wegen, die durch eben diese Harmonisierung 
versperrt waren’95 [‘when (pretended) harmony is revoked […] through irritation, 
this irritation takes ways that were previously blocked by the selfsame harmonisation’ 
(my translation)]. In this sense, Verstimmung becomes a constructive phenomenon and 
the basis for writing since the obliteration of the pretended harmony that governs the 
narrative world enables new, creative modes of experience. The previously 
mentioned section, which describes the narrator’s disgust at the Auersbergers’ all too 
perfect apartment, illustrates this idea in its phrasing ‘wie überhaupt Wohnungen, in 
welchen, wie gesagt wird, alles stimmt, nichts und rein gar nichts aus dem Rahmen 
fällt und auch niemals aus dem Rahmen fallen darf, widerwärtige Wohnungen sind’. 
McLintock translates the italicised ‘alles stimmt’ as ‘just so’, but it really should be 
‘everything is right’ or ‘everything is in tune’. In his trademark hyperbolic fashion, the 
narrator thus postulates that which is well attuned as something that is revolting and 
disgusting. For him the lifestyle of the Auersbergers, which is seemingly perfectly 
attuned to the artistic society of post-war Vienna, is destructive and nauseating, 
whereas the mode of Verstimmung becomes the actual locus of creativity. 
 In an interview with Krista Fleischmann in 1984, which was conducted 
shortly after the release of Holzfällen, Bernhard commented extensively on the role of 
Stimmung in the creative process:  
 FLEISCHMANN Brauchen Sie nicht auch manchmal das Unangenehme zum Schreiben? 
Das, was Sie ärgert? 
 BERNHARD Um das braucht man sich ja nicht zu sorgen, weil das verfolgt einen ja auch 
nach Spanien. Und im Grund schreib’ ich ja eh nur, weil’s halt unangenehm ist, weil’s sehr 
viel unangenehme Sachen gibt. […] Und das ist notwendig. Im Grund schreib’ ich ja nur aus 
dem Grund, weil vieles unangenehm ist. Wenn alles angenehm wär’, könnt’ ich ja 
wahrscheinlich überhaupt nichts schreiben. Da würde niemand schreiben. Aus einem 
angenehmen Zustand heraus kann man ja gar nicht schreiben, außerdem wär’ man blöd, 
wenn man schreiben würde, wenn’s angenehm wär, weil man sich ja dem Angenehmen 
hingeben soll, nicht. Das muss man ja ausnützen. Und wenn Sie in angenehmer Stimmung 
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sind und sich an den Schreibtisch setzen, zerstören Sie ja die angenehme Stimmung. Und 
warum soll ich mir die zerstören? Ich könnt’ mir auch vorstellen, daß ich mein ganzes Leben 
nur in angenehmer Stimmung leb’ und überhaupt nichts schreib’. Aber da es eben, wie 
gesagt, eine angenehme Stimmung nur stundenweise oder nur kurze Zeit gibt, kommt man 
immer wieder zum Schreiben96. 
[FLEISCHMANN Don’t you sometimes need something unpleasant to write? Something 
that irritates you? 
 BERNHARD You don’t have to worry about that, because that will follow you all the way to 
Spain. Essentially I only write ‘cause it’s unpleasant, ‘cause there’s a lot of unpleasant things. 
[…] And that’s a necessity. Essentially I only write ‘cause many things are unpleasant. If 
everything was pleasant, I probably wouldn’t be able to write anything at all. Nobody would 
write then. You can’t really write from a pleasant state of mind, on top of that, one would be 
stupid to write in a pleasant state of mind, ‘cause you’re supposed to devote yourself to the 
pleasant things, aren’t you. You have to make the most of that. And if you’re in a pleasant 
mood and sit down at your writing desk, you destroy the pleasant mood. And why would I 
destroy it? I could also imagine living my whole life in a pleasant mood and not writing 
anything at all. But, as I said, as a pleasant mood only exists for a few hours or a short period 
of time, you get to write again and again (my translation).] 
According to Bernhard, being in a bad mood, being out of tune is thus the origin of 
writing. Without a sense of Verstimmung, one would always be immersed in the 
positive mood of a moment and never find an incentive to write, while writing 
becomes a corrective mode of responding to a sense of being ‘out of tune’ with the 
world. However, as the positive moods only last for a limited period of time, one 
finds a reason to write time and again. Being in a bad mood and feeling out of tune 
with the world thus becomes the driving force for any artistic endeavour as the sense 
of Verstimmung discloses the tensions in the relationship between self and world, an 
out-of-jointness that is reminiscent of Hamlet’s existential dilemma.  
What is more, in Bernhard’s œuvre, the disharmonious attunement between 
characters and narrative world is fundamentally constitutive for the concept of 
character as Bernhard’s characters indeed emerge out of their strained relationship 
with the world they live in. Bernhard’s idiosyncratic narrators are thus an epitome of 
the structure of Stimmung which I inially described as the result of an originary 
attunement taking place between the ‘I’ and the world. The self, according to this 
view, only exists insofar as it defines itself in relation to the world through the process 
of an ever-evolving negotiation and attunement. Although Bernhard’s characters 
despise the world they find themselves ‘thrown’ into, they simultaneously depend on 
it in order to define their own subjectivity. In the trilogy, the negotiation between the 
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self and world, which is depicted in many of Bernhard’s works, is thus integrated as a 
fundamental aspect of his aesthetic theory. 
 Not only is the concept of Stimmung the origin and central theme in 
Bernhard’s creative process; in his poetology, the mood of irritation plays a crucial 
role: 
 FLEISCHMANN „Holzfällen“ - das Buch hat den Untertitel „Eine Erregung“. 
 BERNHARD Ja, weil der Stil auch ein etwas erregter ist in dem Buch, musikalisch gesehen, 
vom Inhalt her schreibt man so was nicht ruhig, sondern in gewisser erregter Stimmung. Das 
kann man nicht ganz ruhig so wie eine klassische Prosa schreiben, sondern da setzt man sich 
hin und ist ja schon einmal von der Idee her erregt, und wenn man zu schreiben anfangt, erregt 
einen schon der Stil. Es ist in einem erregten Stil geschrieben.  
FLEISCHMANN Das heißt, es steigert sich zum Schluß? 
 BERNHARD Eine Erregung steigert sich bis zum Ende immer mehr. Endet ja auch in einer 
totalen Erregung97. 
[FLEISCHMANN ‘Woodcutters’ - the novel has the caption ‘An Irritation’.  
BERNHARD Yes, because the style in the book is also an irritated one, from a musical point 
of view, and content-wise, you don’t write something like that in a calm state of mind, but in 
a certain irritated mood. You can’t write something like this like classical prose, you sit down 
and are already agitated about the idea, and once you start writing, the style agitates you. It 
was written in an irritated style.  
FLEISCHMANN That means it continually increases until the end? 
BERNHARD An irritation increases more and more until the end. [The novel] also ends in 
a total state of irritation (my translation).] 
The German word Erregung can be translated as agitation, irritation and (sexual) 
arousal, a polysemy Bernhard also relates to the musical dimension and employs to 
various ends in Holzfällen. As Erika Tunner98 argues,  
Erregung ist eine Quelle für Neugier, Inspiration und kreatives Schaffen, Erregung kann 
Ärger, Empörung und Zorn erzeugen oder erotische und sexuelle Wunschvorstellungen 
hervorrufen, eine reiche Skala, über die Thomas Bernhard virtuos verfügt. Erregung kann 
sich im Erleben oder in der Niederschrift äußern, oder in einer Mischung von beiden99.  
[Agitation is a source of curiosity, inspiration and creative production, agitation can create 
anger, indignation and wrath or erotic and sexual desires, a rich spectrum, which Thomas 
Bernhard commands with virtuosity. Agitation can be felt in experience or in writing, or in a 
mixture of both (my translation).] 
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At the same time, Bernhard qualifies Erregung not only as a mood one can experience 
or be in, but also as a state of mind with a sense of an agency in its own right that can 
draw one in and then, in turn, stimulate creativity as he describes having been 
aroused by the agitated style of the writing. In this sense, Erregung is not something 
one ‘has’ but a condition that envelops one, a state of mind – and body – that takes 
one in and thereby creates a certain relationship between the experiencing self and 
the world. From a Heideggerian point of view, it discloses the world in a certain light 
and opens up existential possibilities, but Bernhard’s notion of Erregung goes even 
beyond Heidegger’s notion of Stimmung as an existential of Dasein that structures its 
‘Being-in-the-world’. In Holzfällen, there would be no plot, no narration and no 
characters without the mood of irritation, which envelops the narrator and which 
renders his account of the artistic dinner possible in the first place. Verstimmung thus 
becomes the birthplace of the experiencing subject position as well as of the aesthetic 
impetus itself. 
 Bernhard’s theory of irritation as the origin of writing is diametrically 
opposed to Wordsworth’s famous description of the role of mood in relation to 
poetry, in which poetry is defined as  
 the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: it takes its origin from emotion recollected in 
tranquillity: the emotion is contemplated till, by a species of reaction, the tranquillity 
gradually disappears, and an emotion, kindred to that which was before the subject of 
contemplation, is gradually produced, and does itself actually exist in the mind. In this mood 
successful composition generally begins, and in a mood similar to this it is carried on; but the 
emotion, of whatever kind, and in whatever degree, from various causes, is qualified by 
various pleasures, so that in describing any passions whatsoever, which are voluntarily 
described, the mind will, upon the whole, be in a state of enjoyment100. 
As opposed to Wordsworth, for whom the original emotion is transformed through 
the act of recollection in tranquillity, Bernhard describes the creative process as being 
based on memories that strongly agitate the writer. Wordsworth’s mode of 
contemplation is thus countered by a mode of visceral and physical affective 
agitation. While Wordsworth’s recollection is framed through a mode of distancing, 
Bernhard claims that the memories of people and events and, even more 
importantly, material encounters with people and places from the past, bring back 
previous states of affectedness and that the idea of a calm recollection of past events is 
a mere ‘cliché’: 
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 BERNHARD Das ist das Klischee von der Vergangenheitsbetrachtung, das ist natürlich 
völlig falsch. Alte Leute können solche Bücher schreiben […], ich bin noch erregt, wenn ich 
schreib’, auch wenn ich etwas Ruhiges schreib’, bin ich letzten Endes auch erregt. Erregung 
ist ja ein angenehmer Zustand, bringt das lahme Blut in Gang, pulsiert, macht lebendig und 
macht dann Bücher. Ohne Erregung is’ gar nix, da können S’ gleich im Bett liegen bleiben. 
Im Bett (lacht) is’ ja auch nur ein Spaß, wenn Sie sich erregen, nicht, und im Buch is’ 
genauso. Ist ja auch eine Art Geschlechtsverkehr, ein Buch schreiben, viel bequemer als 
früher, wo man das wirklich natürlich ausg’führt hat, ist ja viel angenehmer, ein Buch zu 
schreiben, als mit jemandem in’s Bett zu gehen101. 
[BERNHARD That’s the cliché about contemplating the past, of course that’s completely 
wrong. Old people can write books like that, […] but I’m still agitated when I’m writing, 
even if I’m writing something tranquil, I’m still agitated in the end. Agitation is actually a 
pleasant state, it gets the lifeless blood into motion, pulsates, makes you feel alive and then 
makes books. Without agitation there wouldn’t be anything at all; without agitation you 
could as well stay in bed. In bed (laughs) it’s also only fun when you become agitated, isn’t it, 
and in a book it’s the exact the same thing. It’s also a form of sexual intercourse, writing a 
book, much more comfortable than it used to be when you really had to execute it naturally, 
it’s much more pleasant, writing a book, than having sex with someone, isn’t it (my 
translation).] 
Bernhard thus revokes the notion of tranquillity as a prerequisite for writing as he 
posits irritation and agitation as the driving force behind the creative process. Both 
Wordsworth and Bernhard, however, depict the act of writing as a pleasant, 
enjoyable state of mind, and in Bernhard, it affects the writer in a very physical, 
almost erotic fashion.  
As Bernhard compares the act of writing to sexual intercourse, he 
provocatively echoes the interactive dimension of the aesthetic process that we have 
previously encountered in Iser’s reader-response theory, underlining the importance 
of the reader’s immersion in and engagement with the text. This notion echoes 
Roland Barthes’s concept of literature as a source of quasi-erotic pleasure in The 
Pleasure of the Text102, which distinguishes between ‘texts of pleasure’ and ‘texts of 
bliss’: while, according to Barthes, the text of pleasure ‘comes from culture and does 
not break with it’, the text of bliss ‘discomforts’ and ‘unsettles the reader’s historical, 
cultural, psychological assumptions’103. Holzfällen – as well as all other texts discussed 
in this study – clearly falls into the latter category, engendering a loss of selfhood in 
the reader which harbours an aesthetic sense of bliss. 
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 Erika Tunner comments on the affinity of the two aforementioned planes of 
irritation in the processes of creation and reception in Holzfällen: 
 Holzfällen ist nicht ohne extreme Reaktionen geblieben, die jedoch allmählich zum Kuriosum 
werden. Was die eigentliche Erregung des Textes ausmacht, ist das ständige Schwanken 
zwischen Künstlichkeit und Authentizität, ist die Inferenz von Gesellschaftsablehnung und 
Gesellschaftsabhängigkeit, ist die Dialektik zwischen der Wahrnehmungsart des Erzählers 
und seinem ambivalenten kommunikativen Verhältnis zum Leser104. 
[Woodcutters has caused extreme reactions, but they are gradually becoming curiosities. The 
actual irritation in the text is the constant fluctuation between artificiality and authenticity, 
the inference of rejecting society and depending on society, the dialectic between the 
narrator’s mode of perception and his ambivalent communicative relationship with the 
reader (my translation).] 
Tunner sees the source of irritation in the novel not in the scandalous public effect 
and libel suit it caused, but in a variety of stylistic features, amongst other things in 
the agitated and agitating style and in the dialectical relationship between the 
narrator and the reader that results from it. The novel thus generates a Stimmung of 
irritation that envelops the reader, causing her, firstly, to leave her attunement with 
the world she is in by showcasing an overstated, absurd and hypocritical mirror 
image of this world, and secondly, by bringing her into a relationship with the 
narrator that is marked by an affective ambiguity. On the one hand, his incessant 
rants are the source of an amusement that attunes the reader through the social 
dimension of Bernhard’s brand of laughter, but on the other hand, she may consider 
the narrator himself as repulsive, hypocritical and frustrating. Even if she becomes 
agitated by the narrative, her agitation will not equal that of the narrator who 
eventually enters a state of full-blown mania that is conveyed through the syntax and 
punctuation as well as Bernhard’s use of italics as a means to emphasise central 
phrases:  
und ich lief und lief und dachte, daß ich, wie allem Fürchterlichen, auch diesem 
fürchterlichen sogenannten künstlerischen Abendessen in der Gentzgasse entkommen bin und daß 
ich über dieses sogenannte künstlerische Abendessen in der Gentzgasse schreiben werde, ohne zu 
wissen, was, ganz einfach etwas darüber schreiben werde und ich lief und lief und dachte, ich 
werde sofort über dieses sogenannte künstlerische Abendessen in der Gentzgasse schreiben, egal 
was, nur gleich und sofort über dieses künstlerische Abendessen in der Gentzgasse schreiben, sofort, 
dachte ich, gleich immer wieder, durch die Innere Stadt laufend, gleich und sofort und gleich und 
gleich, bevor es zu spät ist105. 
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[and as I went on running, I thought: I’ve survived this dreadful artistic dinner, just as I’ve 
survived all the other horrors. I’ll write about this artistic dinner in the Gentzgasse, I thought, 
without knowing what I would write—simply that I would write something about it. As I went 
on running I thought: I’ll write something at once, no matter what—I’ll write about this artistic 
dinner in the Gentzgasse at once, now. Now, I thought—at once, I told myself over and over again 
as I ran through the Inner City—at once, I told myself, now—at once, before it’s too late106.] 
In this sense, the novel first brings the reader in tune with the narrator, but then 
leads her to revoke this harmony, ultimately ending on a note of discord as Bernhard 
employs ‘a prose that mercilessly hammers away at the reader’s nerves with endless 
repetition and elaboration of a few basic themes’107 – a claim that is substantiated by 
the extremely repetitive closing section of the novel, which is quoted above. The style 
of the novel becomes unnerving and irritating to the reader, ultimately creating a 
sense of discord with the text and creating a dialectic between narrator and reader 
that is contingent on an attunement between the two, and which also entails a 
dialectical simultaneity of harmony and dissonance. The novel thereby fictionalises 
the continuous process of attunement between the reader and the world in a manner 
that pursues the suspension of what is considered as an oppressive and flawed mode 
of existential harmony. 
 All of the aspects mentioned above play into Bernhard’s creation of the genre 
of the Erregung as irritation becomes the origin of the artistic process. Fictionalising 
the act of artistic creation itself, the novel fittingly ends as the writing process begins. 
By foregrounding the affective plane of the text, the genre of the Erregung prioritises 
erregen – arousing or exciting in a very visceral sense – over erzählen – narrating. At the 
same time, the creation of this mock-genre is an ironic comment on Bernhard’s 
public image and a foreshadowing of the reaction the novel was going to provoke in 
its readers through textual and paratextual means. Furthermore, it calls attention to 
the difficult question of genre posed by the affective structure of Holzfällen: like 
Bernhard’s other works, the novel may well be considered an elegiac work of art as 
death and suicide are one of its central themes; and yet, it is also hysterically funny in 
its grotesque portrayal of artistic hypocrisy. 
This ambivalence is not resolved by the novel itself and the genre she assigns 
to it is a question of the reader’s own sense of attunement, which opens the text to a 
structural undecidedness that can only be settled in the aesthetic process. As Willi 
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Huntemann points out, Bernhard’s prose is one that challenges the reader, requires 
her active participation and extends the relationships between the characters within 
the text to the reader108. However, if the novel’s affective potential fully unfolds, the 
reader is attuned to, and then, in turn, brought out of tune with a mood of deep 
excitement and irritation. If genres are defined by their most dominant form of 
affectedness, then Holzfällen can be nothing but an ‘irritation’. Through the structure 
of attunement between text and reader that I have outlined the subject position of 
the reader is fundamentally posited and created by means of an originary 
discordance which is created by the mood of irritation and which facilitates the 
negotiation between reader, narrator and text. 
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion: Bernhard’s Aesthetics of Stimmung and the Failure of 
Art in Alte Meister 
Over two decades after Bernhard’s passing, the stir caused by the scandalous nature 
of his public persona has settled enough for his works to actually have taken centre 
stage through discussions of his aesthetics and philosophy. Nowhere else in 
Bernhard’s œuvre are his musically inspired narrative style and enquiry into the nature 
of art as condensed and explicit as they are in the trilogy, the last part of which, Alte 
Meister: Komödie, was the last novel Bernhard wrote before his death – as Auslöschung 
(Extinction, 1986), sometimes wrongly referenced as his last novel as it was published 
one year after Alte Meister, was actually written in the early 1980s and only published 
later on109.  
Like the majority of his other prose works from the 1980s – including the 
autobiographical narrative Wittgensteins Neffe (1982, Wittgenstein’s Nephew), the novel 
Beton (1982, Concrete) and Bernhard’s longest prose work, the aforementioned 
Auslöschung – the novels of the trilogy feature narrators looking back on those they 
have survived: in Der Untergeher, the narrator contemplates his friendship with the late 
Gould and Wertheimer, the narrator of Holzfällen muses about the recent death of his 
friend Joana and in Alte Meister, the narrator Atzbacher converses with the critic 
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Reger, who reflects on the loss of his wife. This pervasive motif of loss creates a 
structure of elegiac belatedness that interrogates art’s capacity to capture and 
preserve that which has been lost and is, by implication, intimately connected with 
Bernhard’s politics and aesthetics of post-war trauma and his critique of modernity, 
which he depicts as an age marked by a structure of a fundamental loss. In her 
excellent book Lamentation and Modernity in Literature, Philosophy, and Culture (2007), 
Rebecca Saunders demonstrates that this notion is pervasive in aesthetic and 
philosophical discourses on modernity110. Saunders further argues that the dominant 
mood of lamentation in the culture of modernity has considerably shaped our 
understanding of the notion of the modern by both expressing and constructing a 
sense of loss that has become constitutive for the very idea of modernity. Her 
argument is particularly helpful to my analysis of Stimmung and modernity as it locates 
the work of art within a circulation of affect that renders it both an expression of and 
a response to a perceived notion of loss, as well as an instrumental part in creating 
and perpetuating this pervasive mood. 
In Bernhard’s trilogy, then, the permanent mode of lamentation gives rise to 
an enquiry into art’s capacity to recoup loss as ‘[t]he poet, as the only survivor, 
represents the dead as they had been in life and in the past so that they can be dead 
and buried in the present’111. However, art is always somehow insufficient in 
preserving the past and in carrying it forth into the present, as is shown in Alte Meister, 
which brings this issue to the fore by exploring the concepts of artistic mimesis, 
imitation and counterfeiting. At the same time, the inability to write is a recurrent 
theme since virtually all of Bernhard’s protagonists speak of a desire but fundamental 
inability to write, almost as if literature’s failure to supplant their experience is 
already anticipated and inherent in art. Ultimately, Alte Meister – perhaps not his 
definitive, but nevertheless Bernhard’s last comprehensive statement on the nature of 
art in the medium of prose – thus discusses the failure of art to meaningfully connect 
to life due to their fundamental structural incompatibility. 
The novel, which is subtitled Komödie [A Comedy], describes a meeting between 
the private intellectual Atzbacher, the narrator of the text, and his long-term 
acquaintance, the 82-year-old music critic and philosopher Reger, at the Viennese 
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Museum of Art History. Atzbacher is intrigued as Reger – who, like clockwork, visits 
the museum every other day – has, rather unusually, asked him to meet at the 
museum, although they had met there the previous day. He arrives an hour before 
the appointed time and watches Reger sit on the bench from which he inspects the 
same painting every other day, the Portrait of a White-Bearded Man by Tintoretto, while 
reflecting on Reger, his views on art and philosophy and their relationship. 
Atzbacher then approaches Reger and engages in a conversation with him, at the 
end of which Reger reveals that the reason he asked to see him was that he had 
planned on inviting him to a performance of Heinrich von Kleist’s play Der zerbrochene 
Krug (1808/11). The novel ends with Atzbacher’s verdict ‘[d]ie Vorstellung war 
entsetzlich’112 [‘[t]he performance was terrible’113]. 
 As I previously observed with regards to Der Untergeher, Alte Meister merges the 
voices of its protagonists since the better part of Atzbacher’s narrative is constituted 
by Reger’s words which Atzbacher reproduces. In a sense, Reger thus speaks 
through Atzbacher, while Atzbacher, at the same time, speaks through Reger’s 
words, creating a polyphonic structure of narration. Atzbacher, the more passive of 
the two, lets Reger take charge of the conversation and thus becomes his listener and 
observer, Reger’s recipient – a notion that becomes particularly prominent when 
Atzbacher observes Reger in the same fashion in which Reger observes the White-
Bearded Man. The text renders the structure of Atzbacher as ‘reader’ and Reger as 
‘text’ more explicit when Reger admits, ‘ich brauche einen Zuhörer, ein Opfer 
sozusagen für meinen musikwissenschaftlichen Redezwang’114 [‘I need a listener, a 
victim as it were, for my compulsive musicological talking’115], a requirement 
Atzbacher fulfils: ‘Sie sind mir gerade recht gekommen, was täte ich nur ohne Sie!’116[(‘you have 
come at just the right moment, what would I do without you’117]. 
 The aesthetic process as it is allegorically portrayed in Alte Meister is defined 
by a process of attunement between Reger and Atzbacher, in which timing plays an 
important role: they both value punctuality and when Atzbacher emerges from his 
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hidden viewpoint the second the appointed time arrives, Reger expresses his 
approval:  
Ich dachte, Sie werden pünktlich sein und Sie sind pünktlich, sagte er, von Ihnen erwarte ich 
ja nichts anderes, als Pünktlichkeit und die Pünktlichkeit, das wissen Sie ja, schätze ich über 
alles, da wo Menschen sind, muß die Pünktlichkeit und die mit der Pünktlichkeit gemeinsame 
Sache machende Verläßlichkeit herrschen, sagte er118.  
[I thought you would be punctual and you are punctual, he said, I do not expect you to be 
anything but punctual, and punctuality, as you know, is what I appreciate above all else, 
wherever there are human beings there must be punctuality and, making common cause with 
punctuality, reliability, he said119.] 
In a social – and in an artistic – context, an attunement between individuals, as 
Reger’s obsession with punctuality demonstrates, is indispensable as it enables a 
common ground for both social and aesthetic forms of encounter. Art, no matter 
how solipsistic or monologic it may appear, is thus inherently ‘rooted in the social’120 
to Bernhard. Reger, when discussing Atzbacher’s unwillingness to publish his texts, 
further observes that every text is written for an audience: ‘niemand schreibt eine 
Schreibarbeit für sich selbst, das ist gelogen, wenn einer sagt, er schreibt sein 
Geschriebenes nur für sich selbst’121 [‘no one writes a work for himself, is someone 
says he is writing only for himself then that is a lie’122]. Quite contrarily, the presence 
of the reader is always implied in the text and her engagement in the aesthetic 
process becomes constitutive for the artwork as Reger tells Atzbacher that talking to 
his acquaintance has become an absolute, even existential, necessity for him:  
Sie hören aufmerksam zu und widersprechen nicht, sagte er, Sie lassen mein Reden in Ruhe, das 
brauche ich, gleich was es wert ist, was ich sage, es ebnet mir nur den Weg durch diese 
fürchterliche, glauben Sie mir, doch tatsächlich sehr selten glücklich machende musikalische 
Existenz. [...] Ich habe keinen nützlicheren Menschen außer Ihnen, sagte er. Wahrscheinlich ist mir 
das Überleben nur durch Sie möglich123. 
[You listen attentively and do not contradict, he said, you leave me to talk, that is what I need, 
never mind what it is worth, it smoothes my path through this dreadful musical existence, 
believe me, one that in fact very rarely provides happiness. [...] I have no other person more useful 
than you, he said. Probably survival has been possible for me only thanks to you124.] 
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Reger can only survive with his ‘recipient’ Atzbacher, just as the text can only survive 
with the reader, which is why art is by definition always incomplete and therefore 
imperfect, an idea Reger follows through in his deposition of the ‘old masters’.  
By referencing the German composer Max Reger, who was strongly 
influenced by Bach and, in turn, exerted a considerable influence on Schoenberg, 
Reger’s name establishes a clear connection to composers whose works interrogated 
the nature of musical temperament and harmony, relating – as in Beckett’s early 
novels – the question of attunement in the reading process to that of musical 
Stimmung. Alte Meister thereby constitutes Bernhard’s most open form of addressing 
aesthetic attunement in prose through the pivotal role given to the reader and, to 
some degree, represents a more positive view on the possibility of achieving Stimmung 
than Beckett’s works or even its own predecessors within the trilogy. While Company, 
Beckett’s most overt integration of the reader in the text, pursues an attunement to 
then arrive at the final conclusion, ‘[a]nd you as you always were. Alone’, Alte Meister, 
although vigorously attacking the monolithic status that artworks have been given in 
Western culture, suggests that an attunement is not only possible but a necessity for 
survival. 
 Bernhard’s often misanthropic and solipsistic characters solidify a continuous 
biographical problem of the author’s: that of distance. In a letter to his brother, he 
stated: ‘Meine Krankheit ist die Distanz’125, ‘my illness is distance’, which referred in 
particular to his relationships with other people. In his works, however, this solipsistic 
and monologic existence gradually turns into the polyphonic symbiosis of multiple 
voices, relating Stimmung to its etymological relative Stimme in order to stimulate a 
quasi-musical attunement in the reader: 
Bernhard is in many ways an ‘expressionist’ writer who, although he uses the material of life 
to create his own universe, experiences a great need to communicate with individuals by 
means of writing, partly, like some of his characters, to escape from himself, but partly also to 
create a ‘presence’ through language, and achieving understanding even while denying its 
possibility. Bernhard’s monologues provide ‘existence’ through their inner dynamic, and 
when the monologue stops, not only the speaker, but also the listener has advanced a small 
step126. 
Bernhard’s characters, as well as his texts and readers, thus oscillate between the 
polar opposites of solipsistic distancing and intersubjective convergence. By creating 
                                                            
125 Bernhard qtd. in Mittermayer, Eine Biografie, p. 257. 
126 Augustinus P. Dierick, ‘The Teller from the Tale: Monologues, Dialogues and Protocols in 
Thomas Bernhard’s Major Novels’, Oxford German Studies, Vol. 44, Nr. 4 (2015), 416-27 (p. 427). 
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a ‘presence’ in his writing, a voice that ropes the reader in, so to say, the texts pursue 
an attunement through the aesthetic process, as a result of which both the speaker 
and the listener evolve. 
Although Alte Meister contains what is perhaps the most comprehensive and 
scathing condemnation of Heidegger in all of world literature – in which the 
philosopher is dismissed as, amongst other things, a ‘lächerliche[r] 
nationalsozialistische[r] Pumphosenspießer’ [‘ridiculous Nazi philistine in plus-
fours’], a ‘Voralpenschwachdenker’ [‘a feeble thinker from the Alpine foothills’] and 
‘eine unablässig trächtige Philosophiekuh, […] die auf der deutschen Philosophie 
geweidet und darauf jahrzehntelang ihre koketten Fladen fallen gelassen hat’127 [‘a 
ceaselessly gravid German philosophical cow […], which grazed upon German 
philosophy and thereupon for decades let its smart little cow-pats drop on it’128] – 
Bernhard’s interpretation of the human condition in the age of modernity 
nonetheless (and perhaps despite Bernhard himself) showcases a number of 
similarities with Heidegger’s. Towards the end of the novel, Reger describes the 
world he lives in as an uncanny one – one that can no longer provide shelter or a 
home: 
Sie können sich nicht mehr verstecken, es gibt kein Versteck mehr, das ist das Furchtbare, so 
Reger, alles ist total durchschaubar und damit total schutzlos geworden; das heißt, daß es 
heute gar keine Fluchtmöglichkeiten mehr gibt, die Menschen werden heute überall, gleich, 
wo sie sind, gehetzt und aufgehetzt und flüchten und fliehen und finden kein Loch mehr, in 
das sie entkommen könnten, es sei den, sie gehen in den Tod, das ist die Tatsache, so Reger, 
das ist das Unheimliche, denn die Welt ist keine heimliche mehr, nurmehr noch eine 
unheimliche. Mit dieser unheimlichen Welt müssen Sie sich abfinden, Atzbacher, ob Sie 
wollen oder nicht, Sie sind mit Haut und Haaren dieser unheimlichen Welt ausgeliefert und wenn 
Ihnen eingeredet wird, das ist nicht so, dann wird Ihnen eine Lüge eingeredet, diese heutige 
ununterbrochen in Ihre Ohren hineingetrommelte Lüge, auf die sich vor allem die Politiker 
und die politischen Schwätzer spezialisiert haben, so Reger. Die Welt ist eine einzige 
Unheimlichkeit, in welcher kein Mensch mehr Schutz findet, kein einziger, so Reger im 
Ambassador129. 
[They can no longer hide, there is no hiding place left, that is what is so terrible, Reger said, 
everything has become transparent and thereby unprotected; in other words there is no hope 
of escape left today, people, no matter where they are, are everywhere hustled and incited 
and flee and escape and no longer find a refuge to escape to, unless of course they choose 
death, that is a fact, Reger said, that is the sinister aspect, because the world today is no 
longer mysterious but only sinister. With this sinister world you have to come to terms, 
Atzbacher, whether you like it or not, you are completely and totally at the mercy of this sinister world 
and if someone tries to tell you otherwise then he is trying to tell you a lie, today’s lie which is 
                                                            
127 Alte Meister, pp. 87f. 
128 Old Masters, pp. 41f. 
129 Alte Meister, pp. 299f. 
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ceaselessly drummed into your ears, the lie on which the politicians and the political 
twaddlers have specialized, Reger said. The world is one big sinister place where no one can 
find shelter any more, no one, Reger said at the Ambassador130.] 
Although translated as ‘sinister’ by Osers, the term ‘unheimlich’ would be rendered 
more accurately as ‘uncanny’ or ‘unhomely’ and was promulgated through Sigmund 
Freud’s essay ‘Das Unheimliche’, where it is defined as that which is at the same time 
strange and familiar131. The uncanny is a central aspect of Heidegger’s concept of 
thrownness, which suggests that the relationship between Dasein and the world is 
fundamentally disturbed. Dasein is, from its outset, not at home in the world and is 
defined by this mode of Un-zuhause [‘not at home’]132. 
 To Reger, the uncanniness of human existence is a novel phenomenon, one 
that is associated with the condition of modernity and, more specifically, with the 
state of Europe after the Second World War. As in Dostoevsky’s and Beckett’s works, 
the omnipresence of illness in Bernhard’s texts133 – which critics have often 
connected to his own lifelong health issues134 – is symptomatic of a modern world 
which does not provide a home or any form of harmony for its inhabitants: more 
strongly phrased, ‘[k]ein anderer Autor der Moderne stellt die Welt als ein so 
häßliches, abgründiges, chaotisches und ekelerregendes Jammertal dar wie Thomas 
Bernhard’135 [‘[n]o other author of modernity depicts the world as as much of an 
ugly, abysmal, chaotic and nauseating vale of tears as Bernhard does’ (my 
translation)]. Art, in its pursuit of perfection and harmony, is fundamentally 
incompatible with the chaotic world and nature of existence, but Bernhard’s trilogy 
also reveals the cracks inside its aesthetic fundaments, its inability to substitute life 
and nature, and its underlying incompleteness without a human recipient. 
Through a close reading of this trilogy, I have explored the dialectical 
structure of genre in Bernhard’s work, which is generated through a harmonisation 
between the text on the one hand and through the reader’s disposition and 
                                                            
130 Old Masters, p. 150. 
131 Cf. Jean-Michel Rabaté, The Cambridge Introduction to Literature and Psychoanalysis (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 75. 
132 Cf. Sein und Zeit, pp. 188-90. 
133 Cf. Alfred Pfabigan, Thomas Bernhard: Ein österreichisches Weltexperiment (Vienna: Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 
1999), p.106. 
134 Ibid. p. 207. 
135 Jürgen H. Petersen, ‘Beschreibung einer sinnentleerten Welt: Erzählthematik und Erzählverfahren 
in Thomas Bernhards Romanen’, in Bernhard: Annäherungen, ed. by Manfred Jurgensen (Bern and 
Munich: Francke Verlag, 1981), pp. 143-76 (p. 143). 
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attunement on the other hand. In these texts, comedy and tragedy are merged, 
becoming virtually indistinguishable, and since traditional frames of meaning-making 
are absent, the reader is drawn – or, perhaps, even forced – into an attunement with 
the texts that is dynamic, unstable and open-ended. Through a dialectical 
relationship between the Stimmung of the reader and the moods created and 
stimulated by the text, a new attunement is created – one that is original, 
destabilising and uncertain; in other words, one that is ‘modern’. The generic 
openness of the texts resides in their structural incompleteness prior to this process of 
attunement; and the intensity of affect that Bernhard’s works engender – on a textual 
and paratextual level, through provocation, irritation and scandal – considerably 
plays into the forcefulness of their aesthetic effect on an almost physical affective 
level. Through the notion of the ridiculous – which describes the tragicomic 
coexistence of tragedy and comedy – the texts create a locus for an intersubjective 
encounter: lächerlich and its English counterpart ‘ridiculous’ etymologically point 
towards laughter, a phenomenon that is, according to Bergson, fundamentally social 
and intersubjective. At the same time, Bernhard’s brand of the ridiculous contains an 
element of sympathy towards those affected by it; it indicates a sense of – in 
Heideggerian terms – Mitsein or Being-with that is the originary structure of art. 
As part and parcel of this existential and aesthetic Being-with, Bernhard’s 
works engender a mode of Stimmung in the in-between of reader and text by creating 
a ‘musical’ prose that uses rhythm, the development of motifs and phonetic clusters 
as well as the human voice in order to overwrite the semantic level of the text with its 
semiotic quality. By doing so, language is employed in its most material form, and 
through this materiality a physical encounter between the narrative and the reader is 
stimulated, where the text engenders a ‘presence’ which, in the narrative process, 
aims to attune the reader to its ‘pitch’ and ‘rhythm’. Bernhard is not an author one 
reads from a distance, Tunner suggests; his texts actively eliminate the distance 
between text and reader and thereby create an aesthetic mood marked by its 
intensity and unpredictability. 
Eliminating the genre question, Bernhard’s mock-genre of the Erregung 
radically foregrounds this attunement by underlining the significance of irritation and 
agitation for the processes of artistic creation and reception. Not only does the 
Erregung depict a state of agitation and discord with the narrative world; it also seeks 
to create a mood of irritation in the reader and unsettles her by, firstly, creating 
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discord between her and the world she is in and, secondly, by causing a complex 
dialectic between the narrator and the reader, which is marked by harmony and 
sympathy and by repulsion and aversion at the same time. To Bernhard, since 
modernity is ‘understood as a break with harmony and perfection’136, being out of 
tune with the world is the originary precondition for writing or any art form at all as 
there would be no incentive to write and, in that sense, no subject position to speak 
from without this sense of dissonance. Holzfällen in particular thus fictionalises the 
attunement which brings the notions of subject and world into being and allows the 
reader to affectively experience this attunement in relationship to the text. 
The intimate connection between the three realms in whose intersection the 
phenomenon of Stimmung resides constitutes a continuous backdrop for Bernhard’s 
aesthetics: ‘Es ist ja klar, daß Literatur ohne Philosophie und umgekehrt und 
Philosophie ohne Musik und Literatur ohne Musik und umgekehrt nicht denkbar 
sind’137 [‘It is obvious, surely, that literature is not conceivable without philosophy or 
the other way round, or philosophy without music or literature without music or the 
other way round’138], Reger states in Alte Meister, intimating the fundamental 
connection between these spheres, which all are shown to be, essentially, ‘eine 
Stimmungssache’. 
                                                            
136 Paola Bozzi, ‘Homeland, Death, and Otherness in Thomas Bernhard’s Early Lyrical Works’, in A 
Companion to the Works of Thomas Bernhard, ed. by Konzett, pp. 71-87 (p. 81). 
137 Alte Meister, p. 257. 
138 Old Masters, p. 129. 
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Conclusion 
Thus literature necessarily gnaws away at existence 
and the world, reducing to nothing (but this nothing is 
horror) these steps by which we go along confidently from 
one result to another, from one success to another1. 
 
 
A historical overview of the aesthetic category of Stimmung has unearthed the most 
significant inflections this concept has developed in the context of European thought. 
From the Pythagorean notion of a universal harmony to its redefinition in the 
modern age, Stimmung has remained intimately connected to its origin in the musical 
context where it designates, first and foremost, a relationship and a process. After its 
successive subjectivisation throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, 
the emergence of urban modernity has, once again, uncovered that relationality 
inherent in the notion of attunement. Heidegger’s ontology and subsequent enquiries 
into the nature of the subject and the conditions of human existence underline the 
ontological primacy of Stimmung and the subject’s contingency on its attunement to 
the world and to other subjects. At the same time, literary articulations of a novel 
mode of experience that are related to the modern have given prominence to the key 
role this phenomenon plays within modern aesthetics. 
The readings in this study, though by no means exhaustive, have given us an 
overview of pivotal modes and manifestations of the aesthetic category of Stimmung in 
modern literature. Since the scope of my analysis has been confined to – in the 
broadest sense – European works of narrative fiction ranging from the mid-
nineteenth to the late-twentieth century, it covers only a very specific and historically 
limited view on the aesthetics and philosophy of mood in the context of modernity; 
and yet, the authors chosen represent a movement central to the reflection on and 
literary articulation of aesthetic and existential forms of attunement within the 
paradigm of modernity. In this context, I have conceptualised modernity as an 
epistemological category that has established a new way of thinking about experience 
and existence specific to the European post-Renaissance age. 
                                                            
1 Georges Bataille, ‘Molloy’s Silence’, trans. by Jean M. Sommermeyer, in Samuel Beckett by Birkett and 
Ince, pp. 85-92 (p. 92). 
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 Through an interpretation of three principal works by Dostoevsky, we have 
first encountered a concept of Stimmung that embeds this phenomenon deep within 
the urban space of nineteenth-century Petersburg. Echoing Baudelaire’s originary 
definition of modernity as a sense of fleetingness and contingency engendered by the 
novel urban environment as well as Dickens’s depiction of the city as a space of 
uncertainty and alienation, Dostoevsky’s works were complicit in heralding a new 
response to the material and epistemological vicissitudes of modernisation and in 
shaping literary modes and themes that would influence principal writers of literary 
modernism, such as Virginia Woolf, Franz Kafka and William Faulkner. According 
to André Gide, Dostoevsky’s works open up an aesthetic discourse on ‘the individual 
and his self’2 that had previously been absent in European literature. Both Notes from 
Underground and Crime and Punishment depict protagonists that are symptomatic of a 
modern pathology uncovering fundamentally disturbed grounds of existence and 
thus initiated a literary existentialism that is intimately connected to the emergence 
of the modern age. Raskolnikov and the underground man equally represent the 
curse of modern subjectivity and of radical individualism; at the same time, their 
subject positions are fundamentally contingent on material space and affective 
‘climate’ as a mode of transsubjective historical attunement.  
In The Idiot, then, a shift towards intersubjectivity takes place: the intensity of 
affect both depicted and created by the novel posits the paradigm of mood as its 
organising principle, thus establishing a poetics of anti-rationalism, volatility and 
affectedness which radically foregrounds the dimension of aesthetic immediacy. 
Dostoevsky’s notion of ‘fantastic’ realism portrays a narrative world in which 
dislocation and dissonance – generated by the modern condition and a detrimental 
capitalist ethos – become part and parcel of a new existential status quo. As a result 
of this perception, The Idiot develops an aesthetic structure in which the reader is 
thrown into this very dislocation since she consistently needs to attune to the rapidly 
changing atmosphere, tone and genre of the text. Due to the intense affective 
involvement the novel causes in its readers, de Jonge views Dostoevsky’s œuvre as a  
significant element of a new literary movement in which the intensity of experience 
                                                            
2 André Gide, Dostoevsky (London: Secker & Warburg, 1952), p. 15. 
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provokes a ‘pure aesthetic response’3, thereby marking a move away from pure 
semantics and towards the experiential dimension of art. 
Beckett’s narrative fiction continues Dostoevsky’s enquiry into the nature of 
affect and attunement. The notion of harmony – which, according to Leo Spitzer, 
has dominated Western philosophy from the Pythagoreans to the Renaissance age 
and which had long been fashioned as the main objective of art – lies at the heart of 
Beckett’s early reflections on Stimmung in Murphy and Watt. In these works, 
attunement is approached through its etymological origin: the musical. Both Murphy 
and Watt represent an existential form of being that is defined by its fundamental 
dissonance with the world. The search for harmony – both existential and aesthetic – 
results in a futile pursuit of ‘Apmonia’ as Murphy’s inability to fruitfully integrate the 
Pythagorean concept of harmony into his skewed sense of being is, from the start, 
doomed to fail since the world around him is marked by an element of discordance 
and dissonance. Subsequently, in Watt the metaphor of attunement manifests itself 
through a literal tuning incident: the piano tuners’ visit early in the novel proves that 
the establishment of an attunement has, by definition, become impossible. No 
material basis remains that would allow for the creation of harmony, both in a 
musical and in a transcendental sense; any attempt to induce a harmonious form of 
Stimmung – such as equal temperament – is fundamentally flawed, basing a perceived 
sense of attunement upon a corrupted system. 
 These reflections on the conditions of attunement are, then, complemented 
by a more affect-driven understanding of Stimmung in the trilogy. In Molloy, Beckett’s 
dictum ‘[a]ll I am is feeling’ translates into a hermeneutics of reading in which the 
reader’s central role in generating textual meaning through affective experience 
supplants the paradigm of representation. As the characters in the novel see, first, a 
degradation of their subject position and then the loss thereof, the reader’s position is 
progressively approximated to a form of existence that is predicated upon the notions 
of displacement and transsubjectivity. This dispossession of self continues in Malone 
Dies and The Unnamable, in which the dispossessed subject makes way for a mode of 
intersubjective affectedness that becomes the new status quo of human existence. In 
these texts, and in Company, Beckett poses the fundamental question of whether we 
can ever be truly alone, unattuned to others, and whether art is capable of producing 
                                                            
3 de Jonge, Dostoevsky and The Age of Intensity, p. 201. 
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such a state. No definitive answers are given: on the one hand, virtually all of 
Beckett’s narrators speak from a place of all-encompassing solipsism; but on the other 
hand, their need for company governs the fact that they are forever seeking to speak 
to, entice and attune their readers. 
 Bernhard, the third author in this compendium of modes of Stimmung in 
modern literature, invigorates the aesthetic reflection on the preconditions of 
existence and aesthetics through the affective extremes his texts generate. The mock 
genre of the Erregung is emblematic of his poetics of intensity, rendering it impossible 
for the reader to encounter his texts with indifference and, further, overriding 
traditional genre conventions and preconceived notions of aesthetic reception. 
Constituting Bernhard’s most overt comment on the nature of art, his 1980s trilogy 
juxtaposes the author’s trademark narrative devices – obsessive narrators displaying a 
propensity for monomania, spiteful rants about the Austrian state, its Nazi past and 
Catholicism, incessant repetitions, narrative circularity, minimalistic plot 
development – with a reflection on art that is framed through an analysis of three art 
forms: music, theatre and visual art. Bernhard’s own understanding of Stimmung as a 
crucial element of artistic production and reception deeply informs all three novels as 
they interrogate the nature of existence and the modes of being with others as 
fundamentals of aesthetic theory. 
 In line with Beckett’s exploration of musical attunement, Der Untergeher 
revolves around the realm of the musical and the parallels between musical and 
existential structures. Bernhard’s musical prose here avails itself of structures 
borrowed from Bach’s Goldberg Variations and other classical pieces to depict the 
relationship between its three protagonists as a quasi-contrapuntal attunement, 
creating a semiotic plane of meaning that emancipates itself from the semantic. 
Creating an opposition between the perceived form of perfection in art and a sense 
of failure, contingency and insufficiency in life, the eponymous ‘Untergeher’ ends his 
life to fulfil his contrapuntal ‘role’; however, fractures in the tapestry of musical and 
artistic harmony expose the very insufficiency of art in relation to life. 
 As we have also seen, subsequently, Holzfällen shifts its focus to the performing 
arts and creates a forcefully immediate spectacle that is reminiscent of the dramatic 
genre. The nameless narrator’s irritation steadily increases in the course of the odious 
artistic dinner, and while his rage is overwhelmingly internal, the reader is included in 
this intense affective state through a dialectical relationship with the narrator. 
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Nowhere else in Bernhard do we encounter a more intense form of Stimmung, one 
that echoes the tempestuous scandal scenes of Dostoevsky’s novels and affects the 
reader in an unusual and forceful way. Irritation as a form of embodied affectedness 
becomes the locus of a dissonance and dislocation that spawns a creative impetus, 
thus becoming the precondition for any artistic activity. 
 Finally, Alte Meister completes the trilogy by foregrounding a sense of loss and 
mourning which is inherent in all three texts: the pivotal question at the heart of the 
novel is that of art’s capacity to preserve or supplant that which has been lost. Reger 
ultimately answers this question in the negative: art, he finds, is always inherently 
imperfect and flawed as long as it lacks a human recipient. The narrator Atzbacher 
fills this void for Reger; and then the reader, in turn, fills it for the text, giving both 
meaning through their presence. Once again, a mode of company or ‘being with’ is 
evoked, while the central role of the recipient in the aesthetic process is underlined as 
she provides one half of the ‘mood affair’ that art constitutes in Bernhard’s view. 
 While the three authors who have been discussed in this study do not exactly 
represent a homogeneous aesthetic philosophy of Stimmung and modernity, their 
works are indicative of a number of aspects that are constitutive for the role and 
articulation of attunement within modern literature. In his study on Beckett’s 
philosophical aesthetics, Andrea Oppo suggests that ‘as with Dostoevsky previously, 
[Beckett] turns literature into philosophy’4, an observation that extends to Bernhard. 
Indeed, all three authors are influential contributors to an aesthetic existentialism 
that dissects the modern condition from its dysfunctional and corroded end and 
which also manifests in the works of Kafka as well as those of the French existentialist 
writers. The ubiquity of illness in Dostoevsky’s Petersburg, the physical and mental 
dissolution of the self in Beckett, and Bernhard’s signature perspective of elegiac 
retrospection in the face of death compose a pathology of modernity that points 
towards a notion of sickness at the heart of the conditions of existence. 
This view is intimately connected to art’s relationship to modernity. While 
Alois Riegl suggests that modern art aims to provide a corrective for the chaotic 
present, the texts we have read have quite the opposite effect: they unsettle their 
readers, throw them out of their existential attunement and into a realm of 
uncertainty, vicissitude and possibility – a realm that we can, in reference to 
                                                            
4 Andrea Oppo, Philosophical Aesthetics and Samuel Beckett (Bern et al.: Peter Lang, 2008), p. 79. 
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Baudelaire, describe as that of the modern. From an ontological point of view, they 
thus destabilise the experiencing self and disturb its existential attunement, allowing 
for the possibility that we can gain insight into the nature and very conditions of this 
attunement. The Cartesian idea of the coherent, internal subject position is thus 
counteracted by a disintegration of the self into a mode of transsubjective 
affectedness, in which the reader is invited – or, at times, violently made – to partake 
in a dissolution of subjectivity as her position in relation to the text becomes, in 
Deleuze’s words, ‘that to which all objects are related as to the continuous variation 
of its own successive states, and to the infinite modulation of its degrees at each 
instant’5. The decentered self is thus ‘turned into an experience’6 made accessible to 
the reader.  
According to Barthes, the unsettling, destabilising quality of the texts that 
have been discussed above is a source of what he referred to as ‘bliss’ in the aesthetic 
experience; a point that may be subject to disagreement. The works of all three 
authors to some degree fall into the category of what Eileen John describes as 
‘tormenting fiction’7, a brand of narrative fiction in which the reader is entrapped in 
the experience of a miserable or spiteful consciousness or frustrating narrative 
situation. John uses Notes from the Underground as a paradigmatic example of this 
fiction; Dostoevsky’s other texts – in which intense modes of volatile affect impinge 
on the reader and which have earned the author the epithet of being a ‘shameless 
manipulator of his readers’8 – may also, to some extent, fall into this category, as 
would Beckett’s often unnerving narrative texts and Bernhard’s characteristic ‘prose 
that mercilessly hammers away at the reader’s nerves’9. Whether this generates a 
sense of cruelty or bliss, the striking intensity of aesthetic effect is central to the 
vehement articulation of Stimmung as a driving force behind the aesthetic process. 
It has also become clear that the five forms in which Stimmung manifests itself 
within the medium of literature – which I initially outlined – continually intersect 
and overlap: as modern fiction moves away from the paradigm of representation and 
                                                            
5 Deleuze, ‘On Four Poetic Formulas That Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy’, p. 30. 
6 Wolfgang Iser, ‘The Art of Failure: The Stifled Laugh in Beckett’s Theater’, in Samuel Beckett by 
Birkett and Ince, pp. 201-29 (p. 226). 
7 This concept is taken from a forthcoming article by John under the working title ‘“Get me out of this 
novel!”: Works of Paranoia, Revulsion and Despair’. 
8 Miller, Dostoevsky and The Idiot: Author, Narrator, and Reader, p. 223. 
9 Kuehn, ‘On Reading Thomas Bernhard’, p. 551. 
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towards an ‘aesthetic of antirepresentation’10 that foregrounds the experience of the 
reading process, aesthetic form and narrative structure orient themselves more 
openly towards the ways in which the reader is affected by the text, thus projecting 
modes of attunement depicted in fiction into the reader’s experience thereof. The 
texts also comment on the role of genre and aesthetic form as preconceived frames of 
affect and affectedness that create meaning as part and parcel of the aesthetic process 
and, by overstepping existing genre boundaries and carnevalising preconfigured 
genres, open up a structure in which these preconceptions become tangible and 
make way for novel forms of aesthetic encounters. 
At the same time, the texts negotiate forms of an epochal Grundstimmung that 
are emblematic of modernity and are simultaneously complicit in generating this 
overarching historical mood. By absorbing the materiality of lived experience – a 
notion that becomes particularly prominent in Dostoevsky’s depiction of Petersburg 
and Bernhard’s treatment of Vienna – the texts dialectically spawn modes of 
attunement shaped by the moods surrounding their creation that then, also, actively 
contribute to the creation and dissemination of a modern mood through art. As a 
result of these modes of engagement, we have observed an increasingly overt 
reflection on the nature of attunement and its aesthetic function. Stimmung thus 
becomes a discursive tool in modern fiction, which operates both at the level of 
textual communication and within the field of tension between art and reality where 
it forms a critical aspect of literary ontologies. 
By expelling the reader from her existential attunement, the works – 
particularly those by Beckett and Bernhard – also bring to light the oppressiveness of 
an imposed notion of harmony in the modern world, which politicises the dimension 
of Stimmung. Since modern literature departs from a position of fundamental 
dissonance, available concepts of harmony are shown to be intertwined with a 
universalising ethos that is connected to modern capitalism. Twelve-tone equal 
temperament, the homogenised acoustic system that is scrutinised in Watt in 
particular, was established as a universal standard to facilitate the mass production of 
instruments and repeatability of musical performances, establishing a universal 
standard that – as the reflections on attunement in Beckett and Bernhard 
                                                            
10 Begam, Samuel Beckett and the End of Modernity, p. 151. 
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demonstrate – is predicated upon the practice of tempering sound which, by 
definition, entails the covering up of a fundamental dissonance. 
 Likewise, the post-war totalisation of political harmony which Bernhard 
overtly rejected – both in his poetics and in his public performances – is interpreted 
as a means to cover up the discontents of modernity – in this specific case, Austria’s 
Nazi past – and the fundamental sense of discord and ‘out-of-jointness’ underlying it, 
which is most poignantly expressed in Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. This goes hand in hand with a politicisation of affect, through which 
otherness is fashioned as a mode of ‘out-of-tuneness’. The patients from Beckett’s 
asylums and his vagrant characters satirically depict the popular opposition between 
those that are attuned to the world and those that are dysfunctional as they are 
‘unattuned’. Modern civilisation’s impetus to answer to the discontents of the 
modern mood through a harmonising effort becomes the source of an imposition and 
oppressiveness – an aspect whose political dimension will need to be uncovered more 
thoroughly in subsequent work. 
Ultimately, what may be at stake in the way modern literature engages 
Stimmung is thus an ethics of mood and attunement that contradicts the idea of a 
‘pure aesthetics’ I have previously spoken of. As the structural openness of modern 
fiction implicates the reader in the aesthetic process, it also hands over the 
responsibility for the way she positions herself in relation to the text to the reader. 
Alexander Spektor points out this dimension in the textual hermeneutics of The Idiot:  
as the primary means of forging intersubjective relationships between the characters, 
discourse in The Idiot acquires an ambiguous moral status. By bringing this realization to his 
reader, Dostoevskii forces him to face the responsibility he must carry for his own dialogue 
with the text11. 
Iser – whose reader-response theory has been a crucial reference point for this study 
– saw the question of ethics as a fundamental element of his concept of readerly 
participation through its democratic empowerment of the reader12. In the same vein, 
Wayne C. Booth frames the relationships readers form with literary characters 
through the notion of ‘ethos’ [ἦθος], which in Ancient Greek referred to ‘character’ or 
                                                            
11 Alexander Spektor, ‘From Violence to Silence: Vicissitudes of Reading (in) The Idiot’, Slavic Review, 
Vol. 72, No. 3 (2013), 552-72 (p. 556). 
12 Cf. John Paul Riquelme, ‘Wolfgang Iser’s Aesthetic Politics: Reading as Fieldwork’, New Literary 
History, Vol. 31, No. 1, On the Writings of Wolfgang Iser (2000), 7-12 (p. 10); Paul B. Armstrong, ‘The 
Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser’s Aesthetic Theory’, New Literary History, Vol. 31, No. 1, 
On the Writings of Wolfgang Iser (2000), 211-23 (pp. 218f.). 
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a collection of customary habits13. To Booth, fictional characters are a form of 
company we keep, allowing for an ethically informed encounter with others that is 
mediated through literature. This notion is evocative of Beckett’s short story of the 
same name as well as Bernhard’s Alte Meister, which are both intimately concerned 
with the questions of companionship, presence and solitude in aesthetic reception. 
Literary Stimmung, then, becomes the locus of an ethical relationship and of the 
responsibility for forming such a relationship by attuning oneself to the text. Our 
Stimmung in relation to literature, to the world and to others is thus inherently an 
ethical phenomenon as it, first, predicates upon an instantiation of selfhood in 
relation to the world and, second, subsequently determines the ways in which we 
orient ourselves towards alterity. 
Many other stones have had to remain unturned: how the aesthetic process I 
have termed Stimmung is engendered by other authors of the modern age, and the 
ways in which it manifests in poetry and drama, are central questions that future 
research will, hopefully, address. Much of what has been said about Stimmung in 
narrative fiction is transferrable to the articulation of attunement in other art forms 
and other literary genres. Due to its affinity with musical structures, poetry in 
particular constitutes an important area of inquiry for future work. More specifically, 
the ‘mood poetry’ of Romanticism and modern renderings of poetic attunement and 
dissonance in Rainer Maria Rilke, T.S. Eliot, Paul Celan and others offer a rich 
corpus for the study of the role of Stimmung in the poetry of modernity. Moreover, the 
inflection of Stimmung that I have developed must be tested against its own historical 
and geographical limitations: what concept, or concepts, of Stimmung has recent 
history developed, and what modes of attunement exist outside the narrowly limited 
scope of European modernity? 
While the limited scope of this study has not allowed me to address these 
questions (though it has served the purpose of producing and revealing the 
questions), they constitute important research desiderata along the lines of an 
emergent form of phenomenological enquiry that prioritises the experiential and 
affective dimensions of human existence. As Michel Haar points out, Stimmung, by 
                                                            
13 Wayne C. Booth, The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction (Berkeley, CA, et al.: University of 
California Press, 1988), pp. 8f. 
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definition entails a reframing of experience through a reconsideration of fundamental 
categories such as interiority and intentionality: 
To ‘listen to’ Stimmung, it is necessary not only to eschew the definitions given by the rational 
faculty of understanding but to take one’s distance from the egocentric interiority of feeling and 
its intentionality. Our epoch is without doubt too thoroughly molded by the reign of subjectivity 
to open itself to such a phenomenon14. 
Haar’s verdict, originally written in 1987, that present-day notions of existence are 
still too firmly grounded in the concept of subjectivity, may finally have started to 
become invalid thirty years on. The resurgence of Stimmung as an aesthetic and 
philosophical category in the last fifteen years – as it has been manifest in studies by 
Gumbrecht, Fraiman and Felski, Thomas Pfau, Hagi Kenaan and Ilit Ferber15 and 
others16 – may indicate that the preconditions for reflecting on affect have changed 
in favour of this ‘alternative approach in which absorption in, and captivation with, 
the world ground the possibility of thinking and the constitution of meaning’17. From 
this experiential mode a new paradigm for conceptualising historical and aesthetic 
actualities through a fundamental sense of spatio-temporal situatedness emerges. 
Thomas Pfau summarises this alternative view, which I have called Stimmung, and its 
role in epochal cultures: 
When approached as a latent principle bestowing enigmatic coherence on all social and 
discursive practice at a given moment, ‘mood’ opens up a new type of historical 
understanding: no longer referential, thematic, or accumulatively contextual. Rather, in its 
rhetorical and formal-aesthetic sedimentation, mood speaks—if only circumstantially—to the 
deep-structural situatedness of individuals within history as something never actually 
intelligible to them in fully coherent, timely, and definite form18. 
The recent revival of the aesthetic and philosophical discourse on Stimmung, to which 
I have sought to make a contribution through this investigation, will beyond doubt 
                                                            
14 Haar, The Song of the Earth, p. 41. 
15 Cf. Thomas Pfau, Romantic Moods: Paranoia, Trauma, and Melancholy, 1790-1840 (Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), and Hagi Kenaan and Ilit Ferber, ‘Moods and Philosophy’, in 
Philosophy’s Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking, ed. by Kenaan and Ferber (Dordrecht et al.: 
Springer, 2011), pp. 3-10. 
16 Within the last decade, mood has recently also become an important new subject of enquiry in 
other disciplines. Cf. in sociology Jaap van Ginneken, Mood Contagion: Mass Psychology and Collective 
Behaviour Sociology in the Internet Age (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2013); in psychology, 
Teresa Brennan, The Transmission of Affect (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); in political 
science John L. Casti, Mood Matters: From Rising Skirt Lengths to the Collapse of World Powers (New York: 
Copernicus Books, 2010); in creative non-fiction Mary Cappello, Life Breaks In: A Mood Almanack 
(London and Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2016) and in the musicology Erik Wallrup, 
Being Musically Attuned: The Act of Listening to Music (Farnham and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015). 
17 Kenaan and Ferber, ‘Moods and Philosophy’, p. 5. 
18 Pfau, Romantic Moods, p. 7. 
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not fail to document how this pivotal concept develops further in the course of the 
twenty-first century. 
Meanwhile, we have come to see that what distinguishes the particular 
configuration of Stimmung reflected in modern fiction is the way in which dissonance 
and ‘out-of-tuneness’ become the originary – and also more productive – states of 
existence and of art. While in Heidegger ‘thrownness’ as the fundamental 
precondition of being structurally presupposes a form of existential dislocation, 
Bernhard’s description of the creative potential of irritation becomes emblematic of a 
mode of writing about modernity that stems from an underlying sense of discomfort 
with that very concept as well as with the modes of existence associated with it. 
Through this ‘emancipation of dissonance’, one that mirrors Schoenberg’s 
articulation of the same principle in the context of music19, an aesthetic 
Grundstimmung marked by anxiety, displacement and uncertainty emerges: it is this 
very mood that we call modernity. 
  
                                                            
19 Cf. Christopher Hailey, ‘Introduction’, in Constructive Dissonance: Arnold Schoenberg and the 
Transformations of Twentieth-Century Culture, ed. by Hailey and Juliane Brand (Berkeley, CA, et al.: 
University of California Press, 1997), pp. xi-xvi (p. xv). 
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